

SHIVAJI

The present book is a study of the life of Chhatrapati Shivaji, the legendary hero of the Marathas. His rise and role in the expansion of Maratha power is vividly depicted against the background of Mughal rule in India. The Book presents a picture of the State, where under the able leadership of Shivaji, justice, righteousness and tolerance prevailed in direct contrast to the fanaticism practised by Aurangzeb, the last of the Great Mughals.

Setumadhavarao S. Pagadi (b. 1910-1994) worked as an Indian Administrative Service officer between 1948 and 1959. A linguist and scholar of Urdu and Persian, he wrote forty three books in Marathi and English. Some of his well-known works are : *Life of Shivaji*, *Eighteenth Century Decan*, *Studies in Maratha History*, *Mughal-Maratha Relations*, *Tahamastana*, etc. His autobiography *Jivan Setu* is acclaimed as an outstanding contribution to Marathi literature.



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Setumadhavarao S. Pagadi

National Biography

SHIVAJI

Setumadhavarao S. Pagadi



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INTRODUCTION

SHIVAJI is one of the great national figures of India. A man of faith as well as action, this extraordinary statesman and general, created a nation, gave its people a cause to fight and die for and established a State permeated with a spirit of tolerance and justice; a truly secular and welfare State.

And yet, who could have believed that this son of a feudal lord of Bijapur—a feudatory kingdom of the Mughal Empire—would, in the course of his brief life span of fifty years, defy the Mughals and carve out an extensive State, the *Hindawi Swarajya*—a State of the sons of the soil.

As a soldier, warrior and general, Shivaji fashioned the army into a truly national one. Perfect discipline, rapid movements, excellent intelligence service, and continuous attention to defence marked his military organisation, and this enabled him to defeat his adversaries time and again. Nor did he neglect the defence of the sea coast. He is rightly called the father of the Indian navy.

He fought for the defence of his homeland. He fought against intolerance, injustice and racial arrogance. His example inspired the Rajputs, the Bundelas and others to follow him. In course of time, his movement assumed the form of an all-India struggle: a struggle which was to change the political map of India. Dauntless in face of defeat, and generous in victory, this man of deep religious convictions, cherished the honour of women and championed and practised tolerance to all faiths. Shivaji's personality and message are as relevant today as they were in the past.

SETUMADHAVARAO S. PAGADI

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THE EARLY YEARS

IT WAS THE month of February. The year was 1630. The Mughal Empire, steadily expanding under the leadership of Emperor Akbar, had entered the Deccan and taken possession of Khandesh, Vidarbha and the city of Ahmadnagar, the latter being the capital of the Nizam Shahi kingdom.

After Akbar's death in 1605, the Mughals, under the ease-loving Jehangir and due to rampant infighting and corruption among generals and officers, could hardly make any headway against the military genius of Malik Ambar, the Abyssinian minister of the Ahmadnagar rulers. Making full use of the Maratha light cavalry and infantry, and employing guerilla tactics, Malik Ambar held the Mughals at bay for nearly a quarter of a century.

With Malik Ambar's death in May 1626, followed by accession of Prince Khurram Shah Jahan to the Mughal throne, the spell of inactivity from which the Mughals were suffering came to an end. The Maratha chief, Lakhuji Jadhavrao, a prominent nobleman of Berar who joined the Nizam Shahi kingdom against the Mughals in 1628, became a victim of court intrigues and was murdered along with his relatives, a year later. Disgusted at this dastardly act, his son-in-law, Shahji Bhonsle, a brilliant young leader who had distinguished himself under Malik Ambar in the battle of Bhatawadi (October 1624), withdrew his allegiance to the Nizam Shahi dynasty. He could not return to the service of Bijapur, which he had left in anger. His *jagir* in Poona was invaded by the troops of Bijapur. Shahji arrived at Shivneri, the fort near Junnar in the Ahmadnagar kingdom, to celebrate the marriage of his eldest son, Sambhaji, with the daughter of Vishwas Rao, the commandant of the Shivneri fort. Shahji then left his wife Jijabai, who was expecting his child, at Shivneri and

went out to organize his contingents, supervise the protection of his *jagir* and assess the prospects of joining the Mughals.

Shah Jahan was keen on putting an end to the Nizam Shahi dynasty of Ahmadnagar. Khan Jahan Lodi, the corrupt Mughal governor of the Deccan, had bartered away Mughal possessions for a bribe. Shah Jahan transferred him to Malwa and forced the Nizam Shah to return the *mahals*, the possessions of Balaghat. Summoned to Agra, Khan Jahan, fearing punishment, fled to the Deccan to join the Nizam Shah at Daulatabad in November 1629. On 24 April 1628, Shah Jahan had appointed Mahabat Khan as governor of the Deccan in place of Khan Jahan. Khan Zaman, Mahabat Khan's son, acted as his father's deputy in the Deccan till March 1629. Then he was replaced by a new governor, Iradat Khan, who later came to be known as Azam Khan.

Khan Jahan's defection to the Nizam Shah was a great blow to Mughal prestige. A determined Shah Jahan decided to march to the Deccan, to punish Khan Jahan and finish once and for all the Nizam Shahi kingdom.

The Deccan Sultans of Bijapur and Golconda apprehensively watched the new spurt in Mughal activities in the Deccan. Meanwhile, on 13 February 1630,¹ Shah Jahan arrived at Burhanpur in Khandesh.

Six days later, on 19 February 1630,² in the Nizam Shahi fort of Shivneri was born Shivaji, who was to pose the mightiest challenge to the Mughal Empire. Paramanand, a great scholar and close associate of Shivaji, has composed an epic, *Shiva Bharat*, under the instructions of Shivaji himself. The epic poem deals with incidents in the lives of the three generations of Bhosle, Maloji, Shahji and Shivaji. The birth date of Shivaji, as mentioned in this contemporary source, as also in the *Jedhe Shakavali* (chronicle of the Jedhe family) and in the horoscope found in Rajasthan, is given as 19 February 1630 (*Phalgun Vadya Tritiya, Saka 1551*.) The previously accepted date of 1627 as mentioned in the *Chitnis Chronicle*, a later work, is no longer given credence.

¹Lahori, Abdul Hamid, *Badshahnama*.

²Paramanand, *Shiva Bharat*, a Sanskrit epic poem.

Shortly after Shivaji's birth in the fort of Shivneri, the Bijapur forces attacked and destroyed the Poona *jagirs* of Shahji. Shahji was not present at Shivneri at the time, busy as he was mobilizing his resources. All his efforts could not save Poona from destruction. It remained a wilderness for eight long years. It was in November 1630, that Shahji decided to serve under the Mughals. The Mughal forces under Azam Khan, the governor of the Deccan, were winning battles and seizing the Nizam Shahi territories. Shahji actively participated in the Mughal campaigns. Shah Jahan awarded him a *mansab* and the Nizam Shahi possessions of Sangamner and Junnar. In March 1631, he was appointed the military commandant at Nasik. His friends and colleagues were given various posts in different parts of Nasik and Ahmadnagar districts of today.

But not for long. In 1632, under the plea that he had been deprived of some of his fiefs, Shahji broke away from the Mughals. He seized the southern part of the old Ahmadnagar kingdom running across Srigonda in the east and Chaul on the west coast. He called on Bijapur for moral and material support in his fight against the Mughal aggressors from the north. In the tradition of Malik Ambar, he set up a scion of the Nizam Shahi dynasty and himself assumed the role of a regent. He could not prevent the Mughals from capturing Daulatabad, the capital of the Nizam Shahs in June 1633. But from his strongholds in Nasik, Junnar and Konkan, Shahji kept up a relentless struggle against the Mughals. Bijapur watched with admiration the struggle which he was waging against the Mughals. To have the Mughals on the borders of Bijapur was no comforting thought for the latter.

But, Shah Jahan was determined to bring the troublesome Nizam Shahi kingdom to an end. By a bold policy of threatening Bijapur with fierce raids on the one hand, while offering the districts of Poona and Kalyan-Bhiwandi to the Nizam Shah, on the other, Shah Jahan succeeded in weaning the Adil Shah away from Shahji.

In 1636, the struggle ended. Shahji surrendered his possessions to the Mughals in Nasik, Junnar, Sangamner and Konkan to enter the service of Muhammad Adil Shah of

Bijapur. The Poona *jagirs* were restored to him. Shahji was then sent to the south to take part in campaigns. Bangalore fell to Bijapur in late 1637 or early 1638 and was assigned as a fief to Shahji. Shivaji was seven-years-old when Shahji's struggle with the Mughals ended. The close affinity of Shivaji with Bijapur and Golconda—the Deccan powers—in their fight against the Mughals, was a natural offshoot of his bitter impressions of the Mughal invasions of the Deccan.

Meanwhile, Shahji had decided to settle down in the fief of Bangalore. Shahji's wife, Jijabai, bore him six children but only two survived. The eldest, Sambhaji remained at Bangalore with his father. Shahji's second wife, Tukabai, and her son Vyankoji—later the founder of the principality of Tanjore—stayed at Bangalore.

Jijabai and her youngest son, Shivaji, stayed on with Shahji at Bangalore till Shivaji was twelve-years-old. It was then decided that Jijabai should move to Poona with Shivaji and manage the *jagirs* there. Various stories related to Shahji's estrangement with Jijabai must be dismissed as imaginary and baseless. It was primarily a simple, practical arrangement.

It was at the age of twelve that Shivaji arrived in Poona, sometime in 1641-42. He was accompanied by a small band of trusted officials of Shahji.

The *jagir* entrusted to Shivaji covered a major portion of the present district of Poona. Under the guidance of his mother Jijabai, a lady of remarkable character and determination to whom he was deeply attached, Shivaji grew up into a man of firm beliefs and devotion to his creed and culture. It was this pride in the great heritage of the country, a deep religious instinct, and a broad spirit of tolerance, which blossomed in him under the affectionate and watchful eye of his mother.

The *jagir*, though not big, was strategically located. The Sahyadri hill ranges, running from Khandesh in the north to the borders of Goa in the south, divide Konkan from the Ghats. These hills rise at some places to 1,218 metres above sea level and provide an excellent defence to the terrain. Small offshoots from these ranges, running west to east, provided enough land to a brave, hardy population—fiercely independent and assertive. Small rivers running through these villages enabled the peasantry to cultivate the lands between Junnar in

the north and Mahabaleshwar in the south. The valleys known as *Khores* were often named after the streams flowing through them. Since they were situated in the west (*mawalthi*—the direction where the sun sets), the land came to be collectively known as *mawals*, and these hardy people as Mawlas. Each valley boasted of a high hill crowned by a fort or fortress, providing good defence to the people.

The Marathas, divided into a number of classes, had since ancient times settled down as hereditary farmers and accountants of revenue. There were the Patils and the Kulkarnis at the village level and the Deshmukhs and the Deshpandes at the level of groups of villages. They served the Bahamani Sultans of the Deccan and the succession States for purposes of land administration. Their services and their emoluments in the shape of cash grants, rent-free lands and small fiefs were called *watans*. These *watandars* were not government servants as is normally understood. But for a stable cultivation and peaceful settlement of land, the *watandars*, some of whom developed into important fief-holders, were highly respected and their activities hardly interfered with.

They played a loyal role in a stable government, but in times of stress, their loyalty to the government dwindled though attachment to their *watans* remained strong. The *watandars* and the fief-holders had, however, strong vested interests and preferred status quo in the political set-up.

Increasing Role of Marathas

The Turko-Afghan dynasty of the Bahamanis succeeded in bringing practically the whole of the present day Maharashtra under its rule, except for the few pockets of the Gond rulers in the east, the Rajput rulers in Baglana, and Koli rulers in the west. The Marathas played the humble roles of *watandars* or garrison infantry and, in a few cases, of feudal captains.

The break-up of the Bahamanis and the distribution of the Deccan into small independent kingdoms in the early sixteenth century tilted the situation slightly in favour of the Marathas.

The Deccan States, each covering a small part of the Deccan, obviously lacked resources in wealth and manpower available to big units. They fought amongst themselves. They

would combine for brief periods against powers like Vijayanagar, but could make little headway against the Portuguese entrenched in Goa and north Konkan.

Since the time of the Bahamanis, there was continuous migration from Persia, the Arab and African coasts to the Deccan. The Turks, Persians, Arabs, and Africans (Siddis) soon constituted the aristocracy of the land. These immigrants were called Afaqis, that is, immigrants from beyond the horizon. Added to these were the Pathans from the north, who soon became a power to be reckoned with.

In the fifteenth century, very few Marathas became army chiefs of the Bahamanis. The Ghorpades of Mudhol, however, attained some distinction. The founder of the Nizam Shahi kingdom of Ahmadnagar was a Maratha Brahmin converted to Islam. Similar was the case with the Imad Shahi dynasty of Berar, with Fatehuua, the founder, being originally a Brahmin captured from the south. The founders of the dynasties of Bijapur, Golconda, and Bidar were all Turks.

The sixteenth century saw a change in the fortunes of the Marathas. In civil administration, some Marathas achieved distinction in Ahmadnagar. The Maratha infantry, called the *nayakwadis*, came to be employed in garrisoning forts.

But it was as light cavalry with a guerilla mode of warfare that the Marathas find a mention in the contemporary Persian chronicles. Syed Ahmad Tabatabai, who arrived from Iraq in 1580 and observed them at the siege of Naldurg, likened the Marathas to the Uzbeks of Central Asia.

In 1596, the Mughals conquered Berar. By 1601, Khandesh came under their direct administration. A number of prominent Maratha families, formerly in the service of Ahmadnagar, now received fiefs and *mansabs* under the Mughals. The Jadhavs of Berar, the family to which Jijabai belonged, and the Udarams of Mahur in Berar were the two leading Maratha families who found service under the Mughals. As more and more of Nizam Shahi territory came under Mughal occupation, the number of Maratha *mansabdars* under the Mughals began to increase.

Malik Ambar, who resisted the Mughals tenaciously, appointed many Marathas in prominent posts. Shivaji's grandfather Maloji and father Shahji achieved name and fame

under him.

Bijapur too had a number of prominent Maratha families whom it employed. The Ghorpades of Mudhol, the Mores of Jawali, the Nimbalkars of Phaltan, the Ghatges of Kolhapur, the Shirkes of Konkan are a few of these names.

This, however, does not mean that the natives of the Deccan, the Marathas in Bijapur or the Andhrites in Golconda had much of a say in formulating or executing policy decisions of the government. The state of affairs in Bijapur has been well described by Dr. Nayeem in the following words: "Bijapur was a theocratic, multi-racial, and dynastic State. It was predominantly an Afaqi State. The Afaqis constituted the upper strata of the nobility and dominated the administration both at the central and provincial levels."¹

Conditions in Golconda were no different to those obtaining in Bijapur. There too, it was mostly the rule of the Afaqis, the foreign intruder.

In 1635, Shah Jahan effectively finished the kingdom of Ahmadnagar and Golconda became completely feudatory to the Mughals.

As for Bijapur, in recognition of its role in the liquidation of the Ahmadnagar kingdom, Shah Jahan guaranteed the status of Bijapur as an important State. Its borders were promised security in return for a fixed tribute. A line running east from south of Junnar, and north of Parenda, and including the towns of Udgir, Ausa and Nander defined the Mughal borders with Bijapur. Perpetual peace was guaranteed to Bijapur. Any disputes between Bijapur and Golconda were to be referred to the arbitration of the Mughals.

With scope for expansion in the south and with peace assured in the north, the two Deccan States rapidly expanded their power in the south. The local rulers became tributary to these States. While Golconda extended along the coast up to Madras, Bijapur covered the present Karnataka to reach Tanjore and Madurai in Tamil Nadu. This expansion of Bijapur occurred during the reign of Muhammad Adil Shah (1627-1656).

¹Nayeem, M.A., *External Relations of the Bijapur Kingdom*, Bright Publishers, Hyderabad-500001, 1974, p.28.

Shivaji in his Jagir

Shivaji grew up amidst the hills and valleys of Poona district. The people he administered were sturdy and manly. There was hardly any political consciousness among them. Important landholders, farmers of revenue and petty chiefs found it safe and convenient to remain loyal to Bijapur.

Great events usually develop from small beginnings. To illustrate this, one has only to trace the origins of the American and French revolutions. Laying the foundations for a purely native, independent and welfare State, national in every sense of the word, with vast potentialities of expansion throughout the country, is the greatest achievement of Shivaji. He awakened national feeling, he imbibed confidence in an apathetic people. He fought against intolerance, arrogance and pride of his enemies and proved to them that no power can stand and flourish without the tacit support of the people.

But this was to come later. The beginnings reveal a young man moving step by step, defining his objectives, extremely shrewd, and charged with an admirable mixture of caution and daring adventure.

Shivaji's first experience with harsh realities occurred when he was barely fourteen-years-old. The *jagirs* or fiefs granted to officials and noblemen, in lieu of services did not include forts which were under the direct management of the central government. The sovereign encountered little difficulty in bringing an unruly nobleman to his heels. Similarly, if the sovereign were to turn hostile without cause, there were no means by which the *jagirdar* could protect his interests.

Such an instance occurred when due to some reason, Muhammad Adil Shah got annoyed with Shahji and ordered his troops to march into Shahji's Poona *jagirs* and destroy them. In the absence of defence strongholds like forts, the *jagirs* were easily overrun, causing a great deal of suffering. However, peace returned soon and Shahji was restored to royal favour. But the lesson was not lost on Shivaji.

The desire to possess forts and build new ones for the purpose of defence must have occurred to Shivaji around A.D. 1645, when he was barely fifteen-years-old. The Bijapur ruler, Muhammad Adil Shah, was taken ill in 1646. He

remained an invalid till his death ten years later, in 1656. His prolonged illness was to throw the affairs of Bijapur into increasing confusion.

At the same time, Dadoji Konddev, Shahji's manager of the Poona estates, died on 7 March 1647. While watching with admiration Shivaji maturing into an adventurous young captain, Dadoji cautioned Shivaji against adventurism. His death naturally removed the restraints imposed by an older and cautious generation.

Shivaji soon took possession of the fort of Morumbdev (later called Rajgad which remained his capital till 1670) and the fort of Torna. His biggest achievement was, however, the peaceful possession of Kondana, which came to be known as Simhagad in 1647.

The Bijapur court was naturally alarmed. The restoration of half-ruined forts was one thing. The seizure of a fort like Simhagad could not be ignored.

Adil Shah ordered his general, Fateh Khan Khudavand Khan, to march against Shivaji in the Kondana region. Maintaining his base at Purandar, Shivaji made preparations to meet this danger.

Meanwhile Shivaji heard the shocking news of his father's arrest on charges of intriguing with Golconda and the enemy garrison of Jinji fort. This was on 28 July 1648. Shahji's *jagirs* in Bangalore were invaded. They were defended tenaciously by Sambhaji, the elder brother of Shivaji.

The Bijapur forces included Maratha contingents led by the Ghatges and the Nimbalkars of Phaltan. It may be noted that Shivaji's wife, Saibai, was the sister of Bajaji Nimbalkar of Phaltan.

Poet Paramanand has, in his *Shiva Bharat*, given a graphic description of Shivaji's campaign against Fateh Khan and of how, after a fierce encounter, the Bijapur forces broke and fled, leaving their leader, Muse Khan, among the dead. From the poem we learn of Shivaji's early companions, like Kavji, Godaji, Bhimaji Wagh, Sambhaji Kate, Shivaji Ingle, Bhikaji Chore and his brother Bhairav. It was a wide strata from which Shivaji drew his forces. While Baji, son of Kanhoji Jedhe, distinguished himself in the battle, Shivaji suffered a great loss in the death of his staunch follower, Baji Pasalkar.

While Shivaji warded off the attack from Adil Shah's forces, the latter yet held Shahji in his captivity. To get him released from confinement was a tough task. Shivaji corresponded with Prince Murad, the Mughal governor of the Deccan, as proved from the latter's letter of 14 March 1649. But this need not necessarily mean that Mughal pressure brought about the release of Shahji from imprisonment. The release took place on 16 May 1649, and Shahji was duly restored to favour. Shivaji had to pay the price of relinquishing the fort of Kondana, that is Simhagad.

Mughal Diplomacy

Although the Mughals established peace with Bijapur, their ultimate aim of conquest of the Deccan kingdoms remained a permanent factor of their foreign policy. The seduction of Bijapur nobles and officials and getting them in Mughal service was their continuous effort. Extracts from the two letters sent by Prince Murad, one to Shivaji and the other to Shahji, throw ample light on Mughal diplomacy. Here is an excerpt from Prince Murad's letter to Shivaji, dated 14 August 1649: "Be glorified with our boundless princely favours and know that, as with extreme graciousness, the pen of forgiveness has been drawn through the offences of your father and the door of favour and pardon have been thrown open to his loyalty and devotion. Now is the time for you to come to my presence along with your father and clansmen for the purpose of saluting the Emperor's threshold, so that after attaining to that happiness you may be exalted among your peers by the grant of a *mansab* of five Hazari Zat with five thousand *sawar* (horse) rank and suitable rewards, and your father may have his former *mansab* in the Imperial service restored."

It may be recalled that in November 1630, Shahji with his son Sambhaji and other colleagues received *mansabs*, cash rewards and posts from Shah Jahan. The above letter was an invitation to them to return to Imperial service. These efforts of the Mughals, to weaken Bijapur through seductions of officers and nobles of the State, were to continue till the end of that kingdom.

With Shahji's release and return to his *jagirs*, there was no occasion for Shivaji to continue his correspondence with the Mughals. During the next five years, Shivaji exercised

effective control over his father's Poona *jagir*. Legally his position was that of an agent of his father. But Shahji, settled in Bangalore, was already remote from Poona. Although orders continued to be issued by Shahji as late as 1655, Shivaji was empowered to remove officials distasteful to him and send them to Bangalore. He secured the loyalty of the remaining officials and appointed fresh persons from among his followers to posts, where required.

By 1655, Shivaji was in full possession of Poona, Chakan, Baramati and Indapur. He also secured the forts of Torna, Rajgad, and Purandar; the last-mentioned by a clever ruse.

The northern borders of Shivaji's *jagirs* were the same as the southern borders of the Mughal Empire. Any question of advancing in that direction was unthinkable. His eastern borders were enclosed by well-administered and strongly guarded Bijapur districts of Satara, Sangli and Kolhapur, known as Balaghat, the uplands.

Konkan

Shivaji's eyes thus turned towards the coastal belt of Konkan, the northern part of which had been held by Shahji during his struggle with the Mughals from 1632-1636.

The Konkan coast running from near Surat consists of a region more than 483 km in length. Its breadth is not more than 80-95 km. In the east rise the towering hill ranges of the Sahyadri. The coastline is broken into innumerable creeks, rivers and streams. The creeks in many places reach the hill ranges. The rainfall is heavy and communications difficult. The coastline boasts of a number of ports, small and big, such as Bassein, Bombay, Chaul, Dabhol, Rajapur, Vengurla, besides the trading places like Sangameshwar, Mahad and Thana, situated on the creeks.

It was through the ports of Konkan that goods and immigrants arrived from beyond the country. The Persians, Arabs, Turks and Africans came in a stream to settle down in the Bahamani, Bijapur, Golconda and Ahmadnagar kingdoms. Goods of value and much prized horses were brought from overseas. The hill ranges of the Sahyadri were intersected by a number of difficult passes known as *Ghats* which led to the uplands.

It took the Bahamanis more than a century to pacify the region. Their main aim was to keep the communications between Konkan and the uplands clear and well protected. With the establishment of Bijapur and Ahmadnagar as successors to the Bahamanis the control of Konkan passed to Ahmadnagar in the north and of central Konkan to Bijapur in the south. The Africans, called Abyssinians or Habshis or Siddis, had primarily settled down near Danda Rajpuri. They were a hardy race. They contributed well-known statesmen and warriors like Malik Ambar and Siddi Raihan to the Deccan States. They manned the coastal navy of Ahmadnagar and had their stronghold at Janjira. These Siddis of Janjira were to play a notable part in Konkan affairs till the middle of the eighteenth century.

It was in 1510, that the Portuguese conquered and occupied Goa. In 1534, they wrested north Konkan from the Sultans of Gujarat. From their headquarters in Thana, they controlled the coast from north of Bassein to Chaul in the south. Bijapur made constant efforts to dislodge them from Goa, but without success. A similar failure was the experience of Ahmadnagar in north Konkan. These two powers at last confessed themselves beaten and agreed to live in peace with their European neighbours.

The north Konkan area outside Portuguese occupation consisted of the Kalyan-Bhiwandi region and a major portion of the present Colaba district. This area was held by Ahmadnagar before that kingdom's dissolution. In the partition treaty of 1635 signed between the Mughals and Bijapur, this area along with the district of Poona was handed over to Bijapur by the Mughals. The Siddis of Janjira transferred their allegiance to Bijapur. While Shahji received the *jagir* of Poona from Adil Shah of Bijapur, the latter put Mulla Ahmad, a prominent official, in charge of the Kalyan-Bhiwandi region.

The rule of Bijapur in the Kalyan-Bhiwandi region of the Talkonkan—as the Mughals called Konkan, began only in A.D. 1636. It was neither firm nor strong. Ever since Muhammad Adil Shah's protracted illness in 1646 for ten long years, Mulla Ahmad spent more and more time in Bijapur, taking part in politics of the capital.

Shivaji's Poona *jagirs* lay between Bijapur and Kalyan-

Bhiwandi. The other pass leading from the uplands to Konkan was near Mahabaleshwar and there lay the powerful Maratha fiefdom of the Mores. Without their co-operation, Shivaji could not advance into central Konkan. Either their co-operation had to be secured or they had to be eliminated.

Evidently Shivaji was, steadily but cautiously, aiming at extending and consolidating his power. In the confused state of affairs, the nobles of Bijapur were not sitting idle either. The Siddi nobleman Rustum Zaman was active in Raibag, Hukkeri and Vengurla, the Pathan nobleman Bahlol Khan in the Dharwar-Belgaum region, and nobleman Siddi Jauhar in the Karnool territory; all were engaged in similar activities. The pattern was the same: extend your jurisdiction at the expense of your neighbours, take possession of forts and hold them nominally in the name of the ruler, get the possessions confirmed and exercise a semi-independent status while playing for power in the capital.

That is how the Bahamanis disappeared and the Deccan kingdoms disintegrated. If Siddis and Pathans could do so, it was no wonder that Shivaji, a nobleman of three generations, should do so in the Maratha homeland! What irked his opponents most was that for the first time a Maratha was slowly but steadily strengthening his power in his homeland.

Shivaji won over a number of Maratha Deshmukhs and other local elements to his side. Those who appreciated his aims were brought to his side through matrimonial alliances, while some of the reluctant ones were forced to submit. The powerful Mores of Jawali, who were strongly loyal to Adil Shah, looked askance at the activities of this young Maratha leader. The idea, that he was steadily aiming at creating a purely native power in place of the dynastic States dominated by foreign noblemen, was beyond them. They could not understand that the Deccan States were fast disintegrating under constant pressure from the mighty Mughals, and that if the Marathas had to come into their own in their homeland, they had to be organised under a daring leadership.

Persistent campaigns against the Mores, petty disputes between the Mores of Jawali (whose leader held the title of Chandrarao) on the borders of Shivaji's *jagirs* soon led to a confrontation among them. Chandrarao had secured the

chiefship through adoption with Shivaji's support. Other members of the family were in possession of various parts of the family fief. The Bijapur governor of Wai, Afzal Khan, tried to interfere in the family disputes of the Mores, but without success.

Shivaji now set his heart on punishing the Mores and conquering Jawali. This was in the year 1655.

Aurangzeb's Activities

Mughal diplomacy in the Deccan became very active with the arrival of Prince Aurangzeb as Viceroy of the Deccan in A.D. 1653. Shah Jahan's policy was to tolerate the existence of Bijapur and Golconda on the southern borders of the Mughal Empire as subordinate and protected States. He even allowed them to expand in the south. But not so, the new Viceroy, Prince Aurangzeb. The conquest of Golconda and Bijapur and establishment of direct Mughal administration were what he had set his heart upon. Seduction of officials from these States had been the policy of the Mughals. Very soon an opportunity presented itself to Aurangzeb.

Mir Jumla, the prime minister of Golconda, was a Persian adventurer. He played a notable part in the campaigns of Golconda in the south. Mir Jumla's military genius, his organisation of a powerful artillery, his administration of trade—inland and overseas, brought him a huge fortune and made him the most powerful person in the court of Golconda. Mir Jumla established himself at Golconda in Carnataca, a fertile province which he had conquered in his later campaigns.

Abdullah Qutb Shah of Golconda became suspicious of his powerful minister. Anxious to save himself and his *jagirs* in the Carnataca, Mir Jumla started looking for supporters. Aurangzeb seized this opportunity to win over Mir Jumla to his side.

Mir Jumla tried to woo Shahji away from the latter's allegiance to the court of Bijapur. Says J.N. Sarkar in his *Life of Mir Jumla*: "He (Mir Jumla) now endeavoured to win over the Maratha leader Shahji Bhonsla(e), who had a grievance against Adil Shah (Bijapur) by interceding on his behalf with Aurangzeb. The latter approved of Mir Jumla's assurances of favours to him as 'highly proper' and wanted to know

from him what Shahji's intentions were. . . Probably Mir Jumla began negotiating with Shahji, even when Muhammad Mumin was in the Carnataca and Aurangzeb had written to him approving of his conduct, 'to conciliate a person (Shahji) who in fear of his own master, expresses a desire to serve in this court, is necessary for you'."

A little known poem *Shiva Kavya* written by poet Sankarshan Sakalkale, who was the court-poet in the employ of Rao Karan, the Rajah of Bikaner, and his son Anup Singh, has been recently discovered.¹ It is a curious tale. The poet tells us how Rao Karan of Bikaner, holding an official post at Daulatabad under Aurangzeb, travelled in the guise of Sadhu Dharni Dhar Maharaj to Shivaji's camp at Shivapur. He was accompanied by his son Anup Singh. Rao Karan is said to have urged Shivaji to attack Jawali and destroy the Mores. Not that Shivaji needed any urging. His plans were already formed. But the poem clearly reveals the efforts of the Mughals to sow seeds of discord in the Deccan States and weaken them.

While Mir Jumla defected to the Mughals, Aurangzeb invaded Golconda on a flimsy pretext. It was a short struggle. Aurangzeb and Mir Jumla would have destroyed the kingdom. It was the intervention of Shah Jahan, who was jealous of Aurangzeb's growing power, which saved Golconda from total destruction. As it was, Aurangzeb inflicted a most humiliating treaty on Golconda before he withdrew his forces. Mir Jumla was appointed by Shah Jahan as the prime minister of the Mughal Empire. What was unheard of before, he was allowed to retain his Carnataca *jagirs* granted to him by the ruler of Golconda. Aurangzeb undertook to keep a watch over them on behalf of Mir Jumla who then proceeded to the Mughal court. These events took place in 1655-56.

Shivaji and the Mores

To Shivaji's message: "I am a King (Rajah). Sri Shambhu Mahadeva has given me sovereignty. You should not in future entitle yourself as Rajah," Chandrarao More had

¹Sakalkale, Sankarshan, *Shiva Kavya*, edited by R.C. Goswami, B.I.S.M. Quarterly, Issues 1 to 4, 1974, Poona.

replied defiantly, "You have become a King only yesterday. Who has bestowed upon you this sovereignty? If you have any courage in you, you should meet us today and not postpone the visit till tomorrow."

Shivaji's campaign against the Mores was sharp and swift. The Jedhe family chronicles, known as the *Jedhe Shakavali* and the *Jedhe Karina*, record the events briefly: "On January 27, 1656, Shivaji marched and captured Jawali. At that time the levies of Kanhoji Jedhe, the Bandals, the Silimkars, and other Deshmukhs of Mawals were with him."

In May 1656, Shivaji took Rairi. This strong fort, later under the name of Raigad, was to become the capital of Shivaji in A.D. 1670. Chandrarao had, after his flight from Jawali, taken refuge in this fort. He was persuaded to come down from the fort. The Mores lost a number of their people. Hanmantrao, one of their kinsmen, was killed. Chandrarao too might have been killed later through secret correspondence and connivance with Bijapur.

Poet Paramanand should be our reliable authority to the exclusion of the *Bakhars*, that is, the chronicles. According to him, Shivaji overthrew Bajirao, Krishnarao and their father Chandrarao in battle and captured Jawali. He also killed the relatives and adherents of Chandrarao. On this happening, Prataprao of the family of Chandrarao, fled to seek refuge with Adil Shah.

The More kinsmen fled from Jawali. Some joined the Mughals and continued to give trouble to Shivaji as for example during Jai Singh's campaign against the Maratha warrior-statesman.

It was a straight fight. It was marked, no doubt, by utmost severity, with Shivaji's aim being the elimination of the Mores from the Jawali region and its annexation to the struggling Maratha State.

But allegations of organised treachery and deliberate murder are baseless. The *Bakhars* should form no reliable guides in such matters to the exclusion of more authentic sources.

With the annexation of Jawali and the capture of the fort of Rairi (later Raigad), Shivaji made his incursion into the present Colaba district of central Konkan. The threat posed to the Siddis of Janjira, the admirals of Bijapur on the coast and

the Bijapur province of Kalyan-Bhiwandi in the north, now became a real one. To stop communications between Bijapur and Konkan and guard the passes leading to Konkan, Shivaji constructed the massive fort of Pratapgad, one of the many which he was to build, repair and renovate throughout his life.

The danger posed by Shivaji was real enough. But a greater danger to Bijapur came from the ambitious prince, Aurangzeb, who had been persuaded by Mir Jumla to leave Golconda alone and invade Bijapur. The causes for invasion which the Mughals invented were flimsy in the extreme. It was alleged that Ali, who had succeeded to the Bijapur throne on the death of his father Muhammad Adil Shah, was not the real son of Muhammad Adil Shah. It was also charged that Bijapur should have sought prior sanction of the Mughal power before announcing the accession of Ali. Both the charges were false. Bijapur did not have to secure prior sanction of the Mughals to settle the succession to the Bijapur throne. Even Shah Jahan realised the high-handedness behind these excuses. It was only under strong persuasion and with reluctance that he agreed to the invasion. The only condition which he laid down was that the conquest of Bijapur should be achieved in the shortest possible period. If this was not possible, the Nizam Shahi territory handed over to Bijapur in 1636, should be taken over.

Aurangzeb and Mir Jumla (who arrived in the Deccan on 18 January 1657) marched to Bidar and laid siege to it. The Mughals captured Bidar on 29 March 1657. The fort of Kalyani was to fall to them on 31 July 1657. Shivaji approached Aurangzeb for certain concessions. Ever ready to weaken Bijapur, Aurangzeb wrote to Shivaji on 22 April 1657, as follows: "In fact all the forts and *mahals* pertaining to Bijapur, that are in your possession have been confirmed to you as before. I also leave to you the revenue of the fort of Dabhol and its dependencies, as desired by you... Your remaining prayers will be granted and you will be comprehended in my favour and grace more than you can imagine."

The Mughal successes alarmed Shivaji. He was also worried about the security of his Poona and Chakan possessions. Were these territories, once a part of the Nizam Shahi

kingdom, to pass under the control of the Mughals? Now, as a nobleman and fief-holder of Bijapur, he created a diversion against the Mughals. He marched against Junnar in 1657 and plundered the town. He carried out raids in the Mughal district of Ahmadnagar.

Aurangzeb was wild with anger. This was to be the reply to his efforts of seducing Shivaji to his side? Aurangzeb's instructions to his officials reveal his bitterness. He wrote: "Invade Shivaji's territory, lay waste the villages, slay people without pity and plunder them to the extreme. Shivaji's possessions, Poona and Chakan, must be utterly ruined and not the least remissness shown in slaying and enslaving the people."

Bijapur put up a tough defence. Mughal progress after the fall of Kalyani was slow. The injustice of the Mughals in invading Bijapur was apparent to everyone. The party hostile to Aurangzeb in the Mughal court won the day. Shah Jahan ordered Aurangzeb to stop the war and conclude peace with Bijapur.

Treaty of August 1657

It consisted of the following terms: Bijapur was to surrender Bidar, Kalyani, Parenda and the dependencies under them, the Pargana of Wangi, all the forts in the Nizam Shahi Konkan, together with an indemnity of one crore rupees.

The terms were not fully implemented. Bidar and Kalyani were held by the Mughals. Bijapur officials hindered the handing over of Parenda to the Mughals. Shivaji was entrenched in the district of Poona. The Kalyan-Bhiwandi region was yet to be taken over by the Mughals.

The disquieting news of Shah Jahan's grave illness, in September 1657, forced Aurangzeb to start making plans to march to the north to force the succession issue. Mughal affairs in the Deccan were in a state of confusion.

Seizing this great opportunity, on 24 October 1657, Shivaji swooped down upon Kalyan and Bhiwandi and occupied them. In January 1658, he captured the fort of Mahuli. He thus came in possession of the old Nizam Shahi Konkan, from the coast to the hills.

Shivaji did not stop corresponding with the Mughals. He was aware that under the Mughal-Bijapur treaty of August 1657, the districts of Poona and Kalyan-Bhiwandi had been annexed to the Mughal Empire. As a subject of the Mughal Empire, Shivaji had now to define his relations with the Mughals. His desire was, it appears, to be left in possession of his *jagirs* in Poona. As a bargain he claimed the Nizam Shahi territory of Kalyan-Bhiwandi which he had seized. Had this region and his Poona *jagirs* been conferred upon him and left undisturbed in his possession, he would have co-operated fully with the Mughals. Sankarshan tells us in his poem *Shiva Kavya* that Shivaji purposely confined his activities to Konkan and avoided incursions into the Mughal districts.

Aurangzeb felt deeply mortified. But in his hurry to go to the north, he could hardly do anything to occupy the Konkan region. He patched up a conciliatory agreement with Bijapur and blamed Mir Jumla for instigating the war. As for the territorial concessions, the following words of Aurangzeb make the position clear: "The fort of Parenda and its dependent territory, Konkan and the *mahal* of Wangi which have been annexed to the Empire, together with that portion of the Carnataca which had been granted to the late Adil Shah, except the forts and the *mahals*, which after the transfer of Mir Jumla, had been incorporated with the Khalsa Sarkar, should be left to him as before."¹

Aurangzeb wrote this to Ali Adil Shah about Shivaji: "Protect this country. Expel Shivaji who has sneaked into the possession of some forts of the land. If you wish to entertain his services, give him *jagirs* in the Carnataca far from the Imperial dominions so that he may not disturb them."

And this is what Aurangzeb wrote to Shivaji on 24 February 1658, when the former left Aurangabad for the north: "You have written, 'If I am given the glad news of being granted all the *mahals* appertaining to my ancestral estates (*watan*) along with the forts and country of Konkan after the imperialists have annexed the old Nizam Shahi

¹Sarkar, J.N., *The Life of Mir Jumla*, p. 131.

territory which now belongs to Adil Khan and after I have received a princely rescript granting my demands . . . I shall depute one of my generals to Your Highness's camp and I shall myself join the Imperial officers in protecting the boundaries of the Imperial dominions in the Deccan and prevent disturbances from any source taking place there.' My reply is 'Send Sonaji to me with a letter stating your demands so that these may be granted . . . In no case deviate from the royal road of true obedience and loyalty'."

Aurangzeb was only delaying matters. Meanwhile, Shivaji was consolidating his gains in the Konkan region. Siddi Fateh Khan of Janjira, now in Bijapur service, was the next to face the might of Shivaji. In the next two years Shivaji deprived the Siddis of many of their strongholds on the mainland. However he could not effectively blockade the sea-fortress of Janjira. Obviously the Portuguese were alarmed at the rise of Shivaji and were assisting the Siddis. This is evident from a Portuguese letter dated 6 August 1659, referring to Shivaji as follows: "A son of Shahji, rebel against Adil Shah, has captured the areas near Vasai (Bassein) and Chaul. He has grown strong. He has constructed some fighting vessels in the Bhiwandi, Kalyan and Panvel ports of the Bassein region. We are therefore forced to remain alert. We have ordered the Portuguese captain not to allow these vessels to come out of the ports and see that they do not move out on the seas."¹

Kalyan, now under Shivaji, began to hum with navy-building activities. The work of building twenty fighting vessels started under trained hands. According to Shivaji, ostensibly the navy was to be used against the Siddis of Janjira, but in reality his aims went far beyond. As the Konkan coast came increasingly under his possession, Shivaji started building a number of coastal fortresses such as Padmadurg, Vijaydurg, Suvarnadurg, Sindhudurg and others to afford protection to his coastal navy and to watch and curb the activities of the Portuguese.

The Mughals were a land-based power. They neglected building up a navy. Even their pilgrim ships and merchant

vessels depended for their safety and security on the guarantees provided by the Europeans on the coast. There was no protection against the pirates who played havoc with sea communications. It was much later that the Siddis of Janjira joined the Mughals to launch a small navy into operation.

Under such circumstances Shivaji's stress on naval activities reveals his far-sightedness. He can well be acclaimed as the father of the Indian navy.

¹Pissurlencar, *Portuguese Marathe Sambandh*, p. 41.

2

SHIVAJI AND AFZAL KHAN

WITH AURANGZEB involved in the succession struggle, and his young son Muazzam holding charge of the Deccan, Bijapur got a respite from Mughal attentions. Bijapur should have realised that it was a temporary respite. Aurangzeb's conciliatory gesture should have been understood for what it was in reality. The Mughal aim to annex Bijapur remained clear and undisguised. Secure on its northern border, Bijapur now turned its attention to Shivaji.

It was a purely political struggle with Bijapur trying to destroy Shivaji and the latter fighting for his survival. Contemporary biographers of Shivaji, poets of Shivaji's period and chroniclers of the regime have, by and large, dwelt on the communal aspect of the issue. Born and brought up in the tradition of the Indian epics and the *Puranas*, they could only see the struggle in the context of the *Puranas* with all its stories of incarnations and conflicts between forces of good and evil. They were not aware of the political, social and economic factors involved therein. The feudal set-up in Bijapur, the inter-factional fighting of the Pathans, Siddis, Deccani Muslims, the ceaseless drain of brain and brawn from Bijapur to the Mughals, was ignored by them. They were also unaware of the nature of the Mughal State, its basis, its set-up, its aims and its heavily foreign-recruited agencies, military and civil.

The chronicles of the Mughals and of the Bijapur court were no different. Depicting the opponents as Satans and infidels, and every war as a holy war against the infidels was the normal pattern which runs through these chronicles. As such, a historian has to be more critical in the assessment of forces involved in the struggle than the chroniclers.

To some scholars it would appear that Bijapur's campaign

against Shivaji was singularly ill-advised. Shivaji was aiming at strengthening himself in Konkan. This probably referred to south Konkan, the Adil Shahi territory, as the future of the Kalyan-Bhiwandi region and the district of Poona formerly annexed to the Mughal Empire was uncertain. The enemies of Bijapur were the Mughals and not Shivaji. Shivaji had not disowned the sovereignty of Bijapur. If he wanted to hold the Konkan region in his direct possession, with a fixed and annual sum to be handed to Bijapur, he was not acting different from what other nobles of Bijapur were doing. The Pathans in the Dharwar-Belgaum region, the Siddis in Karnool on the one hand, and Raibag, south Konkan and Karwar, on the other, were acting similarly.

The Dutch have remarked on the working of this process in the following words: "The King favours a Leenberen (Lord) by means of *farmans* with large territories. His office is not a hereditary one, but a mere favour on the part of the King. Some Leenberens practically conduct themselves as if they were independent. None the least, among this latter sort, Lord Bahlol Khan being but a subject in name of the Bijapur Crown."

Aurangzeb was keen to get Shivaji away from the districts annexed to the Empire. In his letter to Adil Shah he called upon the latter to expel Shivaji from the region. This has been referred to in the previous chapter. Bijapur decided to accept the instructions of the Mughals.

Bijapur could have adopted a strictly neutral attitude in the affairs of the Mughals and Shivaji. After all, what the Mughals did or did not do to Shivaji in the annexed region, was solely their affair and not that of Bijapur. Realising the ultimate menace posed by the Mughals, Bijapur could have come to an understanding with Shivaji by ensuring his interests in south Konkan on similar lines as it was doing with its other nobles. This would have strengthened Bijapur's bargaining position *vis-à-vis* the Mughals. Instead, Bijapur undertook to accomplish what the Mughals wanted it to do. It was not really Bijapur which fought against Shivaji. The Mughals, busy in the north, were fighting Shivaji by proxy.

Having decided on a campaign against Shivaji, Bijapur found a number of justifications for doing so. But their

main aims were two: one was to destroy Shivaji and the other to see that the Mughal annexations were smooth and undisturbed. The instructions given to the Bijapur general, Afzal Khan, admitted of no other interpretation.

Writes Nurullah, a nobleman at the court of Adil Shah and the author of *Tarikhe Ali*:¹ "At the time of giving *conge* to Afzal Khan, Adil Shah had instructed him, that in case Shivaji, being hard-pressed by the Bijapur forces, in his habitual deceptive manner offered to make a peaceful submission, the Khan must not listen to him but follow no other policy than that of flinging the fire of death on the harvest of his life."

Equally interesting are the earlier observations of Nurullah which throw light on the pattern and standard of chronicle-writing of the period. He says: "Ali Adil Shah, on seeing that the prevalence of the Mohammedan religion was not possible unless the bramble of infidelity was burnt up in the fire of the enemy-consuming sword, appointed Afzal Khan with ten thousand horsemen to chastise and extirpate that wicked man Shivaji."

Afzal Khan was appointed governor of the province of Wai. Witness the tone of Adil Shah's *farman* sent to the Maratha chief, Kanhoji Jedhe, on 16 June 1659: "Shivaji, out of narrow-mindedness and evil propensities, has started troubling the Mohammedans residing in the province of Konkarn belonging to the Nizam Shahis. He has also plundered them. He has also captured many forts in the Padshahi province. Therefore, in order to drive him out and conquer him, we have appointed Afzal Khan."

Afzal Khan marched out from Bijapur in April 1659. There were a number of Maratha chiefs in his army. The allegation, that he pulled down the temples of Tuljapur and Pandharpur in this campaign, is not supported by any evidence. Tuljapur was not on his route. What must have happened, as it generally happened, is that he might have asked for funds from the temples for his campaigns and must have threatened them with destruction if not paid. In such cases of danger it was the custom to hide the images out of

the reach of evil-minded persons. That such things happened in Pandharpur in this campaign is borne out by contemporary documents. The injury to Tuljapur must have occurred at the hands of Afzal Khan in some earlier campaign. It is widely believed that the image of Bhawani at Tuljapur was removed to the west by her devotees. It might be the same as the one at Pratapgad.

With Shivaji having arrived at Wai, Afzal Khan sent out his contingents to reoccupy the district of Poona which was in Shivaji's domain. He then started planning his campaign against Shivaji.

Shivaji fully understood the nature of this threat to his very survival. In the midst of this crisis, Shivaji's ailing wife Saibai, mother of his son and heir Sambhaji, passed away in September 1659. Her death was a great shock to him. He bore this grief with great fortitude. Earlier, on 11 July 1659, after leaving his capital Rajgad near Poona, he made Pratapgad in the Mahabaleshwar hills, a few kilometres from Wai, his stronghold.

Ultimatum from Afzal Khan

Two letters, one from Afzal Khan to Shivaji and the other a reply from Shivaji to Afzal Khan, seem to have been literally translated into Sanskrit and thus unconsciously preserved for posterity in the Sanskrit poem, *Shiva Bharat* of Kavindra Paramanand. Following is the ultimatum which Afzal Khan sent to Shivaji:

"(1) The territory, which after the disappearance of the Nizam Shah had been taken by Adil Shah, and which had been given by him to the Mughals in the interest of peace, that territory full of hill-forts, has been taken and appropriated by you.

(2) The Lord of Rajpuri (the Siddis of Janjira) who was more than once besieged and deprived of his territory by you, is angry with you.

(3) You invaded and after fighting, forcibly seized this wide kingdom of Chandrarao altogether inaccessible to the enemy.

(4) You took Kalyan and Bhiwandi too and, so they say

¹Sarkar, J.N., *Shivaji*, Appendix to Chapter III, p. 73.

destroyed the mosques.

(5) You robbed the Mohammedans of their all and insulted them. They are full of fury against you.

(6) Not considering your own strength you have placed under restraint the holy men of Islam and obstructed the practice of the religion of Moslems.

(7) As you freely assume emblems of sovereignty, sit unjustly on a golden throne, award favours and punishments to men on your own authority, and waywardly refuse to render obeisance to those to whom it is due, and move freely as you like, fear nobody, therefore I have been sent by the great Adil Shah.

(8) The army which is accompanying me is pressing me to fight. Muse Khan and other officers of mine, desiring to fight, as also the chiefs desiring to capture Jawali are pressing me to march against you.

(9) Now, O Chief, obey my orders, make peace, and give up all forts and territory.

(10) Simhagad and Lohagad, great and strong forts, so also the fort of Purandar, and city of Chakan, also the territory between the Nira and the Bhima, surrender these to the Emperor of Delhi of immeasurable power.

(11) And Ali (Adil) Shah asks of you (the State of) this Jawali which you seized forcibly from Chandrarao."

The supposed destruction of mosques is sheer propaganda as will be apparent from *Dr. Fryer's Diary*, Volume I, page 309. Dr. Fryer, who visited Kalyan a few years later, has carefully noted the condition of the religious buildings.

It will be seen that though Bijapur was campaigning against Shivaji, it was the Mughals who were waging the war, involved as they were in the north, by proxy. Bijapur was obviously carrying out the wishes of Aurangzeb in this affair.

Shivaji was in a desperate position. To surrender would have meant political suicide. It was only his supreme self-confidence, his conviction that he was fighting for a just cause, and that Providence was with him which enabled him to come out of the crisis with success.

Shivaji had the unique capacity for inspiring confidence and loyalty among his followers. Names of many of his

great and life-long colleagues appear in this campaign. Moropant Pingle—the Peshwa, Netaji Palkar—commander of the cavalry, and a number of captains were with him. Shivaji had called up his infantry from Konkan. Cavalry operations were entrusted to Netaji Palkar. In the hills round Pratapgad, strong Maratha contingents were posted.

Shivaji's aim was to lure Afzal Khan to the stronghold of Jawali. The letter which he wrote to Afzal Khan is a masterpiece of diplomacy. It plays on the fancies of Afzal Khan as much as on Shivaji's own fear and anxieties. Here is the letter:

"1. That you, who annihilated all the princes of the Carnataca in war, should show even this much grace to me is a great deal.

2. Incomparable is the strength of your arms. Your valour is like fire. You are an ornament to the earth. There is no guile in you.

3. If you would see the splendours of these woods, come and have a view of this Jawali.

4. It is best, I think, that you come here now. That will free me from all fear, and will promote my advancement.

5. I have nothing but contempt for the army of the haughty Mughals, also for that of Adil Shah, excepting you of terrible power.

6. Come along and be comfortable in the journey. I shall give up the forts, and as you ask for it, this Jawali also.

7. Looking on you, who are terrible to look at, without fear, I shall place my sword in front of you.

8. Seeing this ancient and vast forest, your army will experience all the pleasures of the world in its depth."

The letter, very carefully worded and full of double-meaning, had the desired effect on Afzal Khan. After an exchange of emissaries, and against the advice of his colleagues, Afzal Khan took the fatal step of going to Jawali. He left his artillery and the main camp at Wai but moved with a respectable force towards Jawali.

It was decided that Shivaji and Afzal Khan were to meet

in a pavilion outside the fort of Pratapgad. They could have ten bodyguards with them, who would be placed at a bow-shot from the place of the interview. While Shivaji and Afzal Khan were to be in the pavilion with their arms, they would be attended by not more than two or three servants. This would include Krishnaji, the emissary of Afzal Khan and Pantaji, the emissary of Shivaji.

Among the bodyguards of Shivaji, poet Paramanand has mentioned in his poem names of Sambhaji Kavji, Katoji Ingle, Siddi Ibrahim and others. Afzal Khan's bodyguards included Rahim Khan, Pahilwan Khan, Shankraji Mohite, and others. This emphasizes the political nature of the struggle. It was not a communal one, as Maratha and Persian chronicles written by opposing parties suggest.

It was a severe crisis in Shivaji's life. The strain on him must have been almost unbearable. Shivaji was a man of great spiritual strength. staunchly devoted to his religion, his traditions, and always seeking his mother Jijabai's blessings, Shivaji had the abiding conviction that in his struggle for his people, he was being guided by divine Providence. The stories current that the Goddess Bhawani appeared before him to bless him must be the outcome of Shivaji's image as presented in the public mind—that of a man with deep spiritual instincts.

Shivaji met Afzal Khan on 10 November 1659. Both entered the pavilion fully armed and attended by their emissaries. Shivaji had a broadsword, a long dagger and possibly concealed *waghanakhs*, the Tiger Claws, although poet Paramanand does not mention the last weapon. Historians like Bhimsen Saxena have probably confused the curved dagger (*bichwa*) with Tiger Claws, although the two weapons are entirely different.

Afzal Khan had a sword and a dagger with him. To inspire confidence in Shivaji, he handed over his sword to his attendant. Paramanand does not speak of Shivaji's similar reciprocal gesture, but other chronicles say that Shivaji handed over his sword to his attendant. This seems to be correct.

According to Paramanand, when Afzal Khan met Shivaji, he called upon the latter to give up his proud and defiant attitude and offer a complete surrender. Afzal Khan also

declared, "With my own hand I shall take you to Bijapur, make you bend your head before the King, and by humble request to that powerful Lord, procure for you still greater splendour. Don't be bewildered. Put your hand in mine and give me an embrace."

With Shivaji in his grip, the temptation to kill the enemy must have proved too strong for Afzal Khan. Paramanand adds, "So saying he held his neck with the left hand and with the other, struck him in the side with a dagger. An expert wrestler, Shivaji quickly got his own neck released, and keeping his head cool and slightly contracting his body, avoided the dagger as it entered his side. Shivaji immediately thrust his dagger deep into Afzal Khan. Afzal Khan reeled under the blow and stumbling with uncertain steps, said to his followers, 'He has killed me. Kill him, the enemy, at once'."

Shivaji jumped from the platform. Meanwhile the attendant struck Shivaji a blow with the sword. According to Paramanand, Shivaji retaliated by killing both the attendant as well as Afzal. Shivaji chopped off their heads.

Paramanand's version differs from other Marathi chronicles. Shivaji did not have the sword with him at the time of the attack. He used the dagger and the Tiger Claws. He inflicted mortal injury upon Afzal Khan. Paramanand would have us believe that Shivaji struck the final blow with his sword and cut off Afzal Khan's head. This is not correct. It were the colleagues of Shivaji who ran after Afzal Khan and finished him. The bodyguards came rushing in. In the fight that ensued, Shivaji too was attacked. He defended himself stoutly. Soon all the bodyguards of Afzal Khan including his emissary were killed or wounded. Shivaji withdrew to the fort.

Understandably, Persian chronicles attribute treachery to Shivaji. Marathi chronicles do the opposite. A historian can only conclude that Shivaji had the presence of mind, while Afzal Khan paid the price for his rash over-confidence.

At a given signal from Shivaji, his troops fell upon the army of Afzal Khan. It was a surprise attack and Afzal Khan's army was destroyed. The plunder which fell into the hands of the Marathas was enormous. Sabhasad, who was with Shivaji at the end of the latter's reign and wrote Shivaji's

biography in A.D. 1696, 16 years after his death, speaks of the plunder as follows: "Sixty-five elephants, four thousand horses, twelve hundred camels, three lakh rupees worth jewelery, two thousand bales of garments, seven lakh rupees in cash. In addition, all cannons, guns and weapons of all kinds, and other equipment were captured."

The remnants of Afzal Khan's army fled to Bijapur. Bijapur had foolishly involved itself in what was really a Mughal-Maratha affair, and what a heavy penalty it had to pay for it!

It was a great boost to the morale of the Marathas. While one army of Shivaji overran the modern districts of Satara and Sangli to reach Panhala, the other descended into Konkan and spread to its southern extremity.¹ The Maratha State, small but compact, was turning into a reality.

¹About the role of the Portuguese in opposing Shivaji, Pissurlencar says in his *Portuguese Marathe Sambandhi*, p. 47: "In July 1659, Shivaji had despatched cavalry and infantry against the Siddis of Janjira. At this time the Portuguese captains of Chaul and Bassein supplied the Siddi with provisions and other assistance. On Shivaji's complaint, they started assisting secretly." Pissurlencar also states that in the prolonged Siddi-Shivaji war, the Portuguese assisted the Siddis.

SHIVAJI AND SHAISTA KHAN

SHIVAJI CAPTURED the strong fortress of Panhala, the pride of Bijapur, on 28 November 1659.

There was panic in the court of Bijapur. Adil Shah requested the Mughals to despatch an army to his assistance.¹ He himself assembled a force and sent it under the command of Rustum Zaman. The other chiefs, Fazal Khan, son of Afzal Khan, Malik Itibar, Fateh Khan, son of Aziz Khan, Sarjerao Ghatge and others were ordered to serve under him.

Shivaji's army consisted of the following captains who were already winning name and fame: Netaji Palkar, Bhimaji, Hiraji Wagh and others.

Shivaji himself led the attack against Rustum Zaman. The battle was fought near Panhala. The Bijapur forces broke and fled. The *Jedhe Shakavali* briefly states under the date (*Magh Shuddha 14, Saka 1581*) 16 January 1660: "Rustum Zaman and Fazal Khan had a fight with Shivaji near Kolhapur. Twelve elephants and two thousand horses were captured by Shivaji and the enemy fled."

The Marathas spread in Konkan. At Rajapur they had their first contact with the British when Revington enabled the governor of Rajapur to escape. This led to the detention of many British agents. The affair was soon settled satisfactorily. This Konkan expedition, extending up to Kudal in the south, was not however a permanent acquisition.

Above the Ghats, the Marathas carried raids as far as Athani (now in Belgaum district). Shivaji even advanced to lay siege to the fort of Miraz (near Kolhapur). The fort was stoutly defended by the garrison.

¹Paramanand, *Shiva Bharat*, Ch. 24, *Shloka* 24.

Siddi Jauhar Against Shivaji

Meanwhile, Bijapur made one more effort against Shivaji. A well-equipped force was placed under the command of the Bijapur noble, Siddi Jauhar (given the title of Salabat Khan). The Bijapur army consisted of 16,000-20,000 cavalry and 35,000-40,000 foot-soldiers. The army besieged Panhala. Shivaji's efforts to divert the enemy by sending his troops to the environs of Bijapur and plundering them did not succeed. Shivaji found himself in Panhala with the Bijapur army besieging the fort. This was in March 1660. The siege was to last for nearly six months.

Another diversionary attack led by Netaji Palkar for raising the blockade failed to achieve its purpose. The siege continued. In July 1659, Aurangzeb, who was now secure on the throne, appointed Shaista Khan as governor of the Deccan. In his letter to Shivaji on 14 July 1659, announcing his accession, Aurangzeb called upon Shivaji to "act according to his (Shaista Khan's) orders and never deviate from his instructions. Exert yourself so that the things you have promised may be carried out in the best manner and your prayers may be granted."

The *Alamgirnama*, official biography of Aurangzeb, drafts of which were seen by Aurangzeb himself, has this to say on the working of Aurangzeb's mind: "Becoming strong, Shivaji gave up all fear and consideration of the Bijapuris. He started overrunning and devastating the region of Konkan. On occasions, seizing the opportunity, he even overran some of the *mahals* belonging to the Emperor. When this news was received, the Emperor ordered the Amir-ul-umara (Shaista Khan), who was the *subedar* of the Deccan, to march with a strong army, strive to put down that wretch, capture his territory and forts and clear the region of all disturbances. In accordance with the orders, the Amir-ul-umara left Aurangabad on the fifth of *jamadilawal*. He appointed Mukhtar Khan, the *faujdar* of Nander, as governor of the city of Aurangabad. On the ninth of *jamadalakhar* (11 February 1660) he reached Ahmadnagar. He left Ahmadnagar on the twenty-fifth of February and marched towards the south."

Shaista Khan was already in touch with Bijapur. Muhammad Aman, the emissary at the court of Bijapur, was

removed. In his place was appointed Muhammad Sadiq, a trusted official of Shaista Khan. Shaista Khan was also in correspondence with Siddi Jauhar.¹ Moving south from Ahmadnagar, Shaista Khan met resistance from the Marathas on his way to Poona. Near Daund, Baramati, Supa, Shirwal and Saswad, stiff encounters took place. The Mughals pushed forward and Shaista Khan reached Poona on 9 May 1660.

The Mughals rapidly took possession of the Konkan region. Kalyan and Bhiwandi were occupied in May 1661. Salabat Khan Dakhni was appointed *faujdar* of the Talkonkan region, with many able officers to assist him in the administration of the area. The Poona region above the Ghats was already in possession of the Mughals.

There was no question of any agreement with Shivaji. The territory was to be occupied and directly administered by the Mughals. The Mughals had come to stay in the Poona and the Konkan regions which they had taken over from Bijapur and they meant to hold tight. Shaista Khan set up his residence in Poona and started administering the region.

While the plains were securely held by the Mughals, the forts were held as strongly by Shivaji. Mughal occupation could not be complete until the capture of the forts. Shaista Khan accordingly marched to Chakan, north of Poona, which was an important stronghold of Shivaji. It was not even a hill-fort. Even as a ground fort it was comparatively small. The entire Mughal force was assembled against it. Shaista Khan too was present in the siege.

And yet the Marathas held out for more than two-and-a-half months, thanks to their valiant leader Phirangoji Narsale. On the other side, a galaxy of Mughal officers were engaged in the siege led by Shaista Khan. It was only after the Mughals had suffered the loss of 268 men killed, 640 wounded, and the tower in the north-eastern corner blown up by a mine explosion, that the garrison offered to surrender on 15 August 1660. They were honourably treated and allowed to go away. The experience of such heavy losses in one siege must have

¹Bukhari, Y.K., *Unknown Historical Letters of Shaista Khan*, journal of the Madhya Pradesh Itihas Parishad, Vol. VII, 1969.

unnerved Shaista Khan. Wisely he desisted from further attacks on Shivaji's forts and retired to Poona.

Since March 1660, Shivaji had been invested in the fort of Panhala by Siddi Jauhar. It was a tight siege. Paramanand in his *Shiva Bharat* suggests that while the Mughal siege of Chakan was a matter of satisfaction to Adil Shah, the latter continued to press on the siege of Panhala. Evidently there was understanding and coordination between the Mughals and Bijapur.

Shivaji decided to leave Panhala and return to Rajgad. He could not fight the Mughals and Bijapur at one and the same time. He started negotiations with Siddi Jauhar to lure the latter into inaction. Taking advantage of the rainy season and dark nights, on 13 July 1660, Shivaji slipped out of Panhala and made straight for the fort of Vishalgad, 64 km away. He was accompanied by a small contingent of 600 men.

Siddi Jauhar learnt of Shivaji's escape. He immediately despatched a considerable force in pursuit of the enemy. The plateau leading to the Vishalgad fort is about 6-9 km in length and breadth. It is known as Gajapur Khind or Ghod Khind. It was on this plateau that Shivaji placed his sturdy men to bar his pursuit by the Bijapur forces, while he himself pushed on towards Vishalgad. The Marathas resisted the Bijapur forces valiantly. Their leader Baji Deshpande earned glory in the fight. He died fighting. It was he who stopped the Bijapur troops long enough to enable Shivaji to reach Vishalgad. Baji Deshpande's name is a household word in Maharashtra. The Khind plateau is now generally known as Pavan Khind or the Sacred Plateau.

The Konkan Maratha chiefs of Adil Shah tried to bar Shivaji's access to Vishalgad, but he easily brushed them aside. The Bijapur troops which had advanced near the fort had to return discomfited.

Soon after, Shivaji returned to Rajgad. He made overtures to the Mughals, but without success. Rajah Jai Singh, who later fought against Shivaji, felt that these overtures should not have been turned down. Shivaji's services should have been utilised in Mughal efforts against Bijapur. The following letter of Jai Singh to Aurangzeb, tells us of

Shivaji's approach to the Mughals:¹ "At the time he (Shivaji) had captured the fort of Parnala (Panhala), and both he and Adil Khan (of Bijapur) had opened negotiations with the servants of the court, if the exigencies of the State had permitted Shivaji to be brought forward, the affairs of Adil Khan would have been managed."

Thus spurned, Shivaji conciliated Ali Adil Khan by returning the fort of Panhala to him in September 1660. But Shivaji had his eye on central and southern Konkan in Adil Shahi territory. With Mughal pressure steadily increasing, Shivaji found himself in dire need of territory and finances to pursue the war.

Bijapur had agreed to hand over, among others, the fort of Parenda to the Mughals as specified in the August 1657 treaty. With Aurangzeb's involvement in the north, Bijapur postponed the handing over. Shaista Khan now seduced the Bijapur commandant of the fort and took over its possession on 20 November 1660. Adil Shah, no doubt, took a dim view of the Mughal capture of Parenda.

Descent in Konkan

Above the Ghats, the Mughals occupied the plains. Shivaji held the forts below the Ghats. The Mughals held a part of the Kalyan-Bhiwandi region. South of this region lay Shivaji's possessions (now in Colaba district) which included the fort of Raigad. The Mughals attempted to push Shivaji further south. One such expedition was led by Shaista Khan's officer, Kartalab Khan. At the end of 1660, Kartalab Khan, equipped with a considerable force, descended the Ghats near Lonavala. Shivaji allowed them to enter the thick forest. The forest was about nine km long. There is a village Umber in the area, hence the name of the pass—Umber Khind.

Poet Paramanand has given a graphic description of the battle of Umber Khind. The Marathas led by Shivaji ambushed the Mughals. The fight was a stiff one. Finding himself unable either to advance or retreat, Kartalab Khan begged

¹Sarkar, Jagadish Narain, *The Military Despatches of A Seventeenth Century Indian General*, p. 76, Scientific Book Agency, Calcutta, 1969.

for mercy. Shivaji took possession of the entire equipment of Kartalab Khan's forces and allowed him to depart.

The expedition ended unsuccessfully for the Mughals. The Maratha chronicle, *Jedhe Shakavali* says that the battle was fought in the beginning of February 1661. The Persian chronicles do not mention the battle. They must have considered it a minor incident in the Mughal campaigns.

Shivaji now divided his forces into two. One force led by Netaji Palkar was to engage the Mughals. The other force led by Shivaji himself marched south to the Konkan territory of Adil Shah.

Shivaji's advance was spectacular. Dabhol, Pali, Sangameshwar, Chiplun, Rajapur and other important towns fell into his hands and yielded considerable wealth, so necessary for continuing the war with the Mughals. The small Maratha fiefdoms of Pali and Shringarpur were wiped out and annexed by Shivaji. Shringarpur fell on 29 April 1661. He spent the summer of 1661 at Wardhangad in Konkan.

It was at Rajapur that British interference came under unfavourable notice of Shivaji. Foolishly, they had supplied ammunition to Siddi Jauhar in the siege of Panhala. For this, Henry Revington, Richard Taylor, Randolph Taylor and Philip Gyfford were arrested and thrown into prison first at Wasota (now in Satara district) and later in the fort of Songad (in Colaba district). They were released only in February 1663.

Soon after Shaista Khan's arrival in the Deccan, forces were despatched to invade the Konkan region below the Ghats. While the plains came under Mughal occupation, the towns of Kalyan-Bhiwandi kept up the struggle. They were captured in May 1661. The forts in the possession of the Marathas, such as Mahuli and Karnala could not be touched. The Mughals tried to advance south. They laid siege to Devri (Colaba district) in August 1661, but after a stiff fight, they had to withdraw.

Shivaji's effective occupation of a major portion of the Adil Shahi Konkan could not be ignored. Adil Shah was having second thoughts about the Mughals being so close to his borders. He had to reconcile himself to Shivaji's occupation of Konkan with as good grace as possible. A letter from

Pilaji Nilkanth, Shivaji's governor, dated 3 August 1661, refers to Shivaji's claim to Konkan being recognised. British letters from Rajapur to Surat, in February 1662, say: "For now it is certain that the King hath given Shivaji a Phirmaund (*farman*) for Rajapur, etc. places that he is possessed of, to enjoy the benefit thereof... This being still part of the King's dominions and Shivaji his subject."

By 1662, the Mughals were in effective occupation of the plain lands. Shivaji held the forts securely. The great forts of Purandar, Simhagad, Rajgad, Torna and Lohagad, so near to Shaista Khan's headquarters at Poona were held by Shivaji. Similarly, the forts of Raigad, Mahuli and Karnala were held in Konkan. With the Mughals in the plains and Shivaji in his forts, it was a stalemate. Shaista Khan was clearly not exerting himself sufficiently, much to the dissatisfaction of the Emperor. Even the arrival of Maharaja Jaswant Singh, in 1661, to assist Shaista Khan, hardly made any difference to the situation.

Without touching the Maratha forts, the Mughals indulged in fruitless raids. Here is one typical example from the news dated 26 January 1662: "News was received that the villages belonging to the wretched enemy were situated at the foot of Lohagad and other forts situated about forty miles away from Poona. The *subedar* sent Namdar Khan and other *mansabdars* on Thursday the eleventh in the direction of these villages. Namdar Khan reached these villages on the same day. He set on fire about seventy or eighty roadside villages. He destroyed grain and other material. He then halted at the foot of the fort of Tikona. The inhabitants of the villages had taken their cattle and goods to the hills. Namdar Khan halted at the place for the next day. He sent his colleagues in pursuit of the inhabitants. They went up the hills and captured about one thousand cattle and three hundred men and women. On the third day Namdar Khan left the place. He set fire to the villages situated between the forts of Tikona, Lohagad, Isapur and Tungi. He then returned."

Shivaji kept up a relentless fight with the Mughals. The precautions he took to protect his people from the Mughals are illustrated in the following letter, dated 23 October 1662:

"To Sarjerao Jedhe Deshmukh of Rohidkhore: News has been brought that raids of the Mughals are likely in your region. Immediately on receipt of this letter you issue warning to all the villages in the Tapa. Send all the *ryots* (people) to a strong place below the Ghats. Send them to places where the enemy will not harm them. Do not delay matters. Act immediately according to the letter. If you fail in your duty and the Mughals arrest people and take them away, all the blame will fall on you. Be visiting your villages night and day and send people to suitable places down the Ghats. Do not delay by even one hour in carrying out these measures. Be alert. There will be some people left who will be guarding their fields. Ask them to be at safe places in the hills. If they see the Mughals from a distance, they should run away from the route of the raid. Be alert."

The *English Records* tell us of the firm occupation of Konkan by Shivaji: "From Danda Rajpuri (Janjira in Colaba district) to Kharepatan in the south which he threatens and resolves in the next monsoon to command as far as Goa."

Evidence is not wanting that Bijapur was not very happy at the presence of such a large Mughal force on its borders as stated in the *English Records* of 30 March 1663. The Mughals, in pursuit of Shivaji's general, Netaji Palkar, came within a few kilometres of Bijapur. Adil Shah took fright and moved away to Bunkapur, while Rustum Zaman persuaded the Mughals to withdraw and thus enabled Netaji to move to safety. Evidently Bijapur must have been watching him keenly and with a great deal of sympathy the struggle which Shivaji was putting up against the Mughals.

Shaista Khan's failure to seize the Maratha forts within this territory was a great blunder. He relied, and relied wrongly on Mughal gold to induce defections from Shivaji's ranks, but no marked success attended to his efforts. By and large, the loyal Marathas right from the Peshwa Moropant down to the humble soldier continued to serve Shivaji whole-heartedly. There were defections, but they were few and far between.

Shaista Khan had excellent qualities as an administrator. He was kind, charitable, high-minded and devoted to the welfare of the people. Bhimsen Saxena, the contemporary author, whose father was at that time an accounts officer in the

Mughal artillery at Aurangabad, tells us in his autobiography *Tarikhe Dilkusha*: "Shaista Khan resided in Poona. He made attempts to establish peace in the region and rehabilitate it. Grain and other articles were extraordinarily cheap in the region and wheat was sold at more than two Shah Jahani maunds for a rupee. The soldiers and *ryots* lived in great contentment. If Shaista Khan's officers were so well-mannered, the noble qualities of Shaista Khan can well be imagined . . . At this time the engagement of Pari Begum with Kamgar Khan (Shaista Khan's sister's son), the son of Jafar Khan, took place in Poona in all splendour. After the marriage ceremonies Jafar Khan left Poona. Shaista Khan said to him, 'Troops have been assembled at Aurangabad by the Musharaf of the Artillery (Bhimsen's father). You inspect them and send them on to Poona . . .' Shaista Khan was in Poona. There he built a mansion for himself. Shaista Khan had absolutely no idea of Shivaji's intelligence, shrewdness and plans. He remained negligent. Although Shivaji had limited resources, yet he had kept up a fight with the Mughals. His attacks were more daring than what his resources would suggest. Through his spies, Shivaji had obtained every possible information about Shaista Khan's camp, the camp bazars and the roads and byroads."

Bhimsen narrates a conversation between Shaista Khan and his nephew and officer of the vanguard, Namdar Khan. Bhimsen must have heard it from authentic sources, as he later became acquainted with Namdar Khan and Jaswant Singh. The conversation recorded by Bhimsen is as follows: "Namdar Khan, son of the minister, Jafar Khan, was an officer in Shaista Khan's vanguard. He said to Shaista Khan, 'Certainly, Shivaji does not possess large forces to make our army reach the end of its tethers. Put a considerable force under me. I will capture Shivaji.'

"Shaista Khan replied, 'If I finish the campaign against Shivaji, the Emperor will have only the expedition of Qandahar on his hands. If you are willing to be in the expedition of Qandahar I have no objection to finish the campaign against Shivaji. This campaign can be finished in a short time. But if an expedition against Qandahar is not contemplated, the result would only be the retrenchment of this army.

Why should we take this responsibility? Is it not our aim to promote the well-being of our people? It is better to delay the campaign (against Shivaji) and hope for promotion. Our activities should be on these lines.’”

Any comment on the above would be superfluous.

Shivaji's position was none too happy. He had to get the Mughals out of the Poona region or come to terms with them and withdraw from the Poona forts to make south Konkan his base in future. He could not do that without a fight. The Mughals were encouraging sedition and defections among Shivaji's followers. There was evidence that a part of the Maratha garrison at Simhagad had come under the influence of the Mughals, thus causing postponement of Shivaji's march in Konkan to meet Namdar Khan's invasion.

A Daring Feat

The need of the hour was to perform some daring act which would throw the Mughals into confusion. And Shivaji made a daring raid into Shaista Khan's camp on the night of 5 April 1663. The raid was successful. Shaista Khan barely escaped with the loss of his fingers. His son Abul Fatah was killed. The number of the dead and wounded was more than 50. With but few losses among his followers, Shivaji left Shaista Khan's camp unscathed.

This daring feat created a profound impression throughout the country. The official Persian chronicle, *Alamgirnama*, refers to the night-attack and the Emperor's displeasure at Shaista Khan's failure to take precautions. Bhimsen Saxena's uncle, Shyamdas, was a personal clerk to Shaista Khan's paymaster Bakhshi and as such was present in Shaista Khan's camp at the time of the raid. Bhimsen's father was an official at Aurangabad. The other historian, Khwafi Khan, records the event as it was narrated to him by his father. Although it is doubtful if Khwafi Khan's father was in Poona at that time, Khwafi Khan's account agrees materially with Bhimsen's version. Among Marathi chronicles, the *Jedhe* chronicle and Sabhasad's biography deserve attention. The other sources are full of exaggerations. The European records are based on hearsay.

Bhimsen notes in his autobiography: "One day (5 April

1663), Shivaji accompanied by a band of two hundred veteran soldiers marched forty miles on foot. He arrived near the camp during the night. He passed by the bazar of Jaswant Singh's camp and approached the place where Shaista Khan's kitchen establishment was situated. Shivaji broke open the wall of the building of the Khan's seraglio. Two or three of his companions entered the building. Shivaji followed them. Ten others followed him. The maid informed Shaista Khan that some persons had entered the building by breaking the wall. The Khan thereupon left his bedroom and went out to the verandah. It was a dark night. It was not possible to know who had gained entry. The intruders attacked Shaista Khan. He sustained two injuries. Lights were burning in the adjacent drawing-room. Shaista Khan's son, Abul Fatah, was asleep there. Mistaking him for Shaista Khan, the party of assailants attacked and killed the young man. His head was cut off and carried away by them.

"At this time, Shaista Khan, much distracted, arrived in the courtyard of the drawing-room. He sent a few soldiers inside the building. There was some fighting. Shivaji withdrew in safety."

Bhimsen further observes: "Uptil now, no Rajah had fought against the Mughal generals in this manner, nor had shown such daring." This unconscious tribute to Shivaji's daring must surely be representative of the prevailing opinion in the country.

About the role of Jaswant Singh, the Maharajah of Jodhpur, in this affair. Bhimsen, who was later for a brief period in the service of Jaswant Singh, is understandably cautious. What he says is worth mentioning: "The public held that Shivaji's daring must have been due to the instigation (*targib*, persuasion) of Jaswant Singh. The reason according to the public was this: Shaista Khan was in the court of Shah Jahan and from that time he used to send reports of happenings in the court to Aurangzeb. The circumstances which brought about the accession of Aurangzeb were created by Shaista Khan. Jaswant Singh used to consider himself a well-wisher of Shah Jahan. That is why, and in accordance with his nature, he brought about the disgrace of Shaista Khan." Bhimsen sagely observes: "God alone knows what the truth is!"

Considering the relations of Jaswant Singh with Shivaji, instigation or collusion is ruled out. But Jaswant Singh must be blamed for criminal negligence with regard to the security of the camp.

Shaista Khan withdrew to Aurangabad. But the army remained in Poona under the command of Jaswant Singh. Flushed with success, Shivaji marched into south Konkan in the middle of April 1663. By the beginning of May he had captured Kudal. According to Dutch sources, in this campaign he had 4,000 cavalry and 10,000 infantry with him. The Bijapur officials at Phonda in south Konkan, in alliance with local chiefs, made efforts to dislodge Shivaji from Kudal and the surrounding region belonging to the chief, Sawant Wadi, but without success. By end of June, Shivaji was back in his capital Rajgad.

Shivaji's bold fight against the Mughals was beginning to impress his neighbours. The Portuguese began to feel it politic to be on good terms with Shivaji. The following letter, dated 5 May 1663, from the Viceroy of Goa to his governor of north Konkan, is significant: "I had a few days ago, a letter from Rajah Shivaji in which he promises me to maintain good relations with this State and those fortresses of the north, as long as I would warn the captains of them not to allow any foodstuffs or provender to go to the people of the Mughal Emperor. For this reason it occurred to me to order you to continue with the said Shivaji and his people the same relations which he promised to have with us, and it would be expedient to prevent with all dissimulation that any kind of provision should go to the camp of the Mughal, in order that for want of it he would leave this neighbourhood and thus Shivaji would have a chance of being able to accomplish his intention of injuring the enemy, who, as he is so powerful, would be better far away and not such a close neighbour."

Mughal Attack on Simhagad

In November 1663, the Mughals under Jaswant Singh made an attack on Simhagad. They had to withdraw in disgrace. Bhimsen writes: "Jaswant Singh laid siege to the fort of Kondana. The Mughals tried to storm the walls of the fort. In the attack a number of Mughals and Rajpust

lost their lives. Many lives were also lost as a result of the explosion of ammunition. It became impossible to conquer the fort. Despairing of success Maharaja Jaswant Singh and Rao Bhau Singh Hada raised the siege of Kondana (on 28 May 1664) and returned to Aurangabad."

The *Alamgirnama* sadly notes:¹ "Not a single fort could be captured. The campaign against Shivaji ran into difficulties and languished."

Shivaji's energy, determination and enthusiasm are well brought out in this celebrated letter addressed to the Mughal officials:² "Far-sighted men know that during the last three years, famous generals and experienced officials have been coming from the Emperor to this region. The Emperor had ordered them to capture my forts and territory. In their despatches to the Emperor they write that the territory and the forts would be captured soon. Even if imagination were a horse it would be impossible for it to move in these parts. It is extremely difficult for this region to be conquered. They do not know this. They are not ashamed of sending false reports to the Emperor. My country does not consist of places like Kalyani and Bidar, which are situated in plains and could be captured by assaults. It is full of hill ranges. There are sixty forts in this region. Some of them are situated on the sea coast. Afzal Khan came with a strong army, but he was rendered helpless and destroyed.

"After Afzal Khan's death, the Amir-ul-umara, Shaista Khan, marched into my land, full of high hills and deep gorges. For three years he exerted himself to the utmost. He wrote to the Emperor that he would conquer my territory in a short time. The end of such a false attitude was only to be expected. He was disgraced and had to go away.

"It is my duty to guard my homeland. To maintain your prestige, you send false reports to the Emperor. But I am blessed with divine favour. An invader of these lands, whoever he may be, has never succeeded."

¹Kazim, Mirza Muhammad, *Alamgirnama*.

²*Khutute Shivaji*, copy of the manuscript is in the State Archives, Bombay.

Sack of Surat

Shaista Khan was replaced in the viceroyalty of the Deccan by Prince Muazzam, the Emperor's son. Shaista Khan left for the court. It was while the change of charge was taking place that Shivaji followed up his successes by yet another daring achievement—the attack on and sack of the rich and bursting port of Surat.

Shivaji passed through Nardurg, Mahuli, Kohaj (Konkan), through the *zamindaris* of his neighbourhood and Ramnagar. The Mughal officials of the Kalyan-Bhiwandi region were extremely negligent. Later, to cover up his negligence, Lodi Khan, the Mughal governor of Kalyan, raided Portuguese positions. The Portuguese protested strongly, "As if this act would hide from the world what he did, with less care or with less zeal than he could have, allowing Shivaji to pass to Surat, for which the Portuguese could not be blamed."

Surat, on the Tapi river, a few metres inland from the sea, has a good ground fort. The city had practically no defences. On the approach of Shivaji's army the governor fled to the fort leaving the city to the Marathas. The British and the Dutch defended their factories.

Shivaji had a force nearly 10,000 strong. He wanted to deal with the city's richest merchants, but on getting no response, his troops entered the city and plundered it. The Mughal garrison kept up a fire from the fort, the only effect being that many fires were caused in the city reducing hundreds of houses to ashes.

From 6 to 9 January 1664, Shivaji plundered the city at leisure. The booty he carried away from the city in cash and kind must have been to the tune of about one crore rupees.

Stringent measures were taken by Shivaji to secure the booty from the city. Bernier, the French traveller, has this pleasant episode to record: "Shivaji, the holy Shivaji, respected the habitation of the Reverend Father Ambrose, the Capuccian missionary. 'The Frankish padres are good men,' he said, 'and shall not be molested.' He spared also the house of the deceased Dalal or Gentile broker, of the Dutch, as he was assured that he had been very charitable while alive."

Thevenot, another Frenchman, who was in Surat on

10 January 1666, two years after Shivaji's attack, speaks of Shivaji (from what he heard) as "short and tawny, with quick eyes that show a great deal of wit."

Escaliot, the Englishman, says, "His person is described by those who have seen him to be of mean stature, lower somewhat than I am erect and of an excellent proportion. Active in exercise, and whenever he speaks, seems to smile, a quick and piercing eye, and whiter than any of his people."

Shivaji left Surat on January 10. The Mughal forces arrived at Surat seven days later. It was only then that the governor emerged from the castle. "At his coming out of the castle the people derided him and flung dirt at him."¹ They must have been convinced that they had been badly let down by him.

Shivaji returned from Surat. It was at this time that he heard of his father's death in the south. For his generation, Shahji had played a distinguished role—that of a valiant fighter, who could set up a King on the Nizam Shahi throne and resist the Mughals bitterly. His struggle no doubt influenced Shivaji. He was convinced that the Mughals were not invincible. His success in creating a nation and establishing an independent State was the result solely of Shivaji's inspiration and efforts. Shahji had no part in the activities.

Aurangzeb was deeply mortified at Shivaji's sack of Surat. A new campaign against Shivaji, this time under a more competent general, had to be decided upon. Meanwhile, Aurangzeb called upon Bijapur to wage war against Shivaji. He offered to excuse and waive the tribute to the extent of 30,000 Hons (about 1,20,000 rupees). Shivaji too made a conciliatory gesture to Bijapur. But the pressure from the Mughals increased. The Bijapur general, Aziz Khan, descended into Konkan and occupied Kudal. Shivaji attacked and plundered the town of Vengurla, in the possession of Bijapur, in October 1664.

The Marathas then attacked Khawas Khan. After a bloody battle the Maratha forces were repulsed.

Meanwhile, Baji Ghorpade, the Maratha captain of Bijapur, rushed to Khawas Khan's assistance. Shivaji attacked

¹English Records on Shivaji.

Baji Ghorpade. It may be recalled that there was always a rivalry between Shahji and Baji Ghorpade. This chief of Mudhol was the instrument through whom Shahji's arrest became possible near Jinji in 1648. In the severe fight which followed Shivaji's attack, Baji died. He was carrying a considerable money with him to make payments to Khawas Khan's army. This treasure fell into the hands of Shivaji.

Unnerved by Baji Ghorpade's death, and in the face of strong Maratha pressure, Khawas Khan hurriedly withdrew from Konkan in November 1664. Shivaji immediately marched up to Kudal and brought the region under his control. The Desais, local chiefs, who had allied themselves with Bijapur fled for asylum to the Portuguese territories. Shivaji chased them up to the borders. At the same time he raided Bijapur. Shivaji thus re-established his rule again in south Konkan. It was to remain under the Marathas thereafter.

Shivaji's Navy

On 5 December 1664, Shivaji laid the foundation of the fort of Sindhudurg near Malvan on the sea coast. The forts of Gheria (Vijaydurg), Suvarnadurg, and other forts on the coast were also strengthened. They were meant to provide protection to Shivaji's navy and keep in check the Siddis of Janjira, the Portuguese and other powers.

Shivaji's navy was a modest but very useful wing of his defence forces. According to contemporary chronicles it consisted of 400-500 ships, big and small, known as "Gurab, Tarande, Galbat, Mubar, Sihad, Pagar, Machva, Tirkati and Pal. Like the infantry and cavalry, the navy formed an important and separate command of equal rank. To this navy were appointed Darya Sarang and Mainak Bhandari as officers, with seafaring and fighting men and Kolis and soldier-sailors to serve under them."

Shivaji's naval activities figure in a number of Portuguese, Dutch and British records. He had constant encounters with his constant rivals—the Siddis of Janjira.

In February 1665, Shivaji personally led the naval expedition to Basrur. The navy consisted of 50 frigates, three little ships and some small craft with 4,000 soldiers. He set sail from the Maland port (Ratnagiri district) and reached

Basrur probably on 13 February 1665. Basrur (Bareclore) on the Canara coast belonged to the principality of Bidnur. The town was plundered. The Dutch estimated the value of the plunder as three lakh Guilders which might be correct. The Marathi chronicles have placed the figure at two crore Hons (eight crore rupees); an incredible sum!

On his way back Shivaji stayed for some time at Gokarna Mahabaleshwar (a religious place of great importance) and Karwar. He hurried back to his capital Rajgad by the land route in the third week of March 1665.

Mirza Rajah Jai Singh, the veteran general of Aurangzeb, reached Poona, on 3 March 1665, to lead the campaign against Shivaji.

SHIVAJI AND JAI SINGH

FULL RECORDS of Jai Singh's campaign against Shivaji are available. The *Alamgirnama*, official history of Aurangzeb, the *Haft Anjuman* containing the correspondence of Jai Singh with Aurangzeb, the *Rajasthan Records* consisting of the correspondence of the Rajput officials under Jai Singh and other Marathi, British, Portuguese records enable us to have a clear picture of the campaign. Nicolao Manucci was with Jai Singh at the time as a captain in his artillery. His autobiography, *The Story of the Mughals*, is a very valuable work.

The veteran general, Jai Singh, was no Shaista Khan. He did not underestimate Shivaji. His plan was to carry out a short and swift campaign to isolate Shivaji from his neighbours—Adil Shah of Bijapur and the Portuguese. He also wanted to set up strongly-guarded military posts at sensitive places like Kalyan, Lohagad and Poona to prevent Shivaji from moving out of his territory, to attack and devastate Shivaji's territory by carrying fire and sword through it, and leave Shivaji with no alternative but to surrender to the Mughals.

Jai Singh wrote to the Emperor and demanded (1) unified control in matters of campaign (2) administrative control over the army to vest in him instead of at Aurangabad under Prince Muazzam (3) control over the Imperial (appointed) commandants of forts in the area, like Parenda and Ahmadnagar, and (4) freedom to draw upon the Imperial treasury at Aurangabad for luring Shivaji's men.

He obtained his demands. Jai Singh even tactfully declined the suggestion of Aurangzeb to camp in Talkonkan, on the plea that were he to do so, Shivaji and Adil Shah would unite against him.

Jai Singh's campaign was brilliantly conceived and equally brilliantly executed. The Portuguese protested that they had

never helped Shivaji (for example in Shivaji's Surat expedition), and that the Mughals need have no apprehensions in the future. Their correspondence reveals that they had a few mental reservations on the issue. Here is an extract from the Portuguese letters to the governor of north Konkan: "However, if without this risk (of arousing suspicion) you could secretly give any aid with ammunitions or foodstuffs to Shivaji, you should do it for money, because it is not desirable that if he is driven from his lands, the Mughals should remain the lord of them."

Adil Shah of Bijapur too was cowed down. He made a feeble effort to descend into south Konkan. But this did not allay the suspicions of the Mughals whose long-term policy aimed at the total elimination of Bijapur as a separate State.

Jai Singh's efforts at isolating Shivaji proved successful. The small chiefs, like the Rajahs of Jawhar and Ramnagar, disgruntled and dispossessed fief-holders like the Mores of Jawali and the service-hungry officers of Bijapur, flocked to the standards of Jai Singh. Jai Singh's notable success was to be the defection of Mulla Ahmad, the premier nobleman of Bijapur. The Siddis of Janjira promptly joined the service of the Mughals.

Having arrived in Poona, Jai Singh marched towards the fort of Purandar. Ihtishan Khan, and on his death Qubad Khan, were posted at Poona with a force of 4,000 horses. Jai Singh left Poona on March 14. On March 29, he reached Saswad in close proximity to the strong fort of Purandar. Diler Khan, his next in command, had already gone ahead with the advance troops and a strong artillery.

The siege of Purandar began on 30 March 1665. In spite of strong Maratha attacks, the Mughals succeeded in establishing themselves between the forts of Purandar and Rudramal. The flying columns of the Mughals, moving across Shivaji's territory, wrought havoc everywhere. The Marathas put up a tough fight. Netaji Palkar raided the Parenda region. "They made sudden raids and carried out night attacks. They used to block roads and hold inaccessible passes. They also used to set fire to the forests. Owing to these activities the condition of the army of Islam was rendered difficult. A considerable number of animals belonging to the army perished."

For the flying columns, Jai Singh had appointed Daud Khan, the governor of Khandesh, at the head of a 7,000-strong cavalry force. Veteran officers like Rajah Rai Singh, Sharza Khan, Amar Singh Chandrawat, Muhammad Saleh and others were appointed under Daud Khan. A single illustration on the nature of their activities would sufficiently show the devastation they caused to Maratha territory: "Daud Khan, Rajah Rai Singh and other Mughal officers reached the environs of the fort of Rohida on twenty-seventh April. They set fire to about fifty villages. Four villages situated in the hills. . . were razed to the ground. A number of inhabitants were made prisoners. Cattle and other goods were captured. The villages in the environs of Kondana were devastated on the second of May. . . Qutbuddin Khan had marched towards the fort of Kimwari. He burnt down villages in that region. On fifth of May the Mughals burnt down populous villages at the foot of Lohagad."

Setting of fire to villages and capturing of men, women and cattle became the set practice of Mughal raiding-parties.

Siege of Purandar

The siege of Purandar has been described at great length in the *Haft Anjuman* letters of Jai Singh. They illustrate the fierce attacks of the Mughals and the equally fierce defence put up by the Marathas. It is one of the memorable sieges in Indian history. Time and again the Marathas emerged from the fort to fall upon Mughal trenches. Hand to hand fights were the order of the day. It was in one of these fights that Murar Baji, the gallant Maratha commandant of Purandar, laid down his life. In the annals of Maratha history he has become immortal.

The Mughals captured Rudramal on April 14. The lower fort of Purandar came immediately under siege. The Mughal trenches were moved to north-east of the fort, the tower of Khadkala. The Mughals erected *damdams* (platform) and mounted guns on them. Maratha efforts to dismantle the platform were repulsed after a stiff fight. The Mughals took possession of five towers of the fort. The Marathas withdrew to the inner walls of the fort.

The Maratha garrison, now in dire trouble, however, held

on grimly. Such was the situation at the end of May 1665, when Shivaji thought of ending the war which was proving ruinous to the country. He approached Jai Singh through more than one letter, offering his co-operation in case of a future Mughal-Bijapur conflict. This is evident from the correspondence of Jai Singh. But the offer was summarily rejected. Jai Singh wanted nothing short of total surrender.

The impending fall of Purandar and the utter isolation in which he found himself, led Shivaji to the realization that meeting Jai Singh and asking for a truce was the only way out through which his predicament could be resolved.

Jai Singh reported to the Emperor as follows: "On Sunday, *Zilhijja* 7 (11 June 1665) one *prahar* of the day being past, while I was holding court, he (the envoy) brought the news that Shiva(ji) had arrived at hand in that manner, accompanied by six Brahmins and some *kahars* (bearers). I sent Udairaj Munshi and Ugrasen Kachhwaha to meet him on the way and tell him that if he agreed to surrender all his forts, he might come, otherwise he should turn back. After hearing this message Shiva(ji) said, 'I have entered into the Imperial service. Many (of my) forts will be added to the Imperial dominions.' Saying this he came on in the company of the men deputed by me. I sent Jani Beg Bakhshi to the door of the tent to conduct Shiva(ji)."

Although the Mughals were poised to capture Purandar, but at the express request of Shivaji, the fort was allowed to be surrendered and the garrison permitted to evacuate the stronghold. The *Alamgirnama* notes that there were 7,000 persons, men and women, in the fort of Purandar; of these, 4,000 were fighting men.

The siege of Purandar was a memorable one.

The negotiations that followed were tough. Jai Singh sought surrender of all forts of Shivaji. Shivaji tried to influence Jai Singh to turn towards Bijapur, so that he (Shivaji) could get liberal terms.

Jai Singh refused. He, however, decided not to drive Shivaji too far, because in such an eventuality, the latter might have in sheer desperation joined hands with Bijapur to resist the Mughals to a bitter end. Bijapur did make an offer to Shivaji, but it came too late. As such it failed to

assuage the bitter feelings roused in Shivaji by Bijapur's lack of support in his campaign against the Mughals. One can only speculate on the fate of Jai Singh's campaign had Bijapur and Shivaji joined hands against the Mughals.

The terms finally agreed to were: (1) Twenty-three of Shivaji's forts, large and small, of which the revenue was four lakh Hons (about sixteen lakh rupees) should be annexed to the Empire (2) Twelve forts belonging to Shivaji, one of which was Rajgad, and the standard revenue of one lakh Hons (about four lakh rupees) should be held by Shivaji on condition of service and loyalty to the Imperial government. (3) His son Sambhaji, however, would be made a *mansabdar* of five thousand. (4) As for himself, Shivaji requested, "Exempt me from *mansab* and service. Wherever in your Deccan wars I am appointed to any duty, I shall without delay perform it." (5) With regard to Bijapur territory, "If out of Bijapur territory, of which Bijapur Talkonkan, yielding four lakhs of Hons is in my possession, some *mahals* of Balaghat of which the total revenue is five lakhs of Hons be granted to me and an Imperial *farman* be issued to the effect that if at any time the Imperial command is sent for the conquest of Bijapur, the above *talukas* would be left to me, then I agree to pay a tribute of forty lakhs of Hons to the Emperor by instalments of three lakhs every year."

The forts taken away by the Mughals included strongholds such as Purandar, Kondana (Simhagad), Rohida, Lohagad and Mahuli. Twelve forts of which only two (Rajgad and Torna) could be deemed important were left to him. The plains of Poona and the coastal belt of Kalyan-Bhiwandi were occupied by the Mughals.

What was left to Shivaji was a small tract yielding about four lakh rupees in annual income from his patrimony of the Poona region, besides the central and southern Konkan wrested from Bijapur in addition to a small portion of the present Satara district covering the fort of Pratapgad and the *taluka* of Jawali.

In modern terms, Shivaji's territory was reduced to about two districts. The Mughals had extended their sway over Janjira by taking the Siddis in their service, even though Janjira was under Shivaji's zone of influence and the latter strongly

resented the action of the Mughals. It was a bitter pill to swallow. It speaks for the greatness of Shivaji that he bore this humiliation with tremendous forbearance and fortitude; he survived to fight, and fight successfully.

Manucci, author of *Storia de Mogor*, who was serving under Jai Singh in this campaign, has left a brief account of his meeting with Shivaji. He says: "A few days after my arrival Shivaji gave himself up and came into our camp. Since I went at night to converse and play with the Rajah (Jai Singh) whenever he so desired. It happened one night during this period, that we were having a game—the Rajah, his Brahmin and I, when in came Shivaji. . . This was the opening which afforded me occasion many times to converse with Shivaji, since I possessed, like any one else in the camp, Persian and Hindustani languages. I gave him information about the greatness of European Kings, he being of the opinion that there was not in Europe any other King than the King of Portugal. I also talked to him about our religion."

About the terms of the treaty, Aurangzeb was not very enthusiastic. He wanted Shivaji to be deprived of all his forts. Jai Singh's arguments in this regard were strong and cogent, as the letters in the *Haft Anjuman* reveal. Aurangzeb agreed but not without mental reservations, as revealed in his treatment of Shivaji in Agra.

Jai Singh's arguments give the impression of emphatic protestations. There was the danger of Shivaji and Bijapur joining hands and thereby creating difficulties for the Mughals. Shivaji, though rendered ineffective, was persuaded to join the Mughals in the Bijapur campaign. Shivaji was a mere *zamin-dar*, who sprang from the class of officials unlike the hereditary rulers of Bijapur and Golconda. His power was not likely to last for more than a decade. Shivaji could be used in the campaign against Bijapur in the first instance. This would be an essential step in the solution of the Deccan problem in which the Mughals—Adil Shah, Qutb Shah—and the Marathas were involved.

So ran the arguments of Jai Singh. On reading between the lines one cannot but sense a feeling of sympathy on Jai Singh's part for Shivaji. But like a truly loyal servant of the Mughals, he seems to have kept his thoughts very much to

himself. The deprecatory references to Shivaji in his letters must have been meant for Aurangzeb's consumption. Harsh as the terms of the treaty were for Shivaji, they could have been harsher, but for Jai Singh's arguments.

In the wake of Jai Singh's victory over Shivaji, the Mughals turned against Bijapur. The campaign against Bijapur was at the express orders of Aurangzeb as is evident from Jai Singh's words, "I had not taken the initiative in this work." Jai Singh had hardly any effective artillery and transport required for this campaign in which Shivaji rendered valuable service to the Mughals. It was mainly due to the Marathas that the strongholds of Phaltan, Tathivade and Mangalvedha were captured.

But on their march to Bijapur, the Mughals met an unexpectedly stiff resistance. On 25 and 28 December 1665, fierce battles were fought. Jai Singh reached the outskirts of Bijapur, about 16 km from the city. The Bijapur army had carried out a policy of ruthless devastation. The fort had been put in an excellent state of preparation guarded by the Carnataca infantry, 30,000 strong. Reinforcements from Golconda also reached Bijapur.

Facing continuing battles with the enemy, Jai Singh had to beat a retreat. He withdrew from Bijapur on 5 January 1666. He was incessantly harassed by the Bijapur army till he reached the Bhima river on January 11.

Shivaji Takes Leave

It was then that Shivaji took leave of Jai Singh. He was to attack the kingdom of Bijapur from the west and capture Panhala. This was the assignment which Jai Singh gave him. Manucci, who was in Jai Singh's camp at that time, has a curious tale to tell. He says: "Diler Khan, being habituated to treachery, wished several times to kill Shivaji and to this intent solicited Rajah Jai Singh to take his life or at least to give him leave to do so. He would assume all responsibility and see that the Rajah was held blameless. He said the King would rejoice at such a result, for Shivaji's valour and intrepidity would never give any rest to the Mughals. But Rajah Jai Singh, who had pledged his word and oath not to allow of a murder but rather that the King should treat Shivaji with great honour, never

listened to the words of Diler Khan."

Shivaji reached Panhala on January 16 and led an assault on the fort. The assault did not succeed owing to the failure of his general, Netaji Palkar, to arrive in time. Strongly rebuked, Netaji, who had been granted a *mansab* by the Mughals which he considered insufficient, left Shivaji and joined Bijapur until he was lured into Mughal service by the offer of a bigger *mansab*.

Netaji's defection illustrates how even the officers nearest to Shivaji failed to understand the significance of the struggle which he was waging.

As a part of his campaign against Bijapur, Shivaji descended into Konkan and laid siege to Phonda. The Bijapur garrison, with the secret assistance of the Portuguese, forced him to raise the siege. Bijapur regained the tract north of Phonda.

The Bijapur campaign ended disastrously for Jai Singh. He had to march against Bijapur under the orders of the Emperor without sufficient artillery. And now that he had to retreat, Aurangzeb threw the blame of the failure on his general.

What was more, Jai Singh feared that Mughal discomfiture against Bijapur might tempt Shivaji to join hands with the latter and recapture the forts surrendered under the treaty.

It was Jai Singh who suggested to the Emperor that Shivaji be called to the court. He wrote: "Now that Adil Shah and Qutb Shah have united in mischief, it is necessary to win Shivaji's heart by all means and send him to northern India to have audience of Your Majesty."

Jai Singh must have used all his skill in persuading Shivaji to go to Agra. He could not hold out any prospects of territorial benefits. The persuasion must have been courteous but firm. Shivaji could not avoid going to the court. Probably he expected Aurangzeb to recognise his worth as an ally and find a way to restore his patrimony.

VISIT TO AGRA AND ESCAPE

SHIVAJI left for Agra on 5 March 1666. He stopped at Aurangabad for a week. Aurangzeb had written to him: "Come here without delay in full confidence in my grace and perfect composure of mind. After you have obtained audience of me, you will be glorified with my royal favours and given permission to return home."

Shivaji reached Agra on 12 May 1666. We owe the excellent description of Shivaji and his entourage to the letters written by Rajput officials of Ram Singh, son of Jai Singh. The letters, included in the *Rajasthani Records*,¹ say: "He has come alone with only one hundred retainers. His escorts number from two hundred to about five hundred and fifty men in all. When Shivaji rides out in a *palki*, many footmen wearing costumes like the Turks, big like Khadauts, go before him. His flag is orange and vermillion coloured, with golden decorations stemped on it . . . At sight Shivaji's body looks lean and short. His appearance is wonderfully fair in complexion and even without finding out who he is, one feels instinctively that he is a ruler of men (*Deel so haqeer, par ajaib goro, aap hee rajasee deesojee*). He is a very brave and high-souled man and wears a beard. His son is nine-years-old and very marvellously handsome in appearance and fair in complexion."

The *Rajasthani Records* provide us with an eye-witness account of Shivaji's audience with Aurangzeb. The memorable scene, so fateful in the history of the Mughal-Maratha relations, has been described in the following words: "The Kumar and Mukhlis Khan were conducting Shivaji. In the meanwhile, the Emperor had left the *Diwan-i-Am* (public

audience hall) and was sitting in the select audience hall, *Diwan-i-Khas*, popularly known as *ghusalkhana*. Shivaji went to the latter place. The Emperor ordered Asad Khan Bakhshi to bring Shivaji forward and present him for audience. Asad Khan conducted him to the Emperor. Shivaji presented one thousand Muhars and Rupees two thousand as *nazar* and Rupees five thousand as *nisar*.

"Sambhaji, the son of Shivaji, was then presented to the Emperor and he offered five hundred Muhars and Rupees one thousand as *nazar* and Rupees two thousand as *nisar*. Shivaji was made to stand in the place of Tahir Khan¹ in front of Rajah Ram Singh.

"It was the Emperor's birthday and betel leaves were distributed to the princes and the noblemen and hence Shivaji too got one. Next the *khilars* (robes) for the occasion were presented to the princes, Jafar Khan and Rajah Jaswant Singh. At this Shivaji became sad and fretful. He flew into a rage and his eyes were filled with tears. The Emperor noticed it and told the Kumar (Ram Singh), 'Ask Shivaji what ails him?' Then the Kumar came to Shivaji's side and the latter said, 'You are seeing, your father has seen, your Padishah has seen what a man I am, and yet you have deliberately kept me standing so long. I cast off your *mansab*. If you wanted me to stand you should have done so according to the right order of precedence.' He then and there turned his back and began to walk away violently from his place in the line for noblemen. Then the Kumar seized his hand. But Shivaji wrenched it away, came to one side and sat down. The Kumar followed him to that place and again tried to persuade him, but he would not listen and cried out, 'My death day has arrived. Either you will slay me or I shall kill myself. Cut off my head and take it there if you like, but I am not going (back) to the Emperor's presence.'

"As Shivaji would not be persuaded, the Kumar went up to the Emperor and reported to him. The Emperor ordered Multafat Khan, Aqil Khan and Mukhlis Khan to go, console Shivaji, invest him with a *khilat* and then bring him to

¹Sarkar and Raghubir Singh, *Rajasthani Records*, Shivaji's visit to Aurangzeb at Agra, Calcutta, 1963.

¹Promoted as a *mansabdar* of 5,000 only, a fortnight prior to the audience.

the throne. The three nobles came and asked Shivaji to wear the *khilat*. He replied, 'I refuse to accept a *khilat*. The Emperor has purposely made me stand below Jaswant Singh. I am such a man and yet I am deliberately kept standing. I decline the Emperor's *mansab*. I will not be his servant. Kill me, imprison me, if you like, but I will not wear the *khilat*.'

"So they returned and reported all this to the Emperor who ordered the Kumar (Ram Singh) to take Shivaji with him to his own residence and try persuasion. The Kumar took Shivaji along with himself to his residence, seated him in a private chamber and reasoned with him. But he would not listen."

In contrast to the above, we have the description given in *Alamgirnama*, written by Muhammad Kazam. In the words of the *Alamgirnama*: "On the day of the celebrations (birthday) the Emperor ordered Kumar Ram Singh and Mukhlis Khan to receive him (Shivaji) and bring him to the court. Shivaji reached the court and paid his respects. He approached the Emperor. He stood in a place suitable for those who were near to the throne and shoulder to shoulder with high noblemen. It had been decided (by the Emperor) on that day that he (Shivaji) should be given great consideration. For some days he should pay respects at the court and receive kind favours (from the Emperor), and achieving his aims and desires, soon receive leave to depart. But this wild animal of the wilderness of ignorance, who had strange ideas within him, who did not know the etiquette of the Imperial court, who had unreasonable expectations and fantastic aims stored in his head, and had queer ideas (*Tawaqqoati beja, wa maqasid door azkar, wa khayalati kham*) stood in his place. In spite of the kindness of the Emperor towards him, a fit of mad obsession, of ignorance and folly issued from his brainless head. He retired to a corner and began to show his annoyance. He made improper complaints and expressed unsuitable desires. His folly thus became apparent. His brain gave out his obsessions and caused him to make tumult.

"As this became apparent, His Majesty decided that he (Shivaji) was not fit to be in his presence. He ordered him to return to his camp and for this reason, all the favours and

rewards which were to have been shown and given to him on that day, could not take place. That foolish and evil person fell from the grace of the Emperor. It was ordered that he should henceforward, not be permitted to come to court."

The official version reads almost like an apology for the gross neglect of courtesies due to and expected by Shivaji. The *Rajasthani Records* convey to us in some measure the sensation created in Agra by this incident. "The people had been praising," says the letter of 29 May 1666,¹ "Shivaji's high spirit and courage before. Now that after coming to the Emperor's presence, he has shown such audacity and returned such harsh and strong replies (*Sakhti kari karada jawab kahya*), the public extols him for his bravery all the more (*Teethe khalaq Sevaji ke mardangine bahut saraha chhoji*)."

Shivaji's behaviour in the *Diwan-i-khas* gave an opportunity to the Mughal nobles, Jafar Khan and others, to protest vigorously to the Emperor. The *Rajasthani* letters quote them as saying: "Who is this Shiva(ji) that in Your Royal presence, he committed such contumacious and insolent acts, and yet Your Majesty passes over them. In this way many *bhumias* (landholders) will come here, and act rudely. Then how will administration continue? The news will reach every country that such a Hindu audaciously did every kind of rudeness and all will act similarly.' It then came into the Emperor's mind (*Teese sree patshahji ka dilmen aayi*), or it was decided (*ya maslahati hui*), that Shivaji should be killed, or confined in a fort or be imprisoned (*Taayin mara ya gadhichadhava ya iske taayin kaid men karan*). Siddi Fulad was ordered to take Shivaji to Rad Andaz Khan's (commandant of Agra fort) *haveli*."

Threat to Shivaji's Life

The move to shift Shivaji from his residence near Ram Singh's camp posed a great danger to Shivaji's life. Ram Singh had been expressly charged by his father, Jai Singh, to see that no harm came to Shivaji during his stay at Agra. He took immediate steps to prevent this unpleasant move.

¹Rajasthani letters, 15-16 May 1666.

He ran to the Imperial Bakshi, Muhammad Amin Khan, and said to him, "The Emperor is thinking of killing Shivaji (*Maarva ko bichare karo chee*). But he (Shivaji) has come here on a guarantee (*qaul*) of safety from my father. So it is proper that the Emperor should first kill me, call up my son and kill him too. Only after putting us to death, he should kill Shivaji or do whatever he likes."

The Emperor inquired whether Ram Singh would stand security for Shivaji. Ram Singh, after consulting Shivaji, executed a bond of security (*zamangiri*).

The immediate danger was averted. But the same letter of May 16 tells us that the Emperor ordered Ram Singh to be posted to Kabul. He was to take Shivaji with him. Significantly, Rad Andaz Khan was to be the vanguard (*karawal*) to Ram Singh. What could be more easy than to eliminate Shivaji in the tribal territory and then let it be known that Shivaji had died in a tribal ambush. The letter says: "When it was thought of killing Shivaji, Rad Andaz Khan said to Ram Singh, 'Kanwarji, I have been appointed your vanguard'."

On being given to understand that he was to accompany Ram Singh to Kabul, Shivaji refused to do so. He had in the meanwhile contacted the *Vazir*, Jafar Khan. Shivaji seems to have paid considerable sums to Jafar Khan and other nobles to gain their support. The Rajasthani letter of May 24 states: "I hear that Shivaji has paid some money to Jafar Khan to win his support. Elsewhere too he has spent more or less."

The proposal to send Ram Singh and Shivaji to Kabul was dropped. Shivaji's son, Sambhaji, was however allowed to attend the court in the company of Ram Singh.

Shivaji submitted a petition to the Emperor through Muhammad Amin Khan offering to pay two crores of rupees if his forts were restored to him and to serve the Emperor faithfully in the Deccan.

The response of Aurangzeb was cold. "He has gone off his head because of my leniency towards him. How can he be given leave to depart for home? Tell him firmly that he must not visit anybody." Hence strong patrols were posted round Shivaji's residence.

The *Alamgirnama* tells us: "As his (Shivaji's) evil nature was apparent to His Majesty and there was a suspicion that the wretch might flee away, His Majesty ordered Fulad Khan, the police chief, to post his force around his (Shivaji's) camp. This force was to be strengthened by a section of the artillery for purposes of watchfulness." The *Alamgirnama* also tells us that a reference was also made to Jai Singh about Shivaji.

Once again Shivaji was in danger of being killed. The Rajasthani letter of June 7 states: "The Emperor first sent a message to Shivaji 'Hand over all your forts to me. I will restore your *mansab*. Call here your nephew too. I will give *mansab* to him also.' Shivaji's reply was, 'I do not want any *mansab*. I have no control over the forts.' The Emperor was already much displeased with him. The *harkara* had brought the following news: 'Shiva(ji)'s troops and Ram Singh's soldiers, who are arriving from his homeland, are getting together.'

"The Emperor ordered Siddi Fulad and the artillery officers, 'Go and kill Shivaji (*Seva ko jat pakdt maro*).'

"Word was sent to Ram Singh, 'We have learnt that men from your homelands are arriving here and a force is being collected.' Ram Singh submitted, 'I had been ordered to Kabul. Hence I had called my men. Now that my posting has been dropped, I have asked my men not to come. We are hereditary servants. Who is Shivaji that one should collect a force for him? I am the servant of the Emperor. Shivaji too is the servant of the Emperor. Your Majesty, if he so desires, may imprison him or kill him.'

"The Begum Saheb (Aurangzeb's sister) interceded. She said, 'Mirza Rajah is your noted servant. It is on his guarantee that Shivaji has come here and has become an Imperial servant. If you kill him (Shivaji), nobody will be available to you on the assurances of your guarantee (*qaul*).' Owing to the intercession of Begum Saheb, the Emperor let the incident pass (*darguzar kari*).

"One day Shivaji said to Ram Singh, 'I thought people listened to you. You have spoken about me to the Emperor but he does not listen. You inform him that Shivaji is no longer in my charge. He may be disposed of in the way the Emperor likes.' Ram Singh said, 'How can I leave your side?'

"Two days ago, the Maharaj Kumar (Ram Singh) had also posted his own guard with Shivaji."

Wild rumours floating in the bazars of Agra, as recorded in the Rajasthani letters, make amusing reading. According to them it was rumoured that, "Rajah Jaswant Singh said to the Emperor, 'Shivaji jumps fourteen or fifteen arms, height from the ground. He walks a distance of forty to fifty kos.' The Shahzada (Prince Muazzam) said gravely, 'I too had heard of this in Aurangabad.' The Emperor was keen to get Shivaji to hand over his forts. This Shivaji would not do. Shivaji must have been thinking of getting away from Agra without involving Ram Singh in the attempt. He requested that he should not be kept in charge of Ram Singh and that a residence might be fixed for him. The request went unheeded. Ram Singh however continued his arrangements for keeping a watch to protect Shivaji from any harm.

"On the seventh of June, Shivaji sent away all his servants, saying, 'Go away. Let none remain with me here. I shall stay here alone. Let me be killed if they wish to kill me.' They were allowed by Ram Singh to stay in his camp. Shivaji sent word to the Emperor to issue passports to his troops to allow them to return to the Deccan."

The Mughal government must have been taking precautions to prevent the possibility of Shivaji's escape. The following letter of June 12 is an indication: "Orders have been received. If ever Shivaji were to escape from Agra to Maryabad Pargana, he be detained.

"To put pressure on the Emperor, Shivaji offered to turn a mendicant and stay at Benares. The Emperor offered to put him at Allahabad under the protection of the governor, Bahadur Khan."

The war against Bijapur in the Deccan was not going according to plan. Jai Singh must have been a difficult position. His following letter about Shivaji is interesting. Writing to his son, Ram Singh, Jai Singh says:¹ "You should communicate the following words from me to the Emperor without telling any one else. Every moment has its special requirement. At the time when I requested the Emperor to send

Shivaji back, the situation here bore a different aspect from what it wears now. Under the present circumstances it is not at all politic to permit him to come to this region. Also tell the Emperor that Shivaji should be detained there in a worthy manner (that is, not as a prisoner), so that his officers here may not despair of his return and thus be induced to join Adil Shah and create disturbances against us. This policy will avoid the necessity of His Majesty sending a (fresh) army to this side."

Again,¹ "Shivaji ought to be conciliated and assured that after the Emperor had reached the Deccan, he would be summoned there from Agra. His son, should as a matter of policy, be kept with the Emperor in order that his followers may loyally assist us."

This last letter was a reaction to the impression that the Emperor was seriously thinking of personally going to the Deccan to bring the campaign to a successful end. While Jai Singh wanted Shivaji to be detained in the north to avoid the possibility of the latter joining Bijapur, Aurangzeb's aim was to pressurize Shivaji to hand over his forts. He was not prepared to let Shivaji go until he had the latter's forts in his secure possession. The pressure began to be exercised increasingly.

"When Shivaji suggested that if only he were allowed to go to the Deccan, he could get his forts for the Emperor, as the garrisons there might not comply with his letters, the Emperor retorted, 'If they will cede the forts on his going there, why will they not yield them on his writing to them?'"

Shivaji's Expenses

The Marathi chronicler, Sabhasad informs us of Shivaji's visits to the *Vazir*, Jafar Khan and other nobles. Bhimsen Saksena too speaks of Shivaji's generous charities and gifts to soldiers and laymen. As such Shivaji ran short of money. He borrowed 66,000 rupees from Ram Singh. The money was, of course, duly returned to Jai Singh in the Deccan.

The Rajasthani letter, dated August 23, throws light on events prior to Shivaji's escape: "Since four days prior to the flight of Shivaji there was much strictness about guards. Once

¹Sarkar, *House of Shivaji*, p. 166.

¹Sarkar, *Shivaji*, p. 149.

again the Emperor ordered that Shivaji be killed (*Aur patt-sahji pachhe mari nakhiba ko hukum keeyo*) but soon after he changed to keeping him in the *havell* of Rajah Vithal Das. Shivaji realised that the evil day had arrived, so he escaped." According to the Marathi chronicles, Shivaji escaped from Agra on 17 August 1666. The Rajasthani letters suggest August 18 as the date, while the *Alamgirnama* mentions August 19 as the day of his departure. The Marathi chronicles are correct. The Rajputs chose to discover Shivaji's escape on August 18 while the Mughals only confirmed the event on the next day, following a hurried search for Shivaji.

Shivaji's escape resulted in a flurry of inquiries, charges and counter-charges. Efforts were made to involve Ram Singh in the dispute. Aurangzeb seemed convinced that Ram Singh had a hand in the affair. But the Rajasthani letters do not bear this out. Shivaji must have made his plans carefully. The Rajputs roundabout his person might have had an inkling. Similarly, the guards of Fulad Khan too, seem to have been involved. Shivaji's gifts and charities, as noted by historian Bhimsen Saksena, had their effect.

But the story of Shivaji's escape in a large basket of fruits seems to have been circulated to save the police guards and their officers from embarrassment. The following letter of 3 September 1666, strengthens this impression. The letter is as follows: "When the day was four *gharis* old, the news came that Shivaji had escaped, even when a thousand men were on guard duties. That day no one could tell when precisely he escaped and through which section of the guard (*chowki*). After deliberation it was concluded that (*Tetha pachhe mansubookar aur ya thaharichhe bhagwa ki*), the baskets used to be brought and taken from there (*jo venkt patyara ki amadraft thi*). Shivaji escaped through the baskets."

The letter is written full 20 days after the event. It is a guess arrived at after mutual consultations on the manner of Shivaji's escape.

The government version seems to be correct. Aurangzeb was not the man to leave anything uninvestigated thoroughly. In the *Alamgirnama*, it is clearly stated that Shivaji fled in disguise (*Tagayyure waze dade*).

Support to this version is lent by another contemporary work of poet Bhushan's Hindi poems in praise of Shivaji. The Sanskrit poet, Jayaram Pindye, has also hinted at this version. The story of the escape in a basket must be rejected as being an invented story to save the negligent parties from harassing inquiries and subsequent punishment. Excepting Ram Singh, who was under disgrace for some time, nobody seems to have been punished.

Shivaji's Route

It has been claimed that Shivaji proceeded first to Mathura and then to the Deccan. With the help of passports (*dastak*) issued to the men of his retinue, he took the straight path to his home and arrived there on September 12. But this is the result of undue emphasis on a spy's report which is discredited by Jai Singh's letter, of September 27, stating that Shivaji had not returned (the word *naraseeda*—not returned, incorrectly translated as *raseda*—returned).

Here the Marathi chronicles are our better guides. The *Jedhe Shakavali* states that Shivaji reached Rajgad along with Sambhaji on 20 November 1666. Some confusion was caused by the above-mentioned words as also by Sambhaji, who returned to the Deccan some time after Shivaji's arrival. But this confusion was cleared in the chronicle, *Jedhe Karina*, where it is stated that: "*Rajashree Swami came to Rajgad on Margashirsh Shuddha Panchami* (20 November 1666). Rajashree Sambhaji Raje had been kept at Mathura with the Brahmin Vishwasrao. Vishwasrao brought him as well."

The Mughals launched a vigorous search for Shivaji. The court bulletins refer to a number of arrests made by the Mughals in Malwa and in the Deccan. Shivaji probably took the eastern route, as far away from Mughal outposts as possible. The Marathi chronicler, Sabhasad, and the Mughal historian, Bhimsen Saksena, both suggest Allahabad, Benares, Gaya, Gondwana and Golconda as the route taken by Shivaji. Shivaji went to Benares. From there he must have moved towards the Sarguja district of the present Madhya Pradesh. So Ambikapur, Amarkantak, Ratanpur near Bilaspur, Raipur, Bastar and the friendly territory of Golconda seem to have been the route taken by Shivaji.

Shivaji's journey was fraught with danger. More than once he escaped being captured by the Mughals. The historian Khafi Khan has narrated a few such stories popular at the time.

Shivaji's safe arrival at Rajgad was celebrated by the Marathas with joyous demonstration. Soon after, Sambhaji too joined his father. Once Shivaji reached Rajgad safely, there was little that Aurangzeb could do to rectify the mistake. His mistake can only be explained by his distractions following the adverse Deccan campaigns and rumours of a threat of Persian invasion of India.

Fifty years later, when Aurangzeb lay dying at Ahmadnagar, he still remembered Shivaji's escape with regret. He has recorded in his will that a moment's carelessness on his part in allowing Shivaji to escape had led to no end of distractions.

From the Mughal point of view it was, no doubt, a mistake. The failure to conciliate Shivaji was a blunder of the first magnitude. Shivaji, as an ally, might have enlarged his own kingdom but he would also have proved of immense use to the Mughals in the elimination of the States of Golconda and Bijapur. The events in Indian history might have had a different story to tell. As it was, Shivaji never again trusted the Mughals. The wide rift between the Mughals and the Marathas was to have momentous consequences later in the eighteenth century.

It is not difficult to imagine what Shivaji's fate would have been, had he not escaped or, having escaped, had been captured. His general, Netaji Palkar, was captured by a ruse and forcibly converted. Shivaji's son, Sambhaji, was years later captured, blinded and later executed. The historian, Saqi Mustaid Khan, who was with Aurangzeb at that time, provides Imperial justification for the blinding of Sambhaji in the following words: "As he had previously ignored the value of Imperial mercy and fled first from the Emperor's court in the company of his father and the second time from the late Diler Khan, therefore, that very night his eyes were deprived of the power of seeing."¹

¹Khan, Saqi Mustaid, *Masire Alamgiri*.

The first reaction of Aurangzeb to Shivaji's escape was to order the arrest of Netaji Palkar, who had accepted service under the Mughals. This step must have been dictated by anger at Shivaji's escape as well as an anxiety to forestall any possibility of Netaji rejoining Shivaji. Netaji was brought to Agra, converted to Islam, given the name of Muhammad Quli Khan, and granted a *mansab* of 3,000. He was attached to the province of Kabul.

In spite of Jai Singh's tenacity, the war against Bijapur was a losing battle. A face-saving peace was patched up with Bijapur. Jai Singh was recalled. Prince Muazzam was appointed the Viceroy of the Deccan. He reached Aurangabad in May 1667. Jai Singh departed for Agra. On his way he fell ill (he suffered from diabetes) and died at Burhanpur on 28 August 1667. There is no truth in the rumour that his death was contrived by Aurangzeb. His death, however, must have come as a relief to Aurangzeb, who had a strong allergy to Rajput influence in Mughal administration. Jai Singh and Jaswant Singh—the latter of Jodhpur, were the two dominant figures among the Rajputs at that time. Ram Singh, son of Jai Singh, was given the State of Jaipur but sent out on the Assam campaign. The house of Jaipur fell into an eclipse from which it emerged only on the death of Aurangzeb. The turn of events in Jodhpur was to come with the death of Jaswant Singh, a decade later.

Although with the death of the King of Persia the threat of Persian invasion of India disappeared, events in the north-west posed a potential danger to the Mughals, as the tribes were getting restless. In the east too, the advance of the Mughals to the interior of Assam had been halted. Aurangzeb could not afford to open a fresh campaign against Bijapur, nor could he afford to have a war with Shivaji. The appointment of the mild and peace-loving Muazzam as the Viceroy of the Deccan is a pointer in this direction.

Shivaji too wanted peace. With a reduced territory he required time to consolidate his position, and if possible to formulate new policies towards Bijapur and his other neighbours. To avoid rousing the suspicion of the Mughals, Shivaji had to project his image of one sincerely desiring to serve the Mughals and entitled to favours from them.

Both the parties played down the incident of Shivaji's escape from Agra. This is one reason why details of the manner and method of Shivaji's escape from Agra and return to the Deccan are not much available in contemporary papers.

Peace

The *Persian Newsletter*, of 6 May 1667, states: "The Emperor ordered the prime minister to summon the *vakil* of Shiva(ji), reassure him and send him to his master, on condition of returning in two months, in order to inform Shiva(ji) that his offences had been pardoned by His Majesty, that his son (Sambhaji) had been enrolled as an Imperial officer (*mansabdar*), that he was at liberty to seize as much of Bijapur territory as he could or else he should remain firm in his own place and obey the Emperor's son."

And this is what the *Newsletter* dated 3 October 1667, states: "The Emperor received a letter from Prince Muhammad Muazzam to this effect. Shivaji has written a letter to me saying, 'I am a hereditary slave of the Imperial court and my son Sambhaji has been created a commander of five thousand (*mansabdar*) but has received no *jagir* as *tankhwa* (subsistence allowance). I now beg that His Majesty would pardon the offences of this servant, restore the *mansab* of my son and assign a *jagir* to him. I am ready to render service in person wherever I am ordered.'

"Aurangzeb accordingly issued suitable instructions which said: Order the restoration of the *mansab* of Sambhaji,

" 'Do you assign him *jagirs* in the territory of the forts surrendered to me? He should come and render service under the Prince'."

Thus it came to pass that young Sambhaji, who had received *jagirs* in Berar and other places, travelled with his contingent to Aurangabad, the seat of the Mughal Viceroy, to render service to the Mughals. He called on Prince Muazzam on 4 November 1667. How curious it is to recall that only a year ago, the same Sambhaji (and his father) had to elude the pursuit of the Mughals, and reach Deccan in disguise. Now everybody seemed to be determined to forget the escapade as a very trivial incident.

Being only ten years of age, Sambhaji was allowed to depart for Rajgad. How far Shivaji could go in his efforts to remove suspicions about himself can be seen from the following letter which Prince Muazzam wrote on 9 March 1668: "His Gracious Majesty has elevated your head by granting you the title of Rajah, which was the extreme point of your desire."

The words 'extreme point of your desire' are very suggestive. They make one feel that Shivaji had made a request for the title.

Shivaji secured a free hand from the Mughals to seize as much of Bijapur territory as he could. This territory included what was known as Bijapur Balaghat, comprising the present districts of Satara, Sangli and Kolhapur. For this, Shivaji had to bide his time. His immediate anxiety was to ward off the danger from Bijapur and hold on to Konkan. Rustum Zaman, the Bijapur general, had captured Phonda and certain other places in 1666. He had however restored the fort of Rangna to Shivaji. The Bijapur State made efforts to recover Konkan through its generals like Abul Muhammad and others. These efforts failed and Shivaji recovered all his possessions excepting Phonda and Jambavali Panchmahal.

Shivaji's territories now ran parallel to those of the Portuguese in south Konkan.

The Portuguese had entered into an agreement with Jai Singh on 17 November 1666, one of the terms of which was that: "The Portuguese should not protect in their kingdom a man who rebels against the Mughal Emperor, and should consider him as a rebel against the King of Portugal." Shivaji could not have failed to notice Portuguese involvement with the Mughals. But the immediate cause of his invasion of Portuguese territory can be gauged from the following paragraph.

The Desais of south Konkan, who had fled from their possessions in south Konkan into the Portuguese territory, had made Goa their base of operations. They would make incursions into Shivaji's kingdom. The Desais—Lakham Sawant, Keshav Naik and Keshav Prabhu, were secretly encouraged by the Portuguese in their activities. Among these Desais, Lakham Sawant and his nephew Narba Sawant of Kudal were staying in the Portuguese territory of

Bardesh. It was to flush these 'refugees' out and teach the Portuguese a lesson that Shivaji suddenly invaded Goa in November 1667.

According to the Dutch, Shivaji arrived at Rangna on November 8. He camped in the vicinity till the seventeenth. He had 5,000 infantry and 1,000 horsemen with him. On November 20, he made a sudden incursion into the Bardesh territory. He plundered three of the principal villages on that day. Within three days he overran nearly the whole of Bardesh before the Portuguese could offer resistance. Shivaji's prime objectives were to plunder and carry away the rebel Desais, who were under the protection of the Portuguese. The Desais escaped capture. They had already fled from Bardesh to Goa. But the havoc wrought on Portuguese territory was considerable. The punishment was swift and severe. Wild contemporary rumours of atrocities coupled with the recent views put forth by some modern historians, that it was a religious war, have been disproved by the extensive researches conducted by Pissurlencar and other historians. It was a purely political war. The Portuguese had been taught a lesson well.

Shivaji left the Portuguese territory on November 23. Peace negotiations were started. A treaty was signed by the Marathas on 12 December 1667.¹

The Marathi and the Portuguese versions of the treaty are preserved in the Goa archives. The treaty provides for, among other things, the release of prisoners, cattle and goods, and the Portuguese assurance to keep a watchful eye on the activities of the Desais.

The original temple of Saptakotishwara situated in Diwadi had been demolished by the Portuguese in A.D. 1540. The same shrine was raised by the Hindus in the adjacent region in 1558. This shrine, situated at Narva, in Bhatagram, was badly in need of repairs. In November, Shivaji got the shrine renovated.

Shivaji's respect for all religions and saints of all creeds is well known. His religious activities, while they provided for assistance to shrines and tombs of various faiths, also included construction, renovation, and reconstruction of desecrated temples. Shivaji had no patience with senseless

vandalism. No retribution seems to have been his aim.

It was at this time that the French too received permission from Shivaji to carry on trade and commerce in his kingdom. They opened a factory at Rajapur in Konkan. This is suggested in the diary written by Francois Martin. On arriving at Calicut on his way to Surat he was informed by the French on 17 January 1669, that "they (Faes and J. Bourean) had been to Rajapur and had seen there Rajah Shivaji, who received them well and gave them permission to trade and establish themselves in his lands."²

The British, who had established themselves in Bombay in 1665, had taken note of the above concessions to the French. The British were confined only to the island of Bombay. The island of Salsette (Thana and nearby places) was under the Portuguese. The British had no access to the mainland. They tried to secure the town of Pen in Shivaji's territory. They fondly imagined that "it is true, it lies in Shivaji's country but as Shivaji is become Aurangzeb's vassal, he is to do whatsoever is commanded by the Prince." The efforts came to naught.

Shivaji's aim had always been to destroy the power of the Siddis of Janjira in Konkan. They were a challenge to his supremacy in the coastal region. As officers, first of Ahmadnagar and then of Bijapur, they stuck to their stronghold in Janjira. They were now looking to the Mughals for their support. The British and the Portuguese too were at hand to support them. These and Shivaji's continuous involvement with Bijapur and the Mughals, saved them from extinction. By the treaty with the Mughals, Shivaji was assured of full control in Konkan. Thus Janjira was under his sphere of influence. He laid siege to Janjira. The British wrote in October 1669:² "The Siddi is much straitened by Shivaji Rajah, who though he cannot storm the place, only thinks to starve him out notwithstanding the grand Mughal command to withdraw his forces; so the Siddi resolves to hold it out to the last and then hath thoughts of delivering it up to the Mughal who hath an army about Kalyan commanded by Lodhi Khan."

¹Hataikar, *Relations Between the French and the Marathas*.

²*English Records on Shivaji*, p. 135.

The British were even contemplating possessing Janjira for themselves. The Portuguese actively assisted the Siddi to resist Shivaji. Under the treaty of 10 February 1670, they even offered to mediate between Shivaji and the Siddi. Shivaji could not tolerate this interference in his region. He was now convinced that the Mughals were bent upon circumscribing his activities in whatever direction they thought necessary and advisable.

It was while the siege of Janjira was in progress that the war between the Mughals and the Marathas broke out. It was to last for 37 years, until the death of Aurangzeb in A.D. 1707.

WAR WITH THE MUGHALS

ACCORDING to historian Bhimsen Saksena, the confiscation of *mahals* in the *jagirs* of Samhaji and the departure of the Marathas from Aurangabad was the cause of rupture. But according to Shivaji's biographer, Sabhasad, the cause of the conflict was the suspicious nature of Aurangzeb and the latter's bid to disarm and imprison men and officers of the Maratha contingent at Aurangabad.

The *Jedhe* chronicles note as follows: "From seventeenth August to fifteenth September 1669, Aurangzeb caused havoc in Benares and destroyed temples. In the month between fourteenth December and eleventh January 1670, peace between the Mughals and Shivaji came to an end. Prataprao and Anandrao, who with their contingents were with the Prince Muazzam at Aurangabad, returned to Rajgad."

The letter of President Gary of Surat dated 23 January 1670, draws attention to the policies of Aurangzeb. It says: "The arch rebel Shivaji is again engaged in arms against Aurang Shah, who out of a zeal for reformation hath demolished many of the gentile temples and forced many to turn Mussulmins." It must be remembered that Aurangzeb's general order for the demolition of temples was issued in April 1669. The Benares temple of Vishwanath was, however, razed to the ground in September of the same year.

Aurangzeb's policy of buttressing his rule by relying on orthodoxy was extremely short-sighted. It hurt the overwhelming majority of the people. It caused a deep anguish to the deeply religious and tolerant nature of Shivaji.

During the years of enforced peace, Shivaji quietly devoted himself to building up his strength. The forts were strengthened through repairs. Strong garrisons were stationed in them. The army was put on a war-footing. It was a national

army comprising neither foreigners nor mercenaries. Shivaji looked far and wide for ammunition, guns and weapons to arm his army. The Deccan State of Golconda had moved closer to the Marathas. Bijapur had given up its hold on Konkan for good.

Shivaji could not have chosen a better time for his attack. The Viceroy of the Deccan, Prince Muazzam, was unwar-like and peace-loving. There were no outstanding Mughal generals in the Deccan at that time. Only Daud Khan Qureishi, the governor of Khandesh, was active and energetic. The Mughals were caught unawares. Aurangzeb was faced with troubles in the north-west and in the Jat region of Mathura.

In 1670, Shivaji burst upon the Mughals with a fury that stunned them. His first aim was to clear his homeland of the Mughals. It will be recalled that in accordance with the treaty of Purandar, Shivaji had to cede 23 forts and territory worth four lakh Hons or about sixteen lakh rupees.

Shivaji attacked the Mughals wherever he found them—on the forts, in the valleys and in cities. The struggle was a bitter one. Fort after fort went down to Shivaji; some after heroic struggles. A popular stirring tale relates to the capture of Simhagad (near Poona) by the Marathas on 4 February 1670. The assault was led by the noted Maratha warrior Tanaji Malusare. The fort was stoutly defended by Udai Bhan, the Rajput commandant. The two leaders fought a duel which resulted in their death. The fort passed on to the Marathas. The loss of the brave Tanaji saddened Shivaji beyond measure. He is said to have cried in anguish, "I have won a fort but lost a lion."

The equally strong fort of Purandar fell to the Marathas on 8 March 1670. The commandant, Razinddin, was captured. The Marathas scaled the fort of Lohagad and captured it. The same fate befell the fort of Rohida.

There was utter chaos among the Mughals. The Marathas were fighting in every part of the Deccan. The Mughal newsletters are full of such reports. For instance, the newsletter dated 24 January 1670, says: "Shivaji's forces are plundering the province of Berar. They have collected twenty lakh rupees from the Imperial territory."

"Barkhurdar Khan, the governor of the fort of Ausa

(now in Osmanabad district, Marathwada), wrote: 'Shivaji's troops consisting of twenty thousand men have arrived in this region. The Marathas are plundering the province and collecting booty. They are camping two *kos* (about six km) from the fort. Shivaji has plundered my *jagir*. I have no means of subsistence left. I may be favoured with some money.' The Emperor remarked, 'Many more persons will, on the plea of being plundered by the Marathas, be asking for assistance. How is it possible to redress their grievances?'"

The fort of Mahuli was gallantly defended by Manohardas Gaud, the Mughal commandant of the fort. The Marathas withdrew. But Manohardas, acutely aware of lack of arms, ammunition and provisions, offered his resignation. He told the Mughal general, Daud Khan Qureishi, "There are not enough men in the fort. Arms and ammunition too are not sufficient. The enemy is numerous. And yet I defended the fort with my utmost strength. To defend it further is beyond my power. I resign from my post. I have defended my honour. This is my greatest asset."

Daud Khan tried his best to persuade Manohardas to change his mind, but to no effect. Left with no alternative, Daud Khan posted an officer Allahwardi Khan, temporarily to the post of the commandant. The garrison was augmented by an addition of 200 soldiers. Daud Khan returned to Junnar. (It was at Junnar that the contemporary historian Bhimsen Saksena obtained his employment under him).

The Marathas were waiting for this opportunity. No sooner was Daud Khan out of the way than Shivaji attacked Mahuli. Allahwardi Khan died fighting. Mahuli, the important fort of Konkan, passed into the hands of the Marathas on 15 June 1670.

Earlier the Marathas had captured Kalyan and Bhiwandi. The commandant, Uzbek Khan, was killed. The Mughal officer Lodhi Khan, severely wounded, fled from the region. According to Bhimsen, a number of Mughal officers arrived in Aurangabad in a very miserable condition.

Soon afterwards the fort of Prabhavalgad near Matheran, fell to the Marathas. Karnala, nearby, was the next to be captured on the 23 June 1670. By the end of June, the Marathas had captured Simhagad (February 4), Purandar

(March 8), Kalyan (March 15), Lohagad (May 13), Mahuli (June 16), Karnala (June 22) and Rohida (June 24).

Diler Khan's Conflict with Muazzam

Diler Khan, who had been campaigning in the Gond area arrived in the Deccan to conduct campaigns against the Marathas. His relations with Prince Muazzam and his advisor, Maharajah Jaswant Singh, were correct but not cordial. Soon a conflict broke out between them. Diler Khan was on the run, being pursued by Muazzam and Jaswant Singh. Aurangzeb sent Diler Khan to Gujarat and ordered Prince Muazzam to turn back. Jaswant Singh too was transferred shortly thereafter. Surprisingly, Prince Muazzam called on Shivaji to assist him in the pursuit of Diler Khan. This could easily have been a trap. Shivaji wisely declined to walk into it.

From January to September, the Mughal government was practically in a state of paralysis. On top of it came the shocking news that Shivaji had once again struck a deadly blow to Surat.

Marching with an army of 10,000 cavalry and the same number of infantry, and accompanied by famous generals and officers, like Pratap Rao Gujar, the Peshwa Moropant, and others, Shivaji moved from Kalyan and took the same route as followed during the first attack on Surat. The route lay through the present day Thana, Nasik and Dang districts. Shivaji approached the walls of Surat on 3 October 1670. The garrison fled under the shelter of the castle guns.

The *English Records* on Shivaji note:¹ "The Marathas possessed themselves of the whole town. The Tartars could keep their houses no longer, but in the night, having conveyed away their King to the castle, left their house a prey to Shivaji, where he found a vast treasure in gold, silver, rich plate, a gold bed and other rich furniture. In the interim, the enemy ransacked the great houses at leisure and found therein vast treasures and rich goods; set fire in several places destroying near-half the town to the ground."

Shivaji departed from Surat on the third day, carrying with him an enormous booty estimated at more than fifty lakhs

of rupees. The justification for Shivaji's attack on Surat is made clear in the following letter addressed to the governor and prominent citizens of Surat:¹ "I demand for the third time, which I declare to be the last, the *chauth* or the quarter part of the revenue under your government. *As your Emperor has forced me to keep an army for the defence of my people and country, that army must be paid by his subjects.*" The underlined sentence should provide a clear understanding of Shivaji's aims and objectives.

The plunder of Surat came as a great shock to the Mughals. Prince Muazzam, as Viceroy of the Deccan, immediately ordered Daud Khan Qureishi, the governor of Khandesh, to intercept Shivaji.

The district of Dang (now in Gujarat state) and the *taluka* of Satana, Kalvan, Surgana and Peth (now in Nasik district) were during Mughal times known as Baglana and formed a district in the province of Khandesh. So also did the area between Dhulia and Manmad (now the Nasik district) constitute a district under the province of Khandesh. Its headquarters was the Galna fort, 22 km north of the town of Malegaon.

The present district of Nasik is divided from east to west by a range of hills (Chandwad range) from near Manmad to the temple of Saptashringi at Vani. North of this range was the district of Baglana bordering the rich province of Gujarat. This range of hills had nearly ten forts—Chandwad, Indrani, Kanchan Manchan, Dhodap, Ahivant, Achalagiri, Hanumantgad, Markand, and Saptashringi.

On his way back from Surat, Shivaji plundered the town of Mulher, the headquarters of the Baglana district. He then moved south towards the hill range. It was while he was crossing the range at Kanchan Manchan that he came up against the Mughals. We have excellent accounts in contemporary Marathi and Persian works on the battle of Vani Dindori. Both Sabhasad and Bhimsen Saksena have written about it. The battle of Vani Dindori (it should be really known as the battle of Kanchan Manchan) is one of the few battles with the Mughals in which Shivaji participated.

¹ *English Records* on Shivaji, p. 173.

¹ Sarkar, *Shivaji*, p. 187.

This is in brief what Bhimsen Saksena, present in the battle, says: "On hearing that Shivaji was approaching the Kanchan Manchan pass, Daud Khan reached Chandwad in the night (16 October 1670). The *faujdar* of Chandwad, Baqi Khan had taken refuge in the fort. He met Daud Khan. In the midnight, messengers brought the news that Shivaji had crossed the Kanchan pass and was moving towards Nasik. Leaving his small baggage in Chandwad, he moved forward. Galib Khan, Naroji and Baswantrao were in the rear guard. They moved with the baggage. (Author Bhimsen, who was an officer, accompanied them.) The advance guard was led by Ikhlās Khan Miyana, grandson of Bahlol Khan (of Bijapur) and son of Abdul Karim. He had a *mansab* of five thousand. With his small contingent, he reached the place of action early. He found the Marathas drawn up for action. Hot-headed as he was, Ikhlās Khan, without waiting for Daud Khan to join up with him, rashly attacked the Marathas. The attack was a disaster. Ikhlās Khan was badly wounded and brought down from his horse.

"Meanwhile Daud Khan had hurried to the scene of action. (According to Bhimsen, the Maratha army exceeded 15,000 in strength). Daud Khan immediately sent, Makarand Khatri, his own brother Shaikh Safi, and Purohit Bhan—an officer of the Rajah of Chanderi, and Sangram Khan Ghori to the assistance of Ikhlās Khan. He himself joined them later. There was a deserted village on a small hillock with a stream running around. The baggage was left there in charge of Baqi Khan and Ibrahim Pauni Khan. Instructions were given that further baggage and the rear guard moving from Chandwad should be detained in the deserted village. (It was there that Bhimsen joined Baqi Khan.) The officers sent by Daud Khan fought against the Marathas. In the fight the Mughals suffered heavy losses in men, dead and wounded. Sangram Khan, his sons and relatives were wounded. It was the Bundelas with their guns who stopped the Maratha attack from developing.

"Meanwhile Daud Khan had arrived on the scene. He lifted Ikhlās Khan from the field. The Marathas kept up their technique of fighting, known as *bargigiri* (meaning a continuous attack) while surrounding the enemy from all sides.

"In another part of the field, Mir Abdul Mabood, the captain of the artillery (a friend of author Bhimsen) was attacked by the Marathas. Mabood's son and a few soldiers were killed while Mabood was badly wounded. (He was rescued by Baqi Khan and Bhimsen and brought to the camp.)

"At that time, Daud Khan had no more than two thousand troops with him. The Marathas attacked the Mughals once again in the evening. The Mughals resisted. The Marathas then disengaged and moved away with the Surat treasure.

"The Mughal aim was to intercept Shivaji, and Shivaji's aim was to brush aside the Mughals and convey the treasure from Surat, swiftly and safely. In this he succeeded. The Mughals lost heavily both in men and material." It was in this place that Abdul Mabood, now restored to consciousness, handed over his charge temporarily to author Bhimsen. Bhimsen concludes that it was a Mughal victory.

"The Mughals arrived at Nasik the next day. The wounded persons were sent to Aurangabad. The Mughals camped at Nasik for nearly a month before moving to Ahmadnagar."

Maratha Raids

Even while the Mughals were camping at Nasik, the Marathas, under the Peshwa Moropant, attacked the strong fort of Trimbak and captured it on 25 October 1670. This was followed by the capture of the forts of Aundha, Patta, Ravla and Javla (southern part of modern Nasik district).

The Marathas carried fire and sword in the province of Berar. In November 1670, Shivaji attacked Karanja, a rich town in Berar. The town was plundered for three days and literally dug out.

The havoc wrought by the Marathas in the settled Mughal provinces can be illustrated by the following petition of Rajah Udaram of Mahur (then in Berar, now in Nanded district), dated 13 January 1671: "In the meantime Abdullah Khan Shirazi was appointed as the *faujdar* of the Mahur *sarkar*. Shivaji's army has laid waste the Pargana of Umberkhed included in Udajiram's *jagir*. The enemy is in the area and is demanding *chauth* from every Pargana. The entire *jagir* of Udajiram has been laid waste."

The raids by Shivaji in Mughal territory extended from

Umberkhed in Berar in the east to Nandurbar in Khandesh in the west. The term *chauth*, later to play a decisive role in later Maratha history, begins to appear from now on in Mughal and Marathi documents.

Plainly, Shivaji threw the Mughals off balance. He kept them on the run. He expelled them from his Konkan homeland and the territory south of the Bhima river. He made it secure against Mughal attacks. The best way to defend it would have been to carry the war into Mughal territory and keep the enemy occupied. Shivaji's strategy was to create large-scale disturbances in the provinces of Aurangabad, Nanded and Berar, by laying waste the *jagirs* of the Mughal officials, by levying *chauth* and by attacking forts and important places. Occupation of territory in these provinces was not his aim.

It was in the Baglana district of the province of Khandesh that Shivaji seized and held Mughal territory. The Mughals looked upon this territory as under settled administration, i.e. as Imperial territory (*mulk-e-badshahi*). Shivaji's acquisitions so far had been at the expense of Bijapur. So it was the first time that he decided to occupy and hold permanently a slice of the Mughal Empire.

Occupation of Baglana meant securing a base for operations against Gujarat. It also meant a permanent threat to the Mughals in the rich region of Khandesh. In the eighteenth century, the Dabhades and the Gaekwads moved from their bases in Baglana towards a permanent occupation of Gujarat.

Shivaji had already seized the forts in the western part of the hill range running east to west in the district of Nasik. North of this range were the important forts of Salher and Mulher, the latter being the headquarters for the Mughal district of Baglana. Shivaji had his eyes on the capture of Salher (today Salher happens to be only a few metres away from the Dang district of Gujarat) which could provide immediate access to Gujarat.

Shivaji's plan was to draw Daud Khan Qureishi away from the latter's camp near Manmad. The Marathas approached Burhanpur, the capital of Khandesh. Daud Khan had left his son, Hamid Khan, in charge of Burhanpur. The Marathas plundered Bahadurpura, a suburb of Burhanpur.

On receiving appeals for help from his son, Daud Khan hurried towards Burhanpur. The Marathas promptly moved to Salher and laid siege to it. Daud Khan hurried after them. He was on his way from Mulher to Salher, 22 km away, when he learnt that the Marathas had captured Salher, and that the commandant of the fort, Fatehulla Khan had lost his life in the fight (5 January 1671). Salher marked the northernmost point of Shivaji's kingdom.

An interesting experience by Bhimsen Saksena, in this campaign, shows how the struggle cut across religious lines. Here are the words of Bhimsen, who in following Daud Khan to Salher, had lost his way: "Daud Khan had issued instructions that the heavy baggage should be deposited at Mulher. The force should leave early in the morning to march to the relief of Salher. Daud Khan left early. I was late. I had some infantry men with me when I moved towards the main army. By that time Daud Khan and the army had gone far ahead of me.

"I reached a deserted village situated between Salher and Mulher. There was a small hillock nearby. From the hillock where I was, I could notice a few soldiers coming towards us. They turned out to be Marathas. They arrived at the foot of the hillock. I was in a fix. The horseman approaching me turned to his comrades and said, 'You stay here. I think I recognise this horseman (myself).' He then approached me accompanied by two horsemen. He called me by my name and said, 'How do you happen to be alone here?'

"I was extremely frightened. I could not recognise the man. He said, 'I am Noor Khan.' He turned to the horsemen and said, 'Go back to your work.' He then turned to me and said, 'I will escort you to your camp and then return. It was good that we met, otherwise you would have lost your life.'

"It turned out that Noor Khan knew my father at Aurangabad. Later he lost his job and was in difficulties. He then gathered a few horsemen and sought service under Shivaji. He was posted in the Baglana region. Noor Khan accompanied me to Daud Khan's camp. I entertained him. I wanted to present a few gifts and cash to him. But he would not take them. He took leave of me in the afternoon."

Noor Khan in Shivaji's service and Bhimsen in Mughal service, helping each other, was strange! But then, nothing illustrates better the fact that the Mughal-Maratha conflict was basically political—the rise of the sons of the soil against an alien power and alien bureaucracy.

Aurangzeb appointed Mahabat Khan (son of the famous general who had captured Daulatabad in 1633 and thus ensured the extinction of the kingdom of Ahmadnagar) as the general to lead the campaign against Shivaji. Mahabat Khan, who was previously the governor of Kabul, arrived at Burhanpur on 3 January 1671. He called on Prince Muazzam at Aurangabad on 10 January 1671. Daud Khan¹ was appointed to the vanguard of Mahabat Khan's army. They captured the forts of Ahivant, Markanda, Javla and Anchlagiri (during April-May). Daud Khan too fought many stiff battles with the Marathas. But they did not loosen their grip on Baglana.

The only general with energy and drive on the Mughal side was Daud Khan Qureishi, the governor of Khandesh. He could not pull on with the lethargic and pompous Mahabat Khan. Daud Khan, in disgust, got himself transferred from the Deccan. He left in June 1671. Bhimsen, the author, who was in the camp of Daud Khan, chose to stay behind. He entered the service of Mahabat Khan.

The Mughals showed great unwillingness to campaigns during the rainy season. Mahabat Khan was no exception. He moved to the cantonment at Parner during the rains. While he idled away his time in frivolities, the Marathas moved from one end of the Deccan to the other.

Bhimsen, who was present in the camp of Mahabat Khan at Parner, gives an amusing account of the conditions in the camp.¹ He says, "Mahabat Khan's camp was at Parner. That year it rained very heavily. A great number of men and cattle perished in the epidemics. At Parner, Mahabat Khan was spending his days in luxury and indulgence. Every day there would be entertainments at the camp of one Amir or the other. There were four hundred dancing girls belonging to Kabul and Lahore in the camp. They used to be loaded with rewards. The Emperor was informed by somebody that Mahabat Khan

¹Saksena, Bhimsen, *Tarikh-e-Dilkusha*.

had a secret understanding with Shivaji and it was for this reason that he was not exerting himself sincerely to put down Shivaji."

Aurangzeb recalled Mahabat Khan from the Deccan and appointed Bahadur Khan as the governor of Gujarat, in his place. The recall of Mahabat Khan took place in September 1671. Bahadur Khan was accompanied by veterans like Diler Khan, Qutbuddin Khan and others.

Battle of Salher

Bahadur Khan began his campaign energetically. Raids were carried out in Shivaji's territory and many battles were fought. But the greatest disaster to Mughal arms resulted from the battle of Salher, early in 1672. The Mughals had laid siege to the fort of Salher. Its capture had become a point of prestige for the Mughals. But Shivaji was determined to force the Mughals to raise the siege.

Sabhasad, biographer of Shivaji, has given a graphic description of the battle. The Maratha army consisted of veterans like the Peshwa Moropant, the commander-in-chief Prataprao Gujar and others. It was a great battle. The Mughal army was routed bag and baggage.

Bhimsen too writes: "In the battle, Ikhlas Khan Miyana and Muhkam Singh were wounded and captured. Muhkam Singh's father Rao Amar Singh Chandrawat was killed in the battle. The entire equipment of the Mughals was captured by the Marathas. Bahadur Khan left hurriedly for Salher but, by the time he reached Baglana, the Marathas had descended into Konkan. They carried away the entire booty captured from the Mughals." The battle of Salher figures prominently in Marathi chronicles and ballads. The Hindi poet, Bhushan, has also devoted more than one forceful stanza to the description of the battle.

Aurangzeb was passing through a troublesome period. The frontier tribes were in open revolt. Aurangzeb appointed Muhammad Amin Khan, son of the late prime minister, Mir Jumla, to the governorship of Kabul province. Amin Khan was attacked by Afghan rebels while passing through the Khyber Pass. It was a disaster for the Mughals. Muhammad Amin lost his son. His womenfolk were captured. He himself

escaped with great difficulty to Peshawar. Aurangzeb sent Fidai Khan to Peshawar. Mahabat Khan was appointed to the governorship of Kabul where he remained from December 1672 to December 1673.

The Satnami rebellion in 1672 in the Mewat district was another source of distraction to Aurangzeb. It was with great difficulty that the rebellion was crushed.

The Mughals under Bahadur Khan fought vigorously against Shivaji. They instigated the Siddis of Janjira to raid the coastal territories of Shivaji. They even despatched a small naval force, miserable as it was, from Surat to increase the resources of the Siddis.

So far, the British treated Shivaji as a nuisance and a rebel against the legally established authority of Aurangzeb. But with Shivaji's successful defiance of the Mughals, their entire tone changed as is obvious from these few letters:

30 March 1670—"The proceedings of Shivaji give some weight to this opinion, for he marches now, not before as a thief, but in gross with an army of thirty thousand men, conquering as he goes and is not disturbed though the Prince lies near him."¹

30 August 1670—"Knowing how much this island must be beholding to the opposite main, which Shivaji possesses at this time, who hath his spies here in all places and can tell from what place his enemies are supplied."²

22 February 1671—"Now we are mentioning of Shivaji, we think it very advisable that you keep a fair correspondence as with all princes in India, so with him (Shivaji) now in power, and this you may lawfully do from Bombay."³

Bijapur was sorely tempted to add to Shivaji's difficulties. But Shivaji had his own plans and was only biding his time.

Golconda in Turmoil

Of the three Deccan States of Ahmadnagar, Bijapur, and Golconda, the kingdom of Ahmadnagar was extinguished by the Mughals. The Mughals had never hidden their ulterior

motive to absorb the remaining States of Bijapur and Golconda in the Mughal Empire. With the treaty of 1635, Golconda virtually accepted the position of a tribute-paying feudatory. Bijapur, however, was treated differently as a price for its collaboration in the extinction of the Ahmadnagar kingdom.

Peace with the Deccan States lasted for 20 years. It was the ambitious Aurangzeb, who as the Viceroy of the Deccan, struck at Golconda in 1656 and secured abject terms from that weakened State. Aurangzeb then invaded Bijapur in 1657. Shah Jahan's illness and the resultant civil war forced Aurangzeb to rush to the north. The Mughals repeated the campaign against Bijapur in 1665. This time it was Jai Singh, who as the general of the Mughal army, attacked Bijapur. The invasion failed to achieve its purpose.

The Deccan States were in a state of perpetual apprehension. And yet they could not join together to fight the Mughals. In both the States, elements collaborating with the Mughals were active.

Shivaji's aim was to broaden his activities against the Mughals. Bijapur was witnessing a power struggle between the Pathans on one side, and the Deccani Muslims and the Siddis (Abyssinian descent), on the other. But in Golconda, an opportunity presented itself to Shivaji of which he took full advantage.

Abdullah Qutb Shah, King of Golconda, died on 21 April 1672. He was succeeded by his son-in-law, Abul Hasan, who was to be the last of the Golconda kings. The Maratha chronicle, *Jedhe Shakavali*, tersely describes Shivaji's alliance with Golconda in the following words: "Shivaji's envoy, Nirajipant, went to Bhaganagar (Hyderabad), made an alliance for one lakh of Hons, and returned to Shivaji bringing sixty six thousand Hons with himself.

"An alliance with the other Deccan powers for resistance to the Mughals—an alliance, which in keeping with Shivaji's political struggle, cut across religious lines—was in the offing."

Shivaji was by now firmly determined to rouse as many elements against the Mughals as possible. His meeting with the young Bundela Rajput chief, Chhatrasal, an official under the Mughals, has been graphically described by Chhatrasal's

¹English Records on Shivaji, p. 144.

²Ibid, p. 159.

³Ibid, p. 190.

Chhatrasal in Bundelkhand and with Golconda's stiffening posture, new openings were discovered with Shivaji's inspiration. The Mughal-Maratha conflict, owing to Aurangzeb's orthodox policies, assumed the form of a nationwide struggle against intolerance and senseless aggression. It cut across all religious and provincial barriers. Thus the attitude of the school of scholars, which views Shivaji's struggle as parochial or communal, in the face of the above evidence can only be regretted.

In 1672, while Bahadur Khan took over charge as the commander-in-chief of Mughal forces in the Deccan, Prince Muazzam continued as the Viceroy of the Deccan. Aurangzeb now recalled Muazzam and appointed Bahadur Khan as the Viceroy. Muazzam reached the court and sought an audience with the Emperor on 25 July 1672.

The Mughals were clearly entangled in the western parts of the present Nasik district, Baglana. This was due to the grand strategy of Shivaji. To prevent the Mughals from marching south into his homelands, he kept them busy fighting in the thick jungles of Baglana. While maintaining his hold there, he led the Mughals in pursuit of the Marathas towards the borders of Golconda and to the north, in the direction of Berar and Khandesh. The Mughals, at times, carried raids upto Poona.

Bahadur Khan set up his cantonment at Pedgaon on the Bhima river, 93 km south of Ahmadnagar and named it Bahadurgad. He built a fort there. Bahadurgad was to form the advance base for the Mughals till the death of Sambhaji in 1689.

Shivaji's wars of occupation in Nasik district and widespread incursions in the Deccan achieved the desired security of his homelands. It took the Mughal generals first and Aurangzeb next a span of 19 years, to clear the Marathas from Nasik and plan a descent to Konkan. Shivaji, thus made his kingdom secure against Mughal attack not only during his own reign but also that of his son. It was only after his son's death that the Mughals could descend into Konkan and march towards Poona and the forts surrounding it.

This war revealed Shivaji as a great general and strategist. Even today his military moves deserve a deep study.

court poet, Lalkavi, in his biographical poem *Chhatraprakash*.¹ In 1672, Chhatrasal left the Mughals, journeyed to Poona, stayed for a considerable time with Shivaji and received training in arms. Shivaji advised him to go to Bundelkhand, organise resistance to the Mughals and liberate his motherland. He tied a sword to Chhatrasal's waist and gave his blessings to him. He then gave him leave to return to Bundelkhand to fight the Mughals.

Here is a translation of his words to Chhatrasal, "O, illustrious Chief, we have never been strangers. Hurry up to your country and destroy the Mughal armies. Do not be cowed down by the Turks. If they are elephants, you are a veritable lion who will destroy them. The Turks are devoid of prudence and wisdom. They spurned us. The Goddess Bhawani guided me. The Mughals could not have their own way. We returned to our country skilfully. The Mughals have now sent their generals against us. We have unsheathed our swords against the Turks. We will strike against them. You go to your country. You wield your sword and destroy the Turks.² Have the remembrance of God Brijnath in your heart, and hold the sword in hand. Be confident that these two (faith in God and sword in hand) will protect you. If I keep you here in my service, your deeds will be credited to me. Therefore, return to your country and beat the Mughal forces. Let us hear the news of your great and good victories.' Having said this, he called for the sword and tied it to Chhatrasal's waist. He then bade a respectful farewell to Chhatrasal. Shivaji was very happy." Later in his old age, Chhatrasal himself wrote to his son about this visit: "I went to Poona and met Shivaji; I stayed with Shivaji for a long time (*Shivaji ke pas Poona gaye thal; Shivaji ke pass hum bahot din rahe*). I received training in archery, etc. (*Vidya seekhi, ban chalavo vagaira*)."³

Chhatrasal's subsequent career is well known. With

¹*Chhatraprakash*, ed. by Dr. Mahendra Pratap Singh, Sri Patal Prakashan, New Delhi, 1973, pp. 88-89.

²The ethnic reference to the enemy as Turks and not Moslems is significant. This puts the struggle in proper perspective.

³*Aitihāsik Pramanavali Aur Chhatrasal*, ed. by Dr. Mahendra Pratap Singh, Sri Patal Prakashan, 1975, p. 120.

In manner, method and timing, the Mughals were clearly out-matched by this remarkable man.

Nor was the heterogenous Mughal army free of tensions. Bhimsen, the historian, has this revealing incident to report: "Bahadur Khan camped on the banks of the Bhima river. The Afghan soldiers of Diler Khan were rude and evil-minded. They plundered the wayfarers. One of the wayfarers was killed. The son of Bahadur Khan conducted an inquiry into the affair. To impress the Afghans, Bahadur Khan got ready his artillery. The Rohillas, without caring for his guns surged forward. Bahadur Khan ordered the artillery to fire. In a short time six hundred Rohillas were killed."

7

THE 1673 WAR

WHILE the war with the Mughals continued, Ali Adil Shah, the ruler of Bijapur, died on 24 November 1672. This opened up fresh horizons for Shivaji. Shivaji's attack on the Mughals was primarily to expel them from *swarajya*, his homeland, and defend it against them. He had made incursions into Mughal territory and seized forts and some territory in the present district of Nasik. It was a part of his grand strategy, to divert the Mughals from their southward advance, to turn them towards the east, to seize the route to Gujarat, and keep a firm hold on it.

This was the only territory—the western part of Nasik together with its forts—which Shivaji had taken from what was unquestionably Mughal territory. Its occupation was a part of his aim to keep his homeland secure.

Shivaji was under no illusion about the annexation of large chunks of Mughal territory. No power, spread all over India as the Mughals were, could even think of keeping quiet while a chunk of its territory was being sliced out. Shivaji knew that the Mughals would fight hard to clear the Marathas from the district of Nasik. It is a tribute to his genius that he made them fight for 19 long years before they could plan an invasion of his homeland. But that invasion came only in 1689, nine years after Shivaji's death and eight years after Aurangzeb's arrival in the Deccan.

With Bijapur, it was a different story altogether. It must not be forgotten that Shivaji's State was mostly (excepting the small Mughal region in Nasik) carved out of the kingdom of Bijapur. Shivaji now held the Poona and Konkan territories. The treaty of Purandar with the Mughals gave him freedom to seize what was then known as Balaghat, and in which are included the present districts of Satara, Sangli, Kolhapur and

the adjacent territories in the present state of Karnataka (portions of Belgaum, Karwar and Dharwar).

With the death of Ali Adil Shah, the State of Bijapur was once again thrown into a turmoil. Repeated sabotage was steadily pushing the State towards disintegration. The accession of Sikandar Adil Shah to the throne, at the tender age of four, signalled the outbreak of rivalries among the nobles for seizure of power. The Pathans, who had no role to play in the politics of Golconda, had become a force to reckon with in the politics of Bijapur. This threw the Abyssinians and the Deccani Moslems in the opposite camp. The struggle was resolved only by a virtual carving out of the State.

The prime minister, Abdul Muḥammad, who had carried on the administration for nearly 12 years was not anxious to form a new government. He had secured the consent of Adil Shah to the following set-up for the kingdom: (1) Khawas Khan, the son of former prime minister, Khan Muhammad Khan Khanan (1648-1657), was to act as the guardian of the boy-King and carry on the administration; (2) Abdul Muḥammad was to keep Naldurg and Gulbarga under his possession. He was to defend Bijapur against the Mughals, if necessary; (3) Abdul Karim Bahlol Khan, the leading Pathan nobleman of Bijapur, was to be in charge of Panhala and Miraz and to carry on the campaign against Shivaji; (4) Muzaffar Khan was to be placed in charge of the Carnataca district.

Shivaji was waiting for such an opportunity. He immediately struck at Bijapur. He attacked the strong fort of Panhala and captured it on 6 March 1673. He stayed at Panhala for a month directing further operations against Bijapur. The fort of Parli, later to be famous as Sajjangad, the seat of Sri Ramdas, fell in April 1673. Satara fell on July 27. Predictably Bijapur reacted violently to this invasion. The capture of Panhala and the battle of Umrani form the theme of two contemporary works—one in the Deccani Urdu by Nusrati, the court poet of Bijapur, and the other in Sanskrit by Jairam Pindye, the celebrated author of *Radha-Madhav-vilas Champu*.

Khawas Khan had made great preparations to meet the threat posed by Shivaji. Jairam writes: "Taking leave of the King, Bahlol Khan arrived at Tikota. Two days later, he was

at Umrani (58 km west of Bijapur). There he was asked by Khawas Khan, the prime minister, to call on the assistance of Sharza Khan and Muzaffar Malik who were camping near the fort of Rangna. The other Bijapur general, Siddi Masud of Adhoni, Abdul Aziz of Karnool and Khizr Khan Panni of Naldurg were instructed to contact Diler Khan, the Mughal general, and persuade him through gifts to render assistance in men and arms."

Bijapur was aiming to launch an attack on Shivaji.

Meanwhile, Shivaji never allowing the enemies to unite against him, decided to strike at Bahlol Khan before the latter could be joined by his generals. Under his instructions, the Maratha commander-in-chief confronted Bahlol Khan in March 1673.

The versions of the battle given by Jayaram Pindye, Sabhasad and Nusrati point to a heavily contested battle. The Marathas hemmed in Bahlol's army and blocked its access to the water-source. The bitter fight lasted till sunset. Casualties were heavy on both sides. By about sunset, Bahlol's men, after a desperate effort, gained access to water.

During the night, probably as a result of some secret understanding, the Marathas withdrew. Shivaji blamed his general, Prataprao Gujar, for allowing Bahlol Khan to escape. Prataprao must have had his own reasons for allowing Bahlol Khan to get away. Casualties must have been heavy. Probably reinforcements were on their way to Bahlol's camp.

The Marathas moved southward and attacked the town of Hubli. In the general plunder of the town, which took place in the second week of April, a British factory suffered some loss. The British sent Thomas Nicolls to Shivaji to settle the case of damages sustained earlier at Rajapur and later at Hubli. Their factories had suffered in Khandesh as well.

We have a detailed description of the British mission to Shivaji which lasted from May 19 to 17 June 1673. The British were encouraged by Shivaji's refusal to the Dutch offer of assistance in the capture of Danda Rajpuri, in return for Shivaji's attack on Bombay with an army 3,000 strong while the Dutch fleet under Reickloff Van Goens captured the port

and fort of Bombay.¹ No doubt, Shivaji had very carefully considered the Dutch offer before rejecting it. The mission of Nicolls, interesting in the light it throws on the personality and thinking of Shivaji, was not exactly successful.

Shivaji was wary and cautious in dealing with foreigners. While assurances on minor matters, such as exemption from customs for wood and timber transport, were agreed to, the British claims for compensation for damages sustained at Rajapur or Hubli were kept pending.

With regard to such claims Shivaji's attitude was what any wise ruler would adopt. After all, the Marathas and the Mughals were in a state of war. If the Marathas caused losses to Mughal territory and the Mughals failed to protect their subjects, the claim for compensation would need to be lodged with the Mughals and not with the Marathas. As such Shivaji could not accept the claims of the British. He had not forgotten how they had aided Siddi Jauhar with arms and ammunition in the siege of Panhala in 1660. He was also aware of how they and the Portuguese sided with the Siddi in the Maratha-Siddi conflict. They were clearly not happy at the rise of a powerful Maratha State in their neighbourhood. Naturally while Shivaji could allow the British to trade in his State, his prime aim was the protection of interests of the Maratha State.

The Mughals

For his negligence in arriving late at Hubli, Muzaffar Khan, the governor, was disgraced by the government of Bijapur. He was stripped of all authority. He rose in rebellion against the government. Mian Saheb, the deputy-governor of Karwar, too, broke into rebellion. Bijapur was thus kept busy in curbing its unruly elements. Bahlol Khan, who had taken up his position at Kolhapur, alone kept up a running fight with the Marathas. With a firm foothold in Kolhapur, Shivaji's operations took him to the adjacent Carnataca districts. The Marathi chronicle, *Jedhe Shakavall*, records that Shivaji plundered Bankapur on 10 October 1673.

¹ *English Records* on Shivaji, 28 March 1673, p. 240.

The British, at Bombay, were visibly impressed by Shivaji's single-handed fight against Bijapur and the Mughals. They wrote: "Shivaji is not in so ill a condition as they wrote him to be. He rather despiseth and beareth up himself manfully against all his enemies."¹

Affairs in the north-west were not proceeding smoothly for Aurangzeb. Muhammad Amin, the governor of Kabul, who had been disgracefully defeated by the Pathans on 6 May 1672, was replaced by Mahabat Khan. Rad Andaz Khan was the next Mughal general to proceed to Peshawar on 17 November 1673 with instructions to quell the Pathans. He too was ambushed and killed by them on 24 February 1674. Aurangzeb was plainly worried by these ugly developments in the province of Kabul.

The Mughal general, Bahadur Khan, did make valiant efforts to check Shivaji. He even made incursions into Shivaji's territory now and then. Bhimsen Saksena refers to one such successful fight. He says: "This time news came that the Marathas had gathered in force in the Poona region. Leaving his baggage and heavy equipment at Chambhargonda, Bahadur Khan went in pursuit of the Marathas. In the ensuing fight, Shubhakaran Bundela fought with great gallantry. The Marathas were repulsed." Judging from a reference in the *Masire Alamgiri*, Aurangzeb's biography by Saqi Mustaid Khan, this battle must have taken place sometime in September 1673.² Bahadur Khan's assistant, Namdar Khan, the deputy-governor of Baglana, had earlier in one of his letters to Aurangzeb, boasted of having defeated the Marathas near Salher on 3 June 1673.

Battle of Nesari

In this battle, Shivaji had to mourn the loss of his energetic commander-in-chief, Prataprao Gujar. He had blamed Prataprao for allowing Bahlol Khan to escape in the battle of Umrani. Stung to the quick, Prataprao rashly fell upon the camp of Bahlol Khan at Nesari on 24 February 1674. The inevitable happened. Prataprao was killed in the attack.

¹ *English Records* on Shivaji, p. 283.

² *Masire Alamgiri*.

He was succeeded by Hambirrao Mohite as commander-in-chief of the Marathas in April 1674. Even earlier, Prataprao's second-in-command had rallied the army for raiding the surrounding Bijapur territory. Bahlol Khan was in pursuit of Anandrao. The Mughals under Diler Khan too joined Bahlol Khan. Here is a graphic description given by Narain Shenoy, the agent of the British, in his letter of 4 April 1674. He writes:¹ "Diler Khan and Bahlol Khan made great haste to fight with Anand Roy, but he, seeing two such valiant enemies before him, durst not fight them, and therefore, took his way towards Canara, journeying fifteen leagues per diem, he before and the two nobles following him, but after many days march not daring to effect anything but only to march after him, they both returned. Diler Khan went under Panhala to besiege it but stayed there for five days and returned to his former station and Bahlol Khan went to Kolhapur. Anand Roy (Anandrao) passing much inland robbed a city called Pench, eight leagues from Bankapur, which city belongs to Bahlol Khan's *jagir*, from whence he returned well-laden with three thousand oxen laden with goods, which Bahlol Khan and Khizr Khan understanding, they intended to intercept him with their whole army, encountering near Bankapur where happened a desperate battle; but Anand Roy got the victory. In said battle fell a brother of Khizr Khan, cousin of Bahlol Khan, and Anand Roy robbed the whole army and brought five hundred horses and two elephants and other things; Bahlol Khan and Khizr Khan fleeing away. Anand Roy on his return, leaving his booty with Shivaji, is gone again to Balaghat to rob more towns."

The above letter refers to Mughal designs on Konkan in the following words: "Bahadur Khan did desire to descend into Konkan but understanding that the Rajah Shivaji hath stopped the passages by breaking the ways and advances between the hills and keeping a constant guard there where the passages were most difficult, he returned from whence he came."

The same Narain Shenoy's letter of 4 April 1674, refers to a naval battle between the Mughal Admiral, Siddi

¹English Records on Shivaji.

Sambole, and the Maratha Admiral, Daulat Khan. The information was conveyed to Narain Shenoy by Shivaji himself. In his letter to the British, their agent Narain says: "I shall give Your Honour what news I have heard of Siddi Sambole in a few words. He engaged with Daulat Khan's navy in Satonly (Satawly, Rajapur) river where there was slain above one hundred men of the Siddis and forty-four of Daulat Khan's who gains the victory but is wounded with an arrow and it is reported that Siddi Sambole is likewise wounded and his hands burnt. He, not meeting with good success in the aforesaid river, is gone to Haresser near Vessing. This news Shivaji told me himself."

Negotiations between the British and Shivaji were brought to a successful conclusion in 1674. The British decided to send Henry Oxinden to Shivaji to get the treaty confirmed. And it was done on 12 June 1674. The British were happy that the Rajapur affair had been settled and that Shivaji had issued *kowlnama* (deed of assurance) on 6 April 1674, allowing them to trade in his territory. *The Articles of Peace, Union and Friendship* describes the contracting parties as "the Noble Prince Shivaji Rajah and the Honourable British East India Company." This is a far cry from the earlier British impression of Shivaji as a freebooter. They had travelled far from their original attitude. They even offered to mediate between Shivaji and the Siddis of Janjira, but the far-seeing statesman that he was, Shivaji firmly declined the offer. He was determined to teach a lesson to the Siddis. He even warned the British to keep away from the Siddis and stop any overt or covert help to them. The British wisely kept their counsel to themselves.

Rebellion against Bijapur had broken out in the Karwar region. It absorbed the entire machinery of the government. The rebellion ended only in April 1674 when the Bijapur government had recovered Kadra, Karwar, Ankola and Shiveshwar from the rebel Mian Khan and appointed Rustum Zaman as the Viceroy. Bijapur was in no position to take any aggressive action against Shivaji.

In the meantime, the rebellion of the Pathan tribes in the north-west had acquired serious proportions. Rad Andaz Khan (Shujat Khan) had lost his life, fighting the Pathans,

on 24 February 1674. Mughal troops were rushed to the north-west. Aurangzeb too followed on 7 April 1674. Bahadur Khan, the Mughal Viceroy of the Deccan, sent his best officers including Diler Khan to the north. There was lull in Mughal activities. The political revolution in Golconda, which had resulted in power passing into the hands of the native Andhra population, had brought it closer to the Marathas. Alarmed at Mughal designs aimed at its destruction, Golconda moved closer to the Marathas. The alliance of the Deccan powers against the Mughals was now becoming a reality than ever before.

Shivaji had now a compact territory and an efficient army under him. Mughals inactive, Bijapur distracted, Golconda friendly, the Portuguese weak and the British on good behaviour—this was the picture in totality of the Deccan in 1674!

It was while Aurangzeb was on his way to Hasan Abdal near Rawalpindi that Shivaji crowned himself King on 6 June 1674, and set himself up as a sovereign prince.

CORONATION AND AFTER

SHIVAJI'S coronation is a landmark in the history of India. During the period of Mughal supremacy, the Mughal Empire in India was equated by Indians and foreigners alike with the Government of India. International treaties and agreements with the Mughals were considered as treaties with India. 'The Great Mughal', 'The Mughal Sovereign', 'The Emperor of India', were some of the terms freely used in international parlance in those days.

Except on the fringes, such as Kerala in the south and the small foreign settlements on the coast, there was no State in India which could be called independent. There was direct Mughal administration in a major part of India. The only States left were the Rajput States in the north and the Deccan States of Bijapur and Golconda. The Rajput States had been fast reduced to the position of *jagirs* or *zamindaris*; the rulers could not claim to rule by right of heredity alone. Every succession had to be formally sanctioned by the Mughal Emperors. At the death of every Rajput ruler, the State was supposed to have lapsed theoretically to the Empire. New accession was treated as a grant *de novo*. On his accession, the ruler was appointed to a *mansab*, which was equivalent to do duty outside his State when called upon. He was liable to transfer from one place to the other. The Rajput rulers were employed as commandants of forts, officers of military outposts or second-in-command to a general. A Man Singh could conquer Orissa and subjugate Bengal, a Jai Singh could lead the Mughal army against Shivaji or Bijapur, a Jaswant Singh might be the governor of Gujarat, but these were exceptions rather than the rule. Most Rajput rulers held comparatively modest jobs.

Even Udaipur was no exception once it had accepted

Mughal sovereignty during the time of Amar Singh. The only concession the Maharana received was exemption from attendance at the court. The Maharana had a *mansab* in the Mughal army. Junior princes of the Udaipur house, similar to others, sought and found service under the Mughals. Contingents from Udaipur served in the Deccan. Rajput States were referred to as *watan jagirs*. The *mansabdari* system of the Mughals was slowly reducing the territories of Rajputs, eroding their autonomy and creating divided loyalties. Shivaji too was confronted with this crisis when his son Sambhaji defected to the Mughals and obtained *mansab* under them.

The ruling class under the Mughals consisted mostly of elements from Central Asia and Iran. The Indian element was very small. Even the Indian Moslems formed an extremely small percentage of the *mansabdars*. The Mughal rulers were very conscious of their Turkish ancestry. Under Shah Jahan, they even made attempts to penetrate into Central Asia, but failed to accomplish their aims.

With reverses in the north-west, in the east (Assam) and in the Deccan, Aurangzeb came to rely on the orthodox and the fundamentalists as apart from the liberal elements for his strength. The result was a number of measures which created a gulf between the rulers and the ruled. The Mughal newsletters, the contemporary histories and chronicles in Persian, and the vast material available in Indian languages are indicative of this alienation. The Pathans, the Sikhs, the Jats, the Bundelas, the Marathas were up against the regime. The struggle with the Rajputs was only a few years away. This lack of consideration for the feelings of the people explains the failure of Aurangzeb as a statesman.

Shivaji's coronation and setting himself up as a sovereign prince symbolises the rise of the Indian people in all parts of the country. It was a bid for *Hindawi Swarajya* (Indian rule), a term in use in Marathi sources of history.

However extensive the conquests of Shivaji, he was till 1674, technically a subject to the Mughal Emperor. The proud Maratha chiefs serving under the Mughals and the kings of Bijapur still thought of Shivaji as less in status than the Adil Shah of Bijapur. What was required was that the position which Shivaji had attained should be legalised and the

institution of monarchy established. The desire to have Shivaji crowned as King seems to have been widely held by all classes of people. It was however left to the great Brahmin scholar, Vishweshar *alias* Gaga Bhatta of Benares, to give expression to the popular sentiment. The Maratha historian, Sabhasad, who witnessed the ceremony, states: "Then one, Gaga Bhatta, having heard of the King's fame came from Benares to have an interview with him. He was distressed that while Muslim kings sat on thrones, held royal umbrellas above themselves and exercised sovereignty, Shivaji Rajah, who had dominated four kingdoms, created an army of seventy-five thousand horses, and captured forts, had no throne and did not exercise the rights of a sovereign. He expressed his opinion that the Maratha Rajah should be the King, the Lord of Umbrella (*Chhatrapati*). The King approved of it. All the principal men were consulted and they all concurred with the idea. Gaga Bhatta said to Shivaji, 'You should ascend the throne'."

Shivaji's aim was to set up an independent State. His continuous war with the Mughals, which started in 1670, shows his determination. After his coronation, Shivaji struck coins and started an era, both symbols of his independence. Later, Chhatrasal, the Bundela chief, to whom Shivaji had given training in arms and whom he had blessed, set up his own State in Bundelkhand (central India) and emulating the example of Shivaji, got himself crowned as King in A.D. 1687.

Subsequently, on May 19, Shivaji visited Pratapgad and paid his obeisance to Goddess Bhawani. He made an offering of a golden umbrella, weighing three maunds and costing 56,000 rupees, to the Goddess.

Shivaji was a Kshatriya, that is, he belonged to the warrior caste. But due to political turmoils, certain rites (*samskaras*) observed by the Kshatriyas could not be performed. Hence the sacred thread-ceremony had to be performed first. He was then weighed. Then a golden image of Vishnu (*tulapurush dan*) was given away. Then the marriage ceremony with his wives (for the second time) was gone through. These ceremonies took place on May 29 and 30 respectively.

The British agent, Henry Oxinden, who was present at Raigad, writes the following about the weighing ceremony:

"This day the Rajah, according to the Hindu custom was weighed in gold and paisas about sixty thousand Pagodas, which money together with one hundred thousand more is to be distributed after his coronation unto the Brahmins who in great number are flocked hither from all the adjacent countries."

The coronation ceremony was held according to strict Vedic rites. On the morning of 6 June 1674, Shivaji ascended the throne. It was truly a historic day. Sabhasad's graphic description runs as follows: "A golden throne weighing thirty-two maunds was made and inlaid with the choicest and most precious jewels of the nine kinds that could be procured from the treasury. Waters from the seven great rivers as well as from other considerable rivers and from the seas, and from renowned holy places were brought. Jars of gold were made. It was settled that the eight ministers should pour water from the eight jars. Then on the propitious day... The King mounted the throne. The throne was adorned with eight pillars decked with jewels. All the ceremonies and rites prescribed by the *Shastras* were observed on this occasion. The expenditure on account of this coronation ceremony amounted to one crore and forty-two thousand Hons. The eight ministers received a lakh of Hons each, besides one elephant, horse, clothes and ornaments. Thus the Rajah ascended the throne. Hitherto in this age, *mlechha* kings ruled over the earth. (The word *mlechha* referred to all foreigners, including Europeans. No particular religious group was intended. It could be translated as non-Indian). A Maratha King now was the first to become *Chhatrapati*. This was an event of no ordinary significance."

The description given by Henry Oxinden is equally picturesque. He says: "June the sixth (1674), about seven or eight of the clock. Went to court and found the Rajah seated on a magnificent throne and all the nobles waiting on him in rich attire; his son Sambhaji Raja, Peshwa More Pandit (Moropant) and a Brahmin of great eminence seated on an ascent under the throne, the rest as well as officers of the army as others, standing with great respect. I made my obeisance at a distance and Narain Senoy held up the diamond ring which was to be presented to him. He presently took notice of us and ordered

our coming nearer, even to the foot of the throne, where being vested, we were desired to retire which we did, but not so soon that we took note of on each side of the throne, there hung (according to the More's manner) on heads of gilded lances many emblems of government and dominion, as on the right hand were two great fishes, heads of gold with very large teeth, on the left hand several horses' tails, a pair of gold scales on a very rich lance-head poised equally, an emblem of justice and as we were returned to the palace gate there were standing two small elephants on each side, and two fair horses with gold bridles and rich furniture, which made us admire which way they brought them up the hill, the passage being so difficult and hazardous."

During this period, on 17 June 1674, Shivaji's mother, Jijabai passed away. She had been the greatest source of inspiration to her illustrious son in his life-long struggle. History can afford very few examples of the devotion and affection which mother and son had for each other.

The Mughals had chosen to ignore the coronation of Shivaji. On 24 September 1674, he repeated the ceremony, but according to tantric rites, to satisfy a considerable part of the population. Even this event was ignored. But Shivaji's war with the Mughals and their proteges—the Siddis of Janjira—continued. The Marathas carried out extensive raids in Berar and Khandesh "to the very walls of Burhanpur." The British complained that their factory at Dharangaon was damaged on 20 January 1675. During these raids, there was very little that the Mughals could do against Shivaji. Shivaji put steady pressure on the Siddis of Janjira. His warning to the British to stop affording facilities to the Siddis is revealed in their letter of 26 August 1674: "The President having received advice from Shivaji that if we admit the Siddi fleets to tarry any longer in our port, he will, notwithstanding the peace between him and us, fall upon his enemy in our harbour and declare war against us, inserting (inferring) that we show more favour to the Siddi than to him, which being seriously considered, ordered that the secretary and captain, Thomas Nicolls, be immediately sent to the Siddi to give him notice of the message Shivaji sent to the president and to declare unto him that himself and fleet must leave this port."

Territorial Expansion

But it was on further territorial gains at the expense of Bijapur that Shivaji had set his heart. The affairs in Bijapur were tempting enough for him to seize the Kolhapur uplands, Karwar, and round off his south Konkan possessions by eliminating Bijapur rule from the area. For this, the capture of Phonda, the seat of the Bijapur governor near Goa, was essential.

Shivaji was not sure that the Mughals would not rush to the assistance of Bijapur. He assured Bahadur Khan, the Mughal Viceroy, that he meant to be at peace with the Mughals. The amusing story of how Bahadur Khan was taken in by Shivaji's words is told by Bhimsen Saksena in the following words: "Bahadur Khan had no idea of the deception which Shivaji was up to. He forwarded the petition of Shivaji (for pardon so that his son could be sent to the Mughal camp) and himself wrote a letter to the Emperor. The Emperor was camping at Hasan Abdal near Rawalpindi. He wrote to Bahadur Khan, 'Do not be deceived by the words of that cunning person (Shivaji). Malik Barkhurdar is acquainted with my nature. You send your officers who are acquainted with the nature of the Hindus and also Malik Barkhurdar to Shivaji. Negotiate in a diplomatic way with him. Find out the motives of Shivaji in making a request for peace. Find out his general behaviour, make sure of these things and then write to me.'

"Bahadur Khan deputed his secretary Muhammed Sayeed, Gangaram Gujarati and Malik Barkhurdar to meet Shivaji. By this time Shivaji had carried out his secret designs. He had conquered Panhalgad (should be Phonda) from Bijapur. The officers deputed by Bahadur Khan met Shivaji in the fort of Purandar. Shivaji made excellent arrangements for their stay and received them well. This was on the the first day. Next day Shivaji said to them bluntly, 'What brave deeds have you done that I should make peace with you? Get away from this place soon, or else you will be disgraced.'

"The officers returned disappointed. They narrated the events to Bahadur Khan. He sent a report to the Emperor."

Meanwhile, Aurangzeb had, on the recommendation of Bahadur Khan, bestowed a *mansab* on Sambhaji. The entry,

in the *Masire Alamgiri*, of 7 July 1675, states: "At Zafar Jung's (Bahadur Khan's new title) request, Sambha, the son of Shivaji, was granted the rank of six Hazari, eighty lakhs of Dam as present, kettle-drums and banner, a robe and a *far-man* were sent with the mace-bearer."¹

While the Mughals were kept busy in negotiations, Shivaji's army spread itself out in the Kolhapur region. He himself marched to the conquest of Phonda, near Goa. It was while he was on his way to Phonda, that John Childe of the British factory met him at Rajapur on 22 March 1675. He has left an interesting description of his interview with Shivaji.²

Shivaji reached Phonda in early April 1675. According to *English Records* of April 1:³ "He hath an army with him of fifteen thousand horse, fourteen thousand foot and thousand measures (workers) with pick-axes, crows, hatchets, etc.

"He hath taken Kolhapur and report speaks he will soon have Raibag."

The siege of Phonda had begun. The governor of Phonda, Muhammad Khan, put up a stiff fight. He called in the Bijapur generals, Bahlol Khan and Rustum Zaman, for help. But Shivaji obstructed their descent into Konkan. As the *English Records* put it: "The Rajah had filled up the passages with trees cut down for the purpose and lined them with men." He also sent forty ships to Vengurla in order to exert pressure on Phonda. The Portuguese tried to help the garrison but without success. The fort was mined and bastions were blown up. Sabhasad, the biographer of Shivaji, mentions the gallant part played in the operations by Shivaji's officer, Ibrahim Khan.

Phonda fell to the Marathas on 17 April 1675. The governor of the fort, Muhammad Khan, was taken prisoner.

The Marathas pressed forward in the district of Karwar.

By May 21, the Marathas took Ankola and Shiveswar. Karwar too passed into their hands in the following month or two. Shivaji's territory now touched the river Gangavali, where it meets the sea south of Ankola. Bijapur had now been

¹*Masire Alamgiri*, by Sarkar, p. 88.

²*English Records* on Shivaji, vol. II, p. 44.

³*English Records* on Shivaji, vol. I, p. 41.

effectively cut off from all connections with the coast.

By July the Marathas had annexed Kolhapur. The British report on the Maratha capture of Kolhapur makes interesting reading. Writing from Raibag (near Kolhapur), on 7 August 1675, the British wrote: "the 30th ditto (July 1675). News was brought as early in the morning that Shivaji's party in Kolhapur had seized the governor there for the King. Many of the inhabitants were leaving the town but Shivaji's soldiers kept all in with promise of fair usage so that the townspeople are preserved in quiet and some security. Shivaji having to guard it, report speaks of about two thousand men and the Moor governor that was in it is carried to Panhala castle where he as yet remains a prisoner."

The serious loss of territory had thrown the affairs of Bijapur into confusion. The State was torn by dissensions between the Deccanis and Abyssinians on the one hand, and the Pathans, on the other. The Pathans were led by Bahlol Khan, while the rival party was led by Khawas Khan, the regent and prime minister. It was widely believed that Bahlol Khan had received handsome presents from Shivaji and a promise to abstain from attacks on his *jagirs*. In return he had remained purposely inactive during Shivaji's campaign.

Khawas Khan was clearly determined to recapture the territories which Bijapur had lost to Shivaji. He was also determined to cut down the Pathan party to size. He thus moved closer to the Mughals.

The Mughal Viceroy, Bahadur Khan, and Khawas Khan the prime minister of Bijapur, met at Pandharpur in October 1675. The terms proposed by Bijapur were: The sister of the boy-King Sikandar Adil Shah to be given in marriage to a son of Aurangzeb; the Mughals and Bijapur should strive jointly to destroy Shivaji's power; Aurangzeb should excuse the annual payment of *peshkash* from Bijapur; and Sikandar was to be given the title of Badshah.

Most of these terms were accepted. What Khawas Khan was keen on was the suppression of his Pathan rivals headed by Bahlol Khan. The Pathans went wild with anger against Khawas Khan for what they conveniently chose to call the betrayal of Bijapur. No sooner did Khawas Khan return to Bijapur than he was seized and thrown into prison (11

November 1675).

In revenge, Shaikh Minhaj, the head of the Deccani party in Bijapur, attacked the Pathans and killed Khizr Khan Panni, a leading follower of Bahlol Khan. Fearing that the Deccanis might make an attempt to get Khawas Khan released and restored to power, Bahlol Khan put Khawas Khan to death on 18 January 1676.

This was the signal for a bitter civil war in Bijapur. A great battle was fought near Adhoni (south of the Tungabhadra river) on 21 March 1676. The Deccanis were dispersed and fled to Golconda. Shaikh Minhaj made Gulbarga his headquarters.

The murder of Khawas Khan was a great shock to the Mughal general, Bahadur Khan. He saw the prize of Bijapur slipping out of his hands. Aurangzeb ordered Bahadur Khan to invade Bijapur. The Emperor had nipped the tribal discontent in the north-west. He had left Hasan Abdal near Rawalpindi on 29 December 1675. He was at Lahore on 31 January 1676. He was back in Delhi on 5 April 1676. To assist Bahadur Khan, Diler Khan arrived from the north in June 1676.

Meanwhile in 1675, Shivaji lay prostrate with a severe illness at Satara. Wild rumours spread. It has been reported in the *English Records* that he had been poisoned, and that his son Sambhaji was involved in the conspiracy. This was a baseless rumour. The illness must have lasted till the beginning of 1676, as we find Shivaji attacking Athni, a prosperous town in the kingdom of Bijapur in March 1676. According to the British, the booty carried away was worth three lakh Pagodas.

With the Mughals preparing to invade Bijapur, Shivaji was relieved of the danger of the Mughals and Bijapur combining against him. He offered his co-operation to Bijapur in its fight against the Mughals. Writing on 1 May 1676, from Surat, the British note: "Shivaji hath now taken the opportunity in these muddy waters also, and sided with Bahlol Khan, the general of Bijapur."

Bahadur Khan crossed the river Bhima on 31 May 1676.

The tough defence put up by Bijapur came as a shock to the Mughals. In the fierce battle of Indi fought on 13 June

1676, the Mughals barely escaped a shattering defeat. Baffled, Bahadur Khan recrossed the Bhima river and laid siege to the fort of Naldurg. Here too, he had to withdraw the siege. Bijapur had received assistance from Golconda.

An Unholy Alliance

Bahadur Khan was now in a desperate position. He planned to annex all possessions of Bijapur north of the Bhima river, such as Naldurg, Akkalkot, Gulbarga. In his hunt for allies, he soon came to terms with Shivaji.

It was a heaven-sent opportunity. Since the time of Shaista Khan in 1660, Shivaji had repeatedly offered to co-operate with the Mughals in a joint campaign against Bijapur. After all, Shivaji had carved out his small State comprising Konkan and the uplands from Bijapur. Under Shaista Khan the Mughals had spurned offer, a step which was strongly criticised later by Mirza Rajah Jai Singh. A Jai Singh could force Shivaji to join him in the Bijapur campaign with the bait of Bijapur uplands (Balaghat) thrown in. But Shivaji's co-operation was not that of an equal. Shivaji could not be very enthusiastic about the campaign. In 1673, Shivaji wrested the Kolhapur Balaghat and the north Canara region from Bijapur on his own efforts.

And now the Mughals were seeking his help against Bijapur. Shivaji knew that the Mughals were closing in on Bijapur from the north. Bahadur Khan was shortly to annex the Bijapur territory, north of the Bhima river. In the west, the Pathans held *jagirs* in the districts of Dharwar and Bankapur. Immediately to the south were the States of Bidnur and Mysore, feudatory to Bijapur.

It was to the south-east, the Tamil provinces of Bijapur, that Shivaji turned his attention. Shivaji's half-brother, Vyankoji, an official of Bijapur had supplanted the previous dynasty in Tanjore and established himself there. If the Tamil provinces of Bijapur comprising today of the districts of North and South Arcot, could be conquered and Maratha power extended to the bank of the Cauvery, Shivaji's State could stretch from coast to coast. It must not be forgotten that the Marathas under Shahji and Vyankoji held Bangalore, Kolar, Hoskote, Dodda Balapur and a number of other places in Mysore

Carnataka.

Developments in the south too favoured Shivaji's ambitions. Raghunath Hanmante, an official of Vyankoji, and the latter's father Shahji, had come up from the south to report on the feasibility of the invasion. The State of Golconda had, under the influence of the ministers Akkanna and Madanna, been pursuing a defiant policy against the Mughals. It had also to settle territorial claims against Bijapur. The ministers of Golconda came to an understanding with Shivaji. Shivaji turned this alliance into a struggle of the Deccan powers against Mughal aggression. Shivaji's alliance with the Qutb Shahi kingdom of Golconda beautifully illustrates the political nature of his struggle.

There was no love lost between Shivaji and the Pathan invaders now dominant in Bijapur. Like all the other Deccanis, Shivaji considered the Pathan dominance in Bijapur as a foreign dominance. He rationalised this attitude by calling on the Marathas to consider themselves freed from allegiance to Bijapur.

Sabhasad writes: "Shivaji sent Nirajipant to him (Bahadur Khan) with a present of treasure, ornaments and precious jewels. A secret friendship was formed with him. He was told, 'I shall require one year to conquer the Carnataka. Do not molest my territories during that time.' Bahadur Khan was persuaded to that effect."

How a seasoned general could be persuaded and lulled into inaction during Shivaji's absence in the south is a riddle. Probably the intense efforts made to destroy Bijapur, added to inordinate vanity and greed, might explain this attitude. Later, Aurangzeb pretended that he had been kept in the dark about the alliance between Bahadur Khan and Shivaji. Before removing Bahadur Khan from the Deccan, and replacing him by Diler Khan, Aurangzeb plainly indicated that he had been shocked by the Bahadur Khan-Shivaji alliance.

Meanwhile, Shivaji made preparations to march to the south by way of Golconda. He made excellent arrangements for the administration of his State during his absence. Peshwa Moropant was in charge of the northern territory. The southern region was under the control of Annaji Datto, while the central region comprising Panhala was administered

by Dattaji Trimbak Wakenavis. Rahuji Somnath was to stay at Raigad and carry on the day-to-day administration.

Shivaji's son Sambhaji was now a grown-up, young man of nineteen. His mother had died while he was still a child. He had, however, been fondly brought up by his grandmother and Shivaji's mother, the saintly Jijabai. He had accompanied his father to Agra. He was also associated to some extent in the campaigns and administration of Shivaji.

The birth of Sambhaji's step-brother, Rajaram in 1670, and the subsequent increase in the influence of Rajaram's mother, Soyarabai, might have affected Sambhaji. Being keen, bold and daring as his father, Sambhaji had grown up into a headstrong youth. His youthful follies involving wine and women must have distressed Shivaji who was a model of moral rectitude. Shivaji had sensed that Sambhaji's presence at Raigad might not be, in the light of the fragile Mughal-Shivaji alliance, very desirable. After a great deal of deliberations on the political and domestic aspects of the case, he decided to send Sambhaji in 1677, to Konkan at Shringarapur. Sambhaji's wife, the celebrated Yesubai, came from that place. Sambhaji was given administrative charge of the region.

Here it may be recalled that in 1665, Shivaji's general, the famous Netaji Palkar had left Shivaji and joined the Mughals. He had, later, been arrested and taken to Agra. There he was converted to Islam. He was named Muhammad Quli Khan and posted to the north-west. Twice he tried to escape but was captured. Then in 1676, he returned to the Deccan with the contingents of Diler Khan. He quickly made up his mind and returned to Shivaji. Shivaji not only welcomed him, but reconverted him to Hinduism. The *Jedhe* chronicle states: "*Saka 1598, Nala Samvatsar, Ashadha Vaidya Chaturthi* (19 June 1976). Netaji Palkar took *prayaschitta* (repentance) and was purified."¹

By this act Shivaji reveals an extraordinary awareness of the needs of the times. Netaji had to remain a Mohammedan for nearly ten years before he was honourably accepted in the Maratha community.

Shivaji moved out of Raigad on the Dusserah day of 6

October 1676. He paid a visit to the holy shrine of Parshurama at Chiplun in Konkan. He then passed the Ghats to reach the village where he sought and secured the blessings of the saint Mauni Bawa. The famous saint and thinker, Samarth Ramdas, too had blessed Shivaji earlier, when the latter visited him at Chaphal (Satara district). Shivaji had great regard for Samarth Ramdas and had built a temple to Lord Rama at Chaphal. Shivaji made substantial grants towards the upkeep and maintenance of the temple and celebration of various festivals. He also requested Ramdas to take up permanent residence in the fort of Parli, now known as Sajjangad, 14 km from Satara. The saint agreed and moved into Sajjangad in 1677.

Shivaji sent a force under his general, Hambirrao Mohite, to engage the Pathans in the western districts of Bijapur. The Marathas came up against the Pathans under Hasan Khan Miana and his brother Qasim Khan, the latter being commandant of the fort of Koppal (Raichur district, Carnataca). A great battle was fought at Yalberga. After a desperate struggle which took place in January 1677, the Pathans broke and fled. Hasan Khan and his brother Qasim Khan were captured by the Marathas. Hambirrao then joined Shivaji who was on his way to Hyderabad.

And while the Mughal general, Bahadur Khan, conquered Naldurg, on 14 May 1677 and Gulbarga on 7 July 1677, to annexe Bijapur territories north of Bhima, Shivaji embarked on his campaign for elimination of the Bijapur rule from Tamil Nadu.

With the security of his kingdom ensured, strangely by the Mughals of all people, as a result of their blind drive against Bijapur, Shivaji arrived in Hyderabad sometime in February 1677. Abul Hasan, King of Golconda, and his ministers gave him a magnificent reception. The city wore a festive look. According to Sabhasad, the streets were sprinkled with saffron water and adorned with flower garlands. Banners and flags waved to and fro. Innumerable citizens assembled to have a glimpse of Shivaji. The women in the city performed his *arati* with lighted lamps and bowed before him. Gold and silver flowers were liberally showered upon Shivaji.

Shivaji was lodged in the Gosha Mahal, the palace of

¹Source *Book of Maratha History*, p. 29.

Qutb Shah.¹ As noted above, Golconda became a completely vassal State of the Mughals by the Deed of Submission, *Inqiyad Nama*, of 23 May 1636, by the royal pardon of 24 February 1656, followed by Aurangzeb's terms in April and finally the agreement called *Taahud*, of 4 May 1674. Madanna, who had become the prime minister, had set two aims before him: resist Mughal advances and settle territorial disputes with Bijapur by eliminating, if possible, the political influence of Bijapur in Tamil Nadu and replacing it by Golconda rule. The alliance with Shivaji worked in pursuance of these aims.

Shivaji had his own aims to pursue. He readily agreed to assist Golconda in its defiant stand against the Mughals. The destruction of the dominant Pathans in Bijapur being one of his aims, Shivaji welcomed the co-operation of Golconda.

Shivaji stayed for about a month in Hyderabad. According to the treaty, Abul Hasan agreed to pay a subsidy of 3,000 Hons per day so long as the campaign lasted. The conquests which Shivaji would make from Bijapur, excluding his *jagirs*, were to be handed over to Qutb Shah.

Shivaji left Hyderabad by the end of March 1677. His army consisted of about 16,000-20,000 cavalry and nearly 30,000 infantry. He moved to Karnool. He then visited the confluence of the rivers Krishna and Tungabhadra, and Nivratti Sangam. He also went to the famous Shiva shrine known as Mallikarjuna at Sri Shaillya on the Krishna river. He was overwhelmed by the religious atmosphere of the place. He even thought of renouncing the world. But he pulled himself up and moved south. Passing through the present district of Cudappah, he paid visits to the shrines at Kalahasti and Tirupati. By the first week of May 1677, Shivaji reached Pedda Polam, 11 km west of Madras.

The southern possession of Golconda included a small part of Tamil Nadu. Only the costal area a few kilometres south of Madras, and including Chingleput, was under Golconda. The districts of North and South Arcot including Cuddalore, and the town of Pondicherry were under Bijapur. Bijapur controlled the principalities of Tanjore and Tiruchirappally (former Tiruchinopally).

¹Aurangabadi, Lakshmi Narain Shafiq, *Bisat-ul Ganaim*.

The Bijapur governor of Tamil Nadu, Sher Khan, had his headquarters at Walgondapuram (now a village in the Tiruchirappally district). He was a partisan of the Pathan prime minister of Bijapur, Bahlol Khan. Nasir Muhammad, the powerful commandant of the fort of Jinji, happened to be the brother of the murdered prime minister, Khawas Khan, who had been a rival to Bahlol Khan.

This civil strife had spread to Tamil Nadu. Sher Khan was out to destroy Nasir Muhammad and take possession of Jinji. Driven to desperation, Nasir Muhammad offered to surrender the fort of Jinji to Golconda. It was a welcome offer.

It was at this time that Shivaji appeared on the scene. Since Shivaji was accompanied by a contingent from Golconda, it was easy to persuade him to hand over the fort of Jinji to Shivaji. Thus without much effort, this strong fort passed into the hands of the Marathas. Martin, a French officer at Pondicherry, writes in his diary:¹ "Nasir Muhammad, who only sought the means of preventing Sher Khan from rendering himself the master of Jinji, did not make any alteration to the terms and got ready to receive Shivaji as soon as he learnt that he was in Carnataca. One of our men returned on the twenty-eighth (May 1677). He had witnessed there the arrival of a detachment of one thousand horses from Shivaji's troops who encamped near the place. The commander had come there to confer with Nasir Muhammad. On the morning of the thirty-first we returned to Pondicherry... We were informed the same day that the agreement between Shivaji and Nasir Muhammad was concluded and that some troops of the former were already in Jinji. Nasir Muhammad had received a sum in cash and some territories with an annual rent of fifty thousand Ecus in perpetuity and he was preparing to leave the place with his family."

Shivaji then moved to Vellore and laid siege to it. Noticing that its capture would take time, he left a detachment to press on with the siege of Vellore, while he himself proceeded to reduce the surrounding districts.

Shivaji's aim was not loot and plunder. It was a permanent

¹Sen, *Foreign Biographies of Shivaji*, p. 269.

conquest he desired. Civil administration was introduced with the help of the considerable number of men Shivaji had brought over from various departments of Maharashtra.

Fortifications

He strengthened the defences of the area. The fort of Jinji received his special attention. Martin writes: "Shivaji, after having examined the site of Jinji, which offered great protection, gave orders to cut off a part and to erect new fortifications" and "they were vigorously labouring (in February 1678) at Jinji for demolishing a portion of the wall at that place and to fortify the area enclosed by it."

The Jesuits, writing in July 1678, state:¹ "Shivaji applied all the energy of his mind and all the resources of his dominions to the fortifications of all the principal places. He constructed new ramparts around Jinji, dug ditches, erected towers and executed all the works with a perfection that Europeans would be ashamed of."

At the same time, Sher Khan was trying to mobilize his resources against Shivaji. He had been instrumental in settling the French in Pondicherry. They, in return had captured Valdour, 24 km west of Pondicherry, from Nasir Muhammad for Sher Khan. Sher Khan called on the French for assistance. According to Martin, who had sent an envoy to Shivaji to request assurances of safety and security for the French, Shivaji administered a stern warning. Martin writes: "Shivaji assured our envoy that we might stay in complete security at Pondicherry without taking the side of either party; that if we offered the least insult to his people, there would be no quarter for us or for those of our people who were in the factory at Rajapur; that he would send a *havaladar* in a few days to govern Pondicherry and that we might have to live with him in the same manner as we had done with the officers of Sher Khan."

Sher Khan talked big when Martin met him on 29 June 1677. Sher Khan boasted that Bahlol Khan, prime minister of Bijapur, had given an ultimatum to the King of Golconda calling upon the latter to break up his alliance with Shivaji.

¹Srinivasachari, G.S., *A History of Jinji and its Rulers*, p. 228.

He said to Martin that if Shivaji sent only 4,000-5,000 horses against him he would hazard a battle.

Martin had his own doubts. According to him Shivaji's army consisted of 12,000 horses and many thousands of infantry. Martin felt that Sher Khan was hardly qualified for war.

The blow fell by the end of June 1677. Tiruwadi, now known as Terumallapadi, is on the Colhdan (Coladun river), about 27 km from Tanjore. In the battle Sher Khan broke and fled. He took refuge in the fort of Bhavangiri where the Marathas besieged him.

On July 5, Sher Khan surrendered all his territories to the Marathas. In addition he promised to pay 2,000 Pagodas in cash for which his eldest son was kept as hostage. Till the end he had hoped for help from Bijapur. It was a vain hope! Thus in one stroke Bijapur lost its Tamil Nadu territories and its influence in the States of Tanjore and Madurai.

Shivaji was confronted with the problem of Tanjore, which was under the rule of Vyankoji, his half-brother. Vyankoji had inherited the possessions in Mysore Carnataca and the Jinji region from his father Shahji. But the seizure of Tanjore and setting himself up as its ruler in January 1676 was a major achievement for Vyankoji. Bijapur could not undo this act of Vyankoji as it had no resources to do so, but it was plain that Vyankoji was still in a position of dependence on Bijapur.

Shivaji had toyed with the idea of taking over Vyankoji's possessions including Tanjore completely. He would have welcomed removal of Vyankoji to a substantial *jagir* in Maharashtra or in Golconda under the patronage of Qutb Shah. This was because of his determination to end all connection of Bijapur not only with Tanjore, but with Madurai and Mysore as well.

However, to achieve his purpose he formally called upon Vyankoji (when they met near his camp at Tiruwadi in July 1677) to agree to a partition of their ancestral possessions. Vyankoji sensed the working of Shivaji's mind. Taking alarm, he fled to Tanjore.

While Shivaji left Vyankoji in possession of Tanjore, he proceeded to annex all the territories held by Vyankoji in

Mysore Carnataca including Bangalore, Hoskot, Kolar and the Jinji region; in fact, all territory north of the Cauvery. It was at his camp in Tiruwadi that the rulers of Madurai, Mysore and the Palegars (minor chiefs) of Velour and Ulandur Petta sent in their agents to wait upon him.

The French have left a good description of Shivaji's camp suggesting wherein precisely lay the strength of Shivaji.¹ The French found that: "The camp of Shivaji was without pomp, without women. There were no baggages, only tents, but of simple cloth, coarse and very scanty, one for him and the other for his prime minister."

In another place, Martin states: "It will not be out of place to mention that the cavaliers of Shivaji ordinarily got for their pay two Pagodas per month. All the horses belonged to that chief who employed some grooms to take care of them. The cavaliers did not in any way meddle with them. There were ordinarily three horses for two men. This is what contributed to his usual celerity. He also frequently surprised his enemies who thought him to be far off when he fell upon them. The families of these cavaliers who belonged to these parts were stationed in the lands of the west coast of India. This is what attached them to his service. This chief also paid his spies liberally who have given him considerable facilities for his conquest by the sure information they have supplied him."

Quick cavalry movements and excellent, well-paid intelligence service were the main causes of Shivaji's success, according to the Frenchman. He also noted the simplicity of Shivaji's camp, the absence of women, the lack of heavy baggage. Nor did he fail to notice that Shivaji's horsemen were paid regularly and that they did not own horses. The horses were the property of the State. What a contrast to the slow-moving, *mansabdari*-ridden Mughal armies!

It was to Shivaji's camp that the Dutch, settled since long on the east coast, sent in their agents on 6 August 1677. They went to seek confirmation and continuance of the concessions granted by previous rulers. These were readily granted.

¹Sen, *Foreign Biographies of Shivaji*, pp. 306 and 316.

Dr. Ravindra Ramdas, a historian, has drawn attention to a particular clause in another trade agreement of Shivaji with the Dutch. The clause runs as follows: "Under the rule of the Mohammedans, you had unrestricted permission to sell and purchase men and women as slaves. But now in my territory you will not have permission for the sale and purchase of men and women as slaves. Were you to try you will be prohibited from doing so by my men. This clause must be scrupulously observed."¹ This concern for his fellow-human beings reveals Shivaji's conception of a welfare State.

Shivaji broke camp from the banks of the Coladun river on 27 July 1677. He visited the pilgrimage centre of Vradhachalam. On September 22, he reached Vanikamwadi, 64 km south-west of Vellore. In the beginning of October he was within two days' march of Madras. He might have visited the Durga temple in Madras. There is a tradition in that temple to that effect. Shivaji, in his correspondence with the British, had asked for some medicines. He also wanted the services of engineers to build new works in several forts and castles. While they supplied him with medicines, they politely declined his request for engineers.

For the administration of the newly-won province, Shivaji made excellent arrangements. Raghunath Narain Hanmante was made the Governor-General of the provinces of Tamil Nadu and portions of Carnataca were placed under his sway. To watch the movements of Vyankoji, Shivaji left a strong force under his commander-in-chief, Hambirrao Mohite.

It was a wise move. Bitterly resenting the loss of his territory north of Coladun, Vyankoji seized the opportunity of Shivaji's absence to attack his forces. This was in November. As expected he was defeated and had to flee to Tanjore. Shivaji's forces could have occupied Tanjore. Shivaji however left Tanjore to Vyankoji. The rest of Vyankoji's possessions, as a result of the treaty, passed on to Shivaji.

The State founded by Vyankoji at Tanjore continued till 1799, until it was taken over by the British. The Maratha rulers of Tanjore were great patrons of art and literature. They patronised Sanskrit, Tamil, Telugu and Marathi

¹English Records on Shivaji, vol. I, p. 137.

scholars. The Saraswati Mahal library of Tanjore, which houses thousands of Sanskrit, Tamil, Telugu and Marathi language manuscripts and is rightly regarded as an institution of national importance, is one of the many good works left by them to posterity.

Relentless March

Shivaji left Tamil Nadu by the end of October 1677. He crossed the Ghats and passed through Carnataca, reducing Vyankoji's possessions on the way. Vellore, in Tamil Nadu, was surrendered by its Bijapur commandant on 21 July 1678.

Shivaji's troops had a brush with Mysore on their way back. Shivaji was plainly in a hurry to return home. The alliance with the Mughals was at best a fragile one. Hardly had Bahadur Khan wrested Naldurg and Gulbarga from Bijapur when Bahadur Khan's second-in-command, Diler Khan, got in touch with Bahlol Khan, the Pathan prime minister of Bijapur. Bahlol Khan's aim was to save Bijapur. Diler Khan complied. Bijapur could be saved only if Mughal arms were diverted against Golconda. Both Diler Khan and Bahlol Khan complained to Aurangzeb that Bahadur Khan was in alliance with Shivaji and that the latter was being befriended by Golconda. Bahadur Khan should clearly be removed. Bahlol Khan and Diler Khan would then march against Golconda to punish it.

Strange to say, Aurangzeb was taken in by these arguments. This was the tragedy of Mughal policy in the Deccan. In 1656, Prince Aurangzeb, then Viceroy of the Deccan, could have destroyed Golconda, but the astute Mir Jumla, ex-minister of Golconda and now the prime minister of Shah Jahan, out of anxiety for his Carnataca *jagirs*, persuaded Aurangzeb and Shah Jahan to attack Bijapur. Golconda gained respite. In 1660, Shaista Khan spurned the offer of Shivaji to assist in the campaign against Bijapur. Rajah Jai Singh's unprepared campaign against Bijapur, with a reluctant Shivaji on the side of the Mughals was singularly ill-advised. The result was that the Mughals had to return baffled. And then the conspiracy against Bahadur Khan by his own generals halted the destruction of Bijapur.

With Bahadur Khan on his way to the north, Diler Khan

and Bahlol Khan invaded the territory of Golconda. They reached Malkhed, 35 km east of Gulbarga in September 1677. Fierce battles were fought for two months. In the face of stiff opposition, the Mughals could not advance. At last in October, the Mughals retreated to Gulbarga. It was a disgraceful retreat, the Mughals having to fight their way back. It took them 12 days to cover a mere distance of 35 km.

Soon Bahlol Khan was stricken with a mortal illness at Gulbarga. It was Abul Hasan, King of Golconda, who brought about a reconciliation between Siddi Masood, head of the Deccani party in Bijapur, and Bahlol Khan. Siddi Masood was to take charge as prime minister while Bahlol Khan would be paid enough amount to clear the arrears of his army's payments. Diler Khan too had a hand in the reconciliation.

It was at this time that Bahlol Khan died on 25 December 1677. The Pathans had to, after so much commotion, yield to the Deccani party.

Diler Khan struck a hard bargain with Siddi Masood. Bijapur was to be fully obedient to the Mughal Emperor. The Mughals would assist Bijapur in destroying Shivaji while the sister of the Bijapur King, Sikandar Adil Shah, was to be married to Azzam, son of Aurangzeb.

Shivaji was keenly watching these developments. He saw how Bijapur, under Masood, was now committed to a policy of war against him. Shivaji had to contend against Mughal resolve to continue the war against him. Bahadur Khan was no longer in the Deccan. The shadow of a Mughal-Bijapur alliance against him was looming large. He could not tarry long in the south. Within a short space of six months he effectively eliminated Bijapur from the south and established a solid base for Maratha defences. It took 20 years of war for the Mughals to oust the Marathas from the south, a fact which profoundly affected Mughal strategy in the Maratha war for Independence.

Succinctly describing Shivaji's achievements in the south, Martin writes; "It could be said that so sudden a revolution had never been witnessed, if we had not seen instances of greater revolutions in Europe."

On his way back, Shivaji touched Koppal (now in

Raichur district, Carnataca) Lakshmeshwar, and Belvadi, the last mentioned, a stronghold captured in February. Shivaji arrived at Panhalgad in his State in April 1678.

THE LAST TWO YEARS

THE WAR with the Mughals continued. The extent of Shivaji's kingdom has been noted by Martin who wrote after the fall of Vellore (North Arcot district, Tamil Nadu) in 1678: "The troops of Shivaji had pushed their conquest further in other provinces in such a way that we were assured that there was only a distance of about thirty leagues by road between his estates on the coast of India and his conquest in these parts."

Diler Khan had forced Siddi Masood, prime minister of Bijapur, to accept stiff terms. The allies did make some attempts against Shivaji but without success. Meanwhile, Diler Khan received a strong rebuke from Aurangzeb. The latter wrote: "Why did you allow Siddi Masood to take over Bijapur? The Afghans are in a state of distraction. The Deccani chiefs too are divided among themselves. Win them over. Take them in Imperial service and lay siege to Bijapur."

Thus Diler Khan had to do what Bahadur Khan had all along been pursuing, namely, work towards the destruction of Bijapur.

Diler Khan camped at Bahadurgad during the rainy season of 1678. While preparing for war against Bijapur, he encouraged a number of defections and desertions from that strife-ridden State. Aurangzeb issued definite instructions that the defecting officers should be provided with suitable *mansabs*. Payments to them, however, were not to await the fixation of *mansabs*. They would start receiving an immediate payment of a salary of six annas per day for each horseman of their contingent. Bhimsen Saksena, author of *Tarikhe Dilkusha*, writes that in a short time 20,000 horsemen deserted Bijapur and Golconda to join Diler Khan.

In the meantime Prince Muazzam arrived in the Decca

in October 1678, to take charge as Viceroy at Aurangabad.

Diler Khan's greatest triumph was when he seduced Shivaji's son Sambhaji into joining the Mughals. The defection of his son came as a severe shock to Shivaji.

Sambhaji was a man of headstrong nature. He was the crown prince and heir to Shivaji. He was probably anxious to play a more active part in the administration than he was allowed. He had a feeling that his stepmother was working in the interests of her own child Rajaram, and that this might adversely affect his own future. He also felt that the ministers of Shivaji were working against him.

Shivaji did not take Sambhaji along with him in his campaign in south India. He posted Sambhaji outside Raigad, his capital, during his absence. Sambhaji probably attributed this step of Shivaji as indicative of a lack of confidence in him.

The Mughals were always striving to get at the weak spots of their enemies. The temptation of *mansabdari* was a strong one. It was the instrument which the Mughals successfully employed in the weakened Rajput States. Even the younger sons of ruling princes of Udaipur accepted *mansabs* under the Mughals, thus unconsciously helping to reduce both the extent and influence of the parent State.

A *mansab* for Sambhaji, received by Shivaji at Purandar (1665) and at Aurangabad (1667), had been asked for from Bahadur Khan in 1675. Sambhaji presumably rationalised the lure of the *mansab* on the above grounds. Sambhaji's self-justification is revealed in the grant which he issued to a Brahmin on 24 August 1680, wherein he said: "The Queen's mind was as pure as crystal. But the evil advice of the villainish ministers that the eldest son should not be given the throne had affected her. The King (Shivaji) was partial to the Queen and therefore against him. And yet he was never remiss in his devotion to his father. In the performance of his duty he was as Dasharathi Ram. He treated the wealth of one-and-a-half crore, the forts and the status of the King as insignificant as grass, and gave them up."

Although Sambhaji grandiloquently compared himself to Rama, the step which he took of joining the Mughals on 13 December 1678 was fraught with danger.

Diler Khan hailed Sambhaji's arrival with great joy. Aurangzeb made the young prince a *mansabdar* of 7,000, an honour bestowed on very few persons, besides giving him the title of Rajah.

Sambhaji's desertion must have been a severe blow to Shivaji. But that great leader of men did not lose his nerve. He kept up his efforts to persuade his son to return home. He drove a wedge between Bijapur and the Mughals, and offered all help to Bijapur.

Meanwhile Diler Khan and Sambhaji attacked the Maratha fort of Bhupalgad. The fort fell on 2 April 1679, mainly because the commandant of the fort was unnerved at seeing Shivaji's son leading the attack. Shivaji took stern disciplinary measures and suitably punished the commandant. The lesson was duly conveyed to all the garrisons and military posts in the State.

Failing to make any headway against the Marathas, Diler Khan turned his attention to Bijapur. Siddi Masood and Shivaji had by now entered into an alliance.

While Diler Khan made strong preparations to attack Bijapur, Aurangzeb was in no position to send either men or reinforcements to the Deccan. He had confiscated the State of Jodhpur following the death of Maharajah Jaswant Singh on 10 December 1678. He himself arrived at Ajmer on 19 February 1679. He tried to detain Ajit Singh, son of Jaswant Singh, born after his death, at Delhi. The Rajputs rescued the boy and carried him away on 23 July 1679.

Aurangzeb once again left for Ajmer on September 3 to deal with the Rajputs. Udaipur joined Jodhpur and put up a spirited fight against the Mughals.

Nothing illustrates Aurangzeb's policy of treating the vast majority of his subjects as second-class citizens of the Empire than his order imposing the *jazia*. Saqi Mustaid Khan, the pious secretary and biographer of Aurangzeb, states:¹ "As all the aims of the religious Emperor were directed to the spreading of the law of Islam and the overthrow of the practices of the infidels, he issued orders to the high *Dewani* officers that from Wednesday, the second April

¹Khan, Saqi Mustaid, *Masire Alamgiri*.

1679, in obedience to the Quranic injunction, 'till they pay commutation money (*jazia*) with the hand in humility, and in agreement with the canonical traditions, *jazia* should be collected from the non-Moslems (jimmies) of the capital and the provinces'."

The historian M. Athar Ali¹ suggests that to justify his coup of 1658-59, the orthodox Emperor closely allied himself with Moslem orthodoxy and pursued a discriminatory policy against the Hindus. Another reason was also his failure in military campaigns. About the Rajput campaign he suggests that the crisis in the *mansabdar* system tempted Aurangzeb to seize Rajput lands and that the resultant eclipse of the Rajputs was in line with the Emperor's new posture of militant orthodoxy. Aurangzeb's short-sighted policy of imposing *jazia* drew a spirited protest from Shivaji. Nothing emphasizes Shivaji's role as a nation-builder than the letter which he wrote to Aurangzeb. The tone, the dignity, the admonitions administered, the appeal to a higher humanity and finally the warning conveyed to the Emperor to desist from his ruinous course make the letter an important document in Indian history. Extracts from the letter run as follows: "Recently it has come to my ears that owing to your war against me your treasury has become empty. You have decided to meet the expenditure through the imposition of *jazia* on the Hindus. Your Majesty, in the Quran, God has been described as the *Rabb-ul-Alameen* and not as *Rabb-ul-Musalmeen*. In fact Islam and Hinduism are both beautiful manifestations of the divine spirit. The call for prayers is given in the mosques. Bells ring to the divine glory in the temples. Any one bearing fanaticism and religious hatred must be said to be acting against the command of God. To presume to draw lines on these pictures is verily to lay blame on the divine artist. To point out blemishes in any creation only means that you are blaming the creator. Do not do so.

"To be just, *jazia* cannot be justified on any grounds. It is an innovation in India."

Unabated Struggle

Shivaji sent a force of 10,000 horses to Bijapur to assist

¹Ali, M. Athar, *Mughal Nobility Under Aurangzeb*.

in protecting the city. Ten thousand oxen laden with grain were sent to Bijapur. People were ordered to transport grain to Bijapur. Shivaji's general, Anandrao, arrived with a cavalry force of 2,000-3,000 at Bijapur.

On 7 October 1679, Diler Khan was 10 km to the north-east of Bijapur.

Shivaji too arrived near Bijapur with a force of 10,000. After consultations it was decided that while Siddi Masood would defend Bijapur, Shivaji should carry devastations in the Mughal Deccan and force them to raise the siege of Bijapur.

Accordingly, while Diler Khan laid siege to Bijapur, Shivaji entered the Mughal provinces and raided wherever he went. The Viceroy, Prince Muazzam, was indignant. He wrote to the Emperor that the capture of Bijapur was a difficult task and that Diler Khan was squandering public treasury without reason. Stung to the quick by his failure, Diler Khan ravaged the countryside, plundering towns and taking the inhabitants as prisoners. Sambhaji protested against these senseless acts. In view of Shivaji's iron-discipline, Diler Khan, even with Sambhaji by his side, could not make any impression on the Maratha State. Sambhaji was by now repenting the rash step he had taken in joining the Mughals. At Shivaji's persuasion he escaped from the Mughal camp at Athni on 20 November 1679. He fled to Bijapur and later arrived at Panhala on 5 December 1679.

Shivaji was carrying out his lightning raids in the Mughal Deccan. He spread out to Berar and Khandesh. His spectacular feat was the plunder of Jalna, barely 64 km from Aurangabad, in the last week of November. While he was camping at the fort of Patta (also known as Vishramgad) on his way back from Jalna, he learnt of Sambhaji's escape and safe arrival at Panhala. Shivaji hurried to the fort to meet his son. It was a touching reunion with a repentant son falling at the feet of his father.

Diler Khan's efforts against Bijapur failed. Under stringent orders from Aurangzeb, he raised the siege of Bijapur on 29 January 1680. In spite of orders to return to the Mughal territory, he chose to attack the war-like Bedar chiefs, feudatories of Bijapur. Here too, he was badly beaten. The Mughal casualties were heavy. They lost 1,700 men, dead or wounded.

Confessing himself beaten, he finally crossed the river Bhima and camped at Bahadurgad. Both Diler Khan and the Viceroy, Prince Muazzam, were recalled to the court. Bahadur Khan was once again appointed as Viceroy in March 1680.

Ironically enough, once again a Mughal general had to retire in disgrace to add to the long list—Shaista Khan, Jai Singh, Daud Khan, Mahabat Khan, Bahadur Khan, Diler Khan, and Prince Muazzam. The Mughal policy of opportunism, lack of perseverance, and unscrupulous manipulations, first with one State and then with the other, had this result. In his later life, Aurangzeb, in one of his letters, complains of the negligence and incompetence of his generals in the Deccan as a result of which he himself had to arrive in the Deccan to lead the campaign. The blame for the failure of his policy lies squarely on Aurangzeb's shoulders only.

Shivaji's war against the British was the direct outcome of Shivaji's defence measures against the Siddis of Janjira, who were now manning the Mughal navy or what went by that name. Shivaji decided to fortify the island of Khanderi.

The British perceived this as a source of danger to their interests and tried to hold back food, etc. from reaching the island from the mainland. In September, Lieutenant Thorpe led a party to attack the island. The attempt failed. Thorpe Bradbury and Henry Welch were killed while several others were wounded. A number of people including George Cole, were held prisoners on the island. Reporting this, Captain Minchin of the ship 'Revenge' wrote on 19 September 1679: "I am now in a condition not able to defend myself if an enemy should approach, humbly desiring Your Worship to dispatch with all speed, fresh recruits or your further orders."

The British then decided to lay a regular siege of the island. Captain Richard Keigwin was appointed commander of the fleet. A naval battle was fought on 18 October 1679. After a stiff battle the Maratha navy withdrew but not before it had captured one of the British officers. The siege had failed; the Marathas soon began transporting freely, material from the mainland and fortifying the island.

The British knew that Shivaji was building up a considerable force on the mainland with a view to landing on the island of Bombay. The Siddis of Janjira too jumped into the

fray and kept up an attack on Khanderi. The Marathas defended it stoutly.

For the British, not only had the operations failed but proved costly too. The danger to Bombay itself could not be easily ignored. By the treaty of January 1680, the British withdrew their fleet from Khanderi. While issuing orders on January 27, to their fleet to return, the British wrote on January 31: "We could heartily wish Hendry Kendry business had never been. The latter (Khanderi) is that Shivaji's people are gone on and hold out to the admiration of all."

Thus ended the naval conflict between Shivaji and the British. The war with the Siddis continued languidly. With the Portuguese, Shivaji had a grouse for not remitting the *chauth* for Ramnagar as promised and had actually started making preparations against them. The Portuguese were a declining power and they knew it. They were intensely aware of the rising glory of the Marathas.

The war with the Mughals continued. Writing on 24 February 1680, from Chopda in Khandesh, the British note: "As to Shivaji's forces, they have plundered and burnt most of these parts (Khandesh) excepting the towns which pay him one-fourth part (*chauth*). His army under Moro Pandit (Moropant) continues still upon these borders endeavouring to take what castles they can. They have already taken Hanumantgad. Some speak as if they intend for Surat, others say Burhanpore."

With Aurangzeb involved against the Rajputs and with Prince Muazzam and Diler Khan ready to depart to the north, there was hardly any retaliation from the Mughals.

Shivaji rushed to meet his son Sambhaji at Panhalgad. There was a reconciliation between the father and the son. Shivaji sensed the need to associate his son more prominently in the administration and toyed with the idea of placing a substantial portion of the State, possibly the southern province under him. But no final decision could be taken.

Shivaji was to return to Raigad to arrange the thread-ceremony and marriage of his younger son, Rajaram. It was his desire to return to Panhalgad after the ceremony and make final arrangements regarding Sambhaji. Fate had willed otherwise! On his way from Panhala, he stayed for some time

with Saint Ramdas at Sajjangad.

The sacred thread-ceremony of Rajaram was performed on March 7. This was followed by his marriage on the fifteenth.

Soon after Shivaji fell ill (according to Sabhasad, of fever, and according to another chronicle, of *navajwar* or typhoid). After a short illness he died. The British attribute his death to a bloody flux, the Portuguese to an abscess (anthrax) and the Mughals to his vomiting out of blood. He must have probably died of fever and blood dysentery.

CONCLUSION

CONTRARY to rumours, baseless in themselves and originating long after, Shivaji's death was due to natural causes. An extraordinary career had come to an end. He had in the course of three decades carved out an independent State, challenged the mighty Mughal Empire and left a name which was to prove a never-failing inspiration to future generations.

Born in an aristocratic family and brought up under the influence of his saintly mother, Shivaji's catholic outlook enabled him to rever and respect all religions. Among the holy men he respected was Baba Yakub, a saint of Konkan. He made generous grants to religious shrines irrespective of caste and creed. The historian Khafi Khan has recorded that if any copy of Quran was discovered in the plunder, he had it returned to its owner with due respect. Similar was his treatment towards women and children taken prisoner during the wars. This deep sympathy for all men and their faiths could only come from a deeply religious nature. This is in refreshing contrast to the militant orthodoxy of Aurangzeb.

It would be wrong to depict the struggle of Shivaji against Bijapur or the Mughals as a struggle between the Hindus and the Muslims. When Shivaji appeared on the scene, Bijapur had already become a feudatory of the Mughals. It was declining in power and prestige. The Pathans, the Deccanis, and the Abyssinian elements in the State were contending for power. The Mughals were openly fishing in troubled waters. With the Bijapur nobles defecting to the Mughals or setting themselves up as semi-independent chiefs, it appeared perfectly natural for Shivaji to set himself up in his patrimony, which was also his homeland, and expand his territory. If a Siddi Jauhar could acquire independent areas in Karnool, if a

Pathan, Bahlol Khan, could defy the Bijapur government from his seat at Bankapur, then surely Shivaji, sprung from the soil and leading his own people, was perfectly justified in working for a Maratha State.

Shivaji's State was primarily carved out of Bijapur. Konkan and the Ghat uplands became his main base. The long struggle ended with Bijapur losing its southern provinces to Shivaji.

The Mughals under Shah Jahan preferred the existence of the Deccan powers, Bijapur and Golconda, as subordinate States to their annexation. It was Aurangzeb who as the Viceroy, was seized with the ambition of destroying these States. For the Marathas led by Shivaji, the struggle became a struggle for survival. While the Mughals aimed at expansion, the Marathas fought for the preservation of their homelands. It was a cause worth fighting and dying for. They were led by a man of no ordinary calibre.

Shivaji had the right personality required for leadership—fair complexion, medium stature, with every muscle taut with energy, a quick and flashing smile; he looked a born ruler of men. A Rajput, who saw him in Agra in 1666, describes Shivaji thus: "Small in build (*Deel so hakeer*) extraordinarily fair-looking (*ajalb goro*), looks every inch a King (*aaphi rajast deeso ji*)."¹

Men flocked to him. In him they found a leader who never hesitated to risk his own life in times of danger. Shivaji's meeting with Afzal Khan, his night attack on Shaista Khan, his visit to Agra, are only a few of the innumerable incidents which display his fearlessness. His military organisation shows him as a new pathfinder. He made full use of the Sahyadri range of hills to build up defences. Scores of new forts were built on the Ghats and the sea coast, while a number of forts were repaired and strengthened with alert garrisons. The forts of Pratapgad, Jinji, the sea-fortress of Sindhudurg among others, are the best tributes to his military engineering skill.

Shivaji's army was raised and directly controlled by him. It was devoid of the evils plaguing the *mansabdari* system of the Mughals under which the army was no more than a loose

combination of feudal levies. In Shivaji's army there was no pomp and splendour, and no slow movement as noticed among the Mughals. The army was paid in cash and that too regularly. All the horses in the army were owned by the State. The horsemen did not own them. The army movements were extremely quick. The French attribute the success of Shivaji to his rapid movements which often took the enemy by surprise.

Discipline in the army was very strict. The army was strictly enjoined not to damage standing crops. The plunder of the campaigns had to be deposited in the treasury, while in the cantonment, the army was to draw from its own supplies stored for the purpose. The army was expressly forbidden from molesting the civil population or making forcible purchases.

In recruitment to services, whether civil or military, there was no discrimination, no casteism, and no communalism. The army was primarily constituted of sons of the soil. Hindus of all castes, Moslems of the sea coasts, all found employment in the navy. To the Siddis of Janjira, Shivaji offered the command of the Maratha navy only if they agreed to join the national mainstream. As it was, a number of Moslem officers were in Shivaji's service—Ibrahim, the hero of Phonda, and Daulat Khan, the admiral, to name a few. While Shivaji's main strength lay in his cavalry and in his forts, it was in the field of navy that Shivaji can rightly be considered as an innovator. The Mughals had woefully neglected this branch. So much so, that for pilgrimages to Mecca, their ships had to seek security under the passports of the Portuguese.

It is indeed to the credit of Shivaji to have founded the Maratha navy in 1657. A number of coastal fortresses kept guard over the sea. The Portuguese, the British, the Siddis and the Mughals were thus effectively kept in check.

Nor were Shivaji's intelligence services neglected. This espionage system formed a well-paid and efficient wing of the Maratha army.

A Saintly Warrior

Bold and daring in person, Shivaji was an outstanding general of his age. He was aware of his limited resources.

¹*Rajasthani Records, Shivaji's Visit to Agra.*

He was conscious of the huge resources of his enemies. He took full advantage of every single weakness of the enemy. He watched their movements, he managed to corner them into difficult positions. Time and again he broke the combinations of enemies by driving a wedge between them.

His campaigns in Baglana in Nasik district in 1670, are a classic example of his war strategy. Unable to face the Mughal army poised to march into his territory south of Ahmadnagar, he struck in the western part of Nasik forcing the Mughals to turn in that direction and thus saved his homeland. Not only that, so effective was his occupation of the Nasik forts that it took the Mughals 19 years to clear the Marathas out of the region. This greatly altered the Mughal strategy in later years with adverse results.

Shivaji's successful raids in various parts of the Deccan threw the Mughals off balance. As in war, so in diplomacy. He widened the base of his movement to include other parts of India, as a part of his struggle against the Mughals. Chhatrasal, the hero of Bundelkhand, was encouraged by him to start the fight against the Mughals from his homeland. Shivaji was in contact with a number of Rajput princes who respected him.

While the militant orthodoxy of Aurangzeb and the consequent discontent enabled Shivaji to widen his struggle with confidence, he never made an attempt to exploit the religious issue. The Mughal Empire had enough weaknesses of its own. With an orthodox Emperor, proudly conscious of his Turkish race and holding Indians to little account, and with a Mughal bureaucracy mostly composed of men from Iran and Central Asia, the Empire's moral basis itself could be questioned. Native powers like the Marathas, the Bundelas, the Rajputs, and for that matter Pathans in the north-west, could have rightly blocked its expansion. It was a political struggle. Shivaji's alliances with Bijapur and Golconda show him rising above the narrow communal consideration.

Shivaji wanted the spirit of *dharma* to spread in the State. The word virtue conveys well the meaning of the word *dharma*. He strongly believed that in his activities a benevolent Providence guided him. In its tolerance and respect

for all faiths, Shivaji's State corresponds to the modern concept of a secular State.

The head of the State was the King. He was assisted by a council of eight ministers. Ministers, in addition to their departments, were placed in charge of specified provinces. There was no interference in the functioning of the judiciary. Customary law prevailed.

Shivaji strove to make his State a welfare State. The State moved closer to the cultivators. Shivaji frowned upon the alienation of land through grants. Only cash grants for services rendered were encouraged. The hereditary farmers of revenue—the Deshmukhs, the Deshpandes—were reduced in importance and kept under control by government officials.

As for cultivators, lands were brought under the plough, measured, and properly assessed. Illegal exactions were done away with. Widespread employment of youth in the army and other fields was no doubt a blessing to all classes of the people.

Nor were trade and commerce neglected. A set of practical regulations were laid down. Import and export levies were fixed and traders encouraged to settle down and develop a free flow of goods.

Men of culture, piety and letters were patronised. Shivaji's devotion to saints is well known. Tukaram, Ramdas, Mauni Baba, Baba Yakub are but a few among many, whose company he frequented. Literature too received liberal patronage under his rule. Sanskrit poets like Paramanand, Jairam, Gaga Bhatta and the Hindi poet Bhushan were honoured by him. His sponsoring of a lexicon, giving Sanskrit synonyms to administrative terms then used in Deccani Urdu, brought forth the *Rajyavyavaharkosh*. It can be described as the earliest and the only Urdu-Sanskrit dictionary to be compiled in A.D. 1679.

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